The Laughing Wolf

Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 201: Scenarios

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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If you would like to help me in my recovery efforts, feel free to hit the tip jar in the upper right or the fundraiser at A New Life on GiveSendGo. Getting hit by lightning is not fun, and it is thanks to your gifts and prayers that I am still going. Thank you.

Nuclear 201: Scenarios

First, for those who have persevered and gotten through: THANK YOU! My hosting provider Dreamhost sucks. Think I’ve been down more than I’ve been up the last few months. I’m now talking with two other providers to find out what it will cost to get their help migrating to an actual hosting provider. Particularly one that can handle basic blogging. I will add that to the fundraiser (getting hit by lightning and being out of work this long sucks even worse than Dreamhost, and that’s going some) and see what can be done.

Yesterday we got into the next level of targeting. Still a high level, even though I notice the comments are already pushing you to not just scuba, but go nitrox deep (smile). Before we go much further, I am being a bit of a bastard to you if you are new to all this. It’s for your own good, but still…

In teaching any subject, but particularly science, there are times when certain concepts almost need to be taught at the same time, but for a number of reasons they can’t be. Not easily at any rate. There are some who argue that in discussing nuclear strategy, you should start with scenarios then get into targeting. I take the tack that you need to start thinking about targeting first, as it is a good intro into the complexities involved. Since yesterday started introducing you to the complexities, let’s kick it up a notch and start talking about scenarios.

For all that I need to get into escalation tomorrow (note to self), why the flip are we going nuclear, and how are we doing it? This being a 201-level course, we’re going to sort of skip over the whole why thing for right now, and look more at the how for today.

In “entertainment” (using that term loosely) it’s usually because some bad guy thinks that they can take out their enemy (ies) without consequences (or at least with few for themselves). The madman who unleashes armageddon (deliberately not capitalized) upon a horrified world that has renounced nuclear evil. Sigh. One dimensional characters and threats. Second most popular trope is the religious nutcase unleashing holy war (funny how jihad is now never, ever mentioned in Hollyweird). Until recently (cough, Iran, cough) none of these terrorist organizations were likely to have more than a couple of weapons which put them to terrorism rather than war. Third most common trope is a madman or group that conspires to have the major nuclear powers (usually U.S. and Russia, funny how China is still getting a pass) get into a nuclear exchange so they can come out on top.

For all that they are tropes, and not even necessarily that good, I guarantee you they have been gamed out. Somewhere in the vaults of DoD (perhaps in the same warehouse as the Arc of the Covenant), there is a scenario for the U.S. to attack (or be attacked by) the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Yes, you do want to look that up, for all that it is far left it is a grand farce that manages to hit some interesting and even important points.

And, yes, the idea of Russia deciding to attack for no other reason than that Vladimir thinks he can win (just as he did in the Ukraine, cough) is a scenario. So are various scenarios where people on both sides miscalculate in response to events. If you’ve read your Clancy, you already know that a number of such war games take place so that people can get to know each other, and figure out how to respond to things. Rumor has it that such “games” have not been done in a while, at least on a senior level. If that is true, I think it a huge mistake. One of my larger concerns for escalation involves Russian doctrine and the asinine concept of “escalate to de-escalate.” For a number of reasons, I can see bumbling incompetence on both sides taking things a lot further than they should.

Where you can really start to have fun is in getting away from the traditional doomsday scenario. That’s when you can truly start to get sneaky and explore options that don’t tend to slag the world. At least not immediately.

For example, we’ve already had a comment on yesterday’s post looking at shipping containers in ports. Valid. Gamed even I believe. But, why stop there? What if a “terrorist group” (cough, cough) smuggled in multiple devices and literally drove them into positions? Given all the various uranium sales and such, the ability to analyze the bomb and figure out who it belonged to may not be as easy as it used to be. Yes, that can be done. Which means that if someone parked multiple devices around the U.S., it would take time to figure out where the devices originated. Meantime, if those locations included Sunnyvale, Peterson, Offutt (does building 500 have a loading dock?), Capitol Hill, the White House, the Pentagon, and maybe a couple of others — congratulations you just carried out a dream-level decapitation strike.

Of the leadership that is left, they are scrambling trying to figure out what has happened, how it has happened, and initiate search and rescue efforts. In short, a bit busy and if there is confusion that the attack(s) may have been with our own devices… Gee, if Vladimir and Xi were to decide to use special weapons and/or push on multiple fronts in that time…

Reality is that we should be looking for bad actors to take advantage of the situation, and there is going to be more than a little suspicion that anyone so doing was involved. There are already options in place for such. Problem is, which option is chosen and who does the choosing? There are operations in place to ensure continuity of government and civilian control of the military, yes, including designated survivors. In his Black Tide series John Ringo is basing his NCCC off reality.

I’ve also already discussed the scenario of exploding a device over the U.S. to take out the electrical grid and more. Exploring this option and variants has occupied more than a little bit of time.

But why look at scenarios? Simple. It allows you to develop defenses and responses that don’t necessarily involve destroying the world. Oh, someone can do X? Let’s make it where they can’t do X. If someone does Y, what can we do in response? Let us count the ways and costs involved in those responses. It also allows you to figure out what works best for you in different circumstances.

For example, someone picked up on something I wrote yesterday about targeting the individual missile silos. Why hit them if they are empty? Well, there can be some very good reasons to do so. There can also be good reason to go for them, especially if you’ve created a scenario where you can get in and hit them before they have a chance to launch, such as the fueling scenario I mentioned.

Even the most outrageous scenarios provide information and food for thought. From war with England to sneaking a device into Vladimir’s special toilet system (where a deliberate squib event might not set off Deadhand and render a bunker useless), it makes people think and get creative. Thus are valid defenses and response options born.

For you, my readers, scenarios let you explore and evaluate your security as well as that of the nation. For example, instead of that dream decapitation strike discussed above, what if you wanted to cripple logistics in the U.S. for a long, long time? Think about that comment on shipping containers in the ports, and then look at two devices hidden in Memphis and Indianapolis. You’ve just taken out our ability to bring goods in from overseas, and you’ve just crippled both air, rail, and road logistics for most of the U.S. Really want to flip things up, and I would add one to two targets more to the West.

If all goes to plan, tomorrow I hope to talk escalation and why I’m cringing at the statements from one OSINT analyst. Then, I want to start getting deeper into how to determine your level of threat and what you can do to survive it. For me, I have two plans. One involves continued support via the Tip Jar in the upper right and the fundraiser so I can move. One involves general preparation, because when you come down to it the disaster doesn’t matter: it’s the type damage it does and that, unlike disasters, is a limited set.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

While I still hope to go back for some further discussion on communications and control, the time has come to talk of mice and men, of targets and targeting. While we did a brief overview in Nuclear 101, it’s time to get a bit further into the weeds.

In many respects, there are three levels of target: Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary.

Primary are those things that if you are to have any chance of pulling off a successful (for values of successful) attack, you have to take those targets out. Such targets can include weapons systems, especially land-based systems; bases from which various systems can operate or be controlled; and, your command and control systems ranging from the NMCC in the Pentagon to the Nightwatch and TACAMO planes in the air. If you can take out the command and control (and communications nodes) centers, you can prevent (or reduce) the retaliation for your attack. If you can damage or destroy the missiles and planes, again, you reduce or eliminate the ability to retaliate. In short, primary targets are those things that can seriously hurt you.

Secondary targets are the “nice to do” targets if you will. They can’t hurt you immediately, but long-term are a problem. For example, tanker aircraft and the bases they fly from may not be a primary target, but you want to take them out in order to prevent refueling of bombers, fighters, and other craft. They can be secondary command and control nodes, military or civilian. RUMINT had state capitals as Soviet secondary targets (bomber targets) unless said city had a major military base/center that would make it a primary target.

Tertiary targets are sort-of the “eh, if we can we will” targets. These tend to be administrative centers and operations that keep the bureaucracy moving as it were. It could be something like Ft. Ben was/is in Indianapolis (want your money? Be nice to Ft. Ben!), to Fort Huachua which is home to a number of commands including the Army Intelligence Center. One can spend some time arguing where any given base or center falls in the rankings. Honestly, a lot comes down to how the given enemy views that location.

Why does it matter? Simple. There are limits to the number of nuclear weapons in the world, and there is a limit to the number of delivery systems. Some of the commenters on earlier posts have already dived head-first into those waters (or potentially even started scuba diving). For today, I’m going to keep it largely hypothetical with just a few dashes of reality.

Let’s start with that dash of reality. The U.S. land-based ICBM of choice is the LGM-30G Minuteman III. The Russian missile on which we will focus is the Satan 2/RS-28 Sarmat, which is in the process of replacing the Satan-1 missiles. Originally scheduled to be completed around 2018, this is still in process which suggests a few things. For all that I’m concentrating for now on Russia and the U.S., you may want to check out what’s going on with the Chinese as they could easily take over as the top threat from Russia. As within hours to be honest.

For our purposes today, we are going to go with some assumptions which may or may not be precise, but work for the points of this exercise. First, for U.S. weapons we are going to go with 400 missiles, each capable of carrying 3 independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (range 1,100 miles though not part of today’s exercise). For Russia, we are going to go with the same number of Satan-2 missiles, but for purposes of the exercise we will limit it to 11 re-entry vehicles (possible mix of light, heavy, HGV; range 11,000 miles).

Now, to set the final stage of the exercise, let’s limit each side to just 1,500 nuclear weapons. Close to treaty, though how close to reality is something very different. Reality is that some on each side are going to be other-than-strategic, with the Russians having (again, according to RUMINT) a significantly larger stockpile of tactical/other-than-strategic. For exercise purposes, treat all 1,500 as strategic weapons of various sizes.

Now, go back to the discussions on reliability and let’s go with the (ludicrous) position of 80 percent success. My very cynical view on reliability is that one would be far better going with a 20 percent success rate, but let’s be optimistic for the exercise. Let’s assume that 80 percent of the missiles will launch; 80 percent of the nuclear weapons will work as advertised; and, that 80 percent of the aircraft will make it into the air and not be sidelined by mechanical or other issues.

Which means that the missiles on either side are reduced to 320 missiles. Which reduces the U.S. to 960 effective warheads via missiles and the Russians to 3,520 warheads. Ooops. Is anyone spotting a problem here? Well, it’s a problem and one of the issues in regards START and related treaties — no one really knows how many ICBMS Russia has. No one knows how many nuclear weapons they truly have either. One set of estimates is here and another is here. You might notice that there is a wide range on the total number of nuclear weapons Russia (and even the U.S.) are reported to have ready to go. As noted earlier, the 40,000+ warheads attributed to the Soviet Union is not reality today. Even so, there is a lot of “wiggle room” and that is what makes planning so much fun!

Again, for purposes of the exercise, let’s ignore reality and limit both sides to 960 effective warheads. Now, which ones are they? Are they on the missiles that don’t launch? How many are on missiles that do launch? Welcome to the sub-lesson Paranoia 101 in target selection! You can’t just assign one warhead to a crucial primary target. You have to figure on at least two warheads, on different missiles, to have a shot at one hitting on target. Really critical targets (such as The Hole, Pentagon/NMCC, etc.) are going to get 3-4 warheads via missiles, and then one or two via bomber.

You can get away with targeting one weapon per missile silo (odds aren’t good on catching it in the ground anyway) or even control capsules (and, yes, the Russians and others pretty much know where they are). Your major command and control nodes? You need to plan on 3-5 warheads for each target. Oh, and to make the planning even more fun, you can’t have all the warheads arrive at once. There’s a thing called nuclear fratricide which could have one nuke take out, or mitigate the effects of, the other nukes if they all hit about the same time. If you want to know more on the topic, do a search of “Dense Pack” and nuclear.

Now, for this exercise, let’s just keep it simple and go with each nuke being a large device. The fact is, as a commenter noted a while back, 4-40 KT bombs can be far more effective than a single 400 KT device. This being a 201-level exercise, we won’t get into size and placement. Presume each device is the same and we are using airburst rather than ground or ground-penetration blasts. FYI, going back to a comment, an underground test is not supposed to breach the surface (though such is reported to have happened), and even the so-called theoretical deep-penetrating warheads are going to send boom upwards and out — and frankly produce some nasty fallout in the process. It will NOT stay all underground.

Okay, now: pick your targets. If you want, you can play Russia and pick targets in the U.S., or you can pick targets in Russia. Up to you. Just you have to stay within the numbers above. In fact, if you like, since this is just an exercise, go with only missiles. Adding in bombers, sea-launch, and other delights really is a 301- or higher level course.

Ready? Go.

In some respects, there are no right or wrong answers for this highly theoretical exercise. The primary purpose is to get you to thinking about what constitutes a target so that you can understand current events. It also allows you to assess things such as if you live in a target zone, and if so what can you do to improve your odds of survival. Despite a number of movies and breathless television dramas, you can survive. Much depends on the level of target near you, distance to that target, and other factors.

For example, currently living in Indianapolis (and please help me get out of here!), I rate us as a secondary target. It’s not like it was years back when you had Ft. Ben as a bit more than just an admin center, major manufacturing, and some other things. Back then, one could make a case that Indy was targeted for at least four weapons. Today, with logistics being the dominant industry here, Ft. Ben reduced, and the critical wartime manufacturing pretty much gone, a good case could be made for a single weapon.

Then the debate turns to how large and where. The argument I put forth earlier in the series looked at a 1 MT device airburst over the state capitol. Such an attack would take out several major interstate highways, a major airport, potentially cripple midwest rail operations, air and ground cargo operations, and state government. An equally good case can be made for targeting the airport (which would take out the state capitol in the process). Frankly, I don’t like either choice as while I am outside the total destruction zone, I would still be in the conflagration zone. Much better odds with the airport, but… Rough (very rough) rule of thumb on a 1 MT airburst: 4 mile radius total/near-total destruction, 2-4 mile additional radius for fire after damage. Not perfect, but gives you something to work with on damage assessment.

Again, this is all a higher level course but it is something about which you do need to think.

Oh, one final thought to share in selecting your targets for this exercise. If you choose to play Vladimir and target the United States, there is one other major consideration when looking at the number of missiles and warheads: you don’t want to use them all. You need to keep a reserve because it’s not just the U.S. and Russia. If you are playing Russia and use all your nukes and missiles on the U.S., Xi is going to be over on the side going ‘youuuuu soooo stuuuppppiiiddddd!’ as you just gave up your ability to deter him from taking some valuable chunks out of your empire.

Again, while it is a higher level course, keep in mind that Vladimir does not have the luxury of just targeting the U.S. He’s got to target NATO and more. Again, that’s higher level, but keep in mind the deeper you get into this the more targets you need to think about for your weapons. You also have to think about which weapons you want to hold in reserve, and how.

Finally, there should be some computer games/simulations out there. Years back, I remember one called (I think, stupid lightning) “Nuke War” that was a limited (only 3 or so dimensions) study that worked you through the Triad (planes, missiles, sub-launched) where you had to choose how to spend your defense budget for same and build up a nuclear capability. It also, at random, would decide to kick off a nuclear exchange. Think there were or are some others. If you know a good one, speak up in the comments.

Ah, that’s the other point I wanted to make today: Nuclear Winter. At worst, it will be nuclear autumn. Keep in mind that the original study on Nuclear Winter used a literally two-dimensional model of the Earth to come up with it’s conclusions. If memory serves, I think 16-24 dimensions are required just to start getting the atmosphere (much less what it does) correct. Caught an earful from a rather annoyed scientist at a major government lab over that one day. Enjoyed the info, though I enjoyed playing with an early version of the holodeck even more.

So, have fun and take a look at your list then tuck it away. If we keep going with this, you will need it again as we once again kick targeting up a level.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

While I still hope for a further guest post or two, today I want to lay out a few further thoughts on nuclear communications. We’ve got into some of the how, and why, they are done the way they are to prevent problems. Another point to consider is that you don’t want any enemy or potential enemy to be able to read your mail.

The fact is, anyone with a functional brain does tests of their command and control systems. You check things out, try to find and correct problems, and test the reliability of the system in all aspects. Thing is, you don’t want those who don’t like you to know what you do and how you do it as it gives them both information and options.

There is a lot of discussion on preventing or eliminating that command and control communications. If you can do that, you can keep release and launch orders from going out. Thing is, even better, if you can get the right info and access the right things you can do something even worse: you can take over that net. Imagine if someone got inside the net, sent the necessary targeting info, then launched your missiles for you — at targets inside your own country/forces.

Shades of a bad James Bond movie? Not entirely, and there are rumors that such has been gamed out.

Going back to reading the mail, keep in mind that different countries/powers use different systems. We tend to go with solid rocket motors, while others go for liquid engines. If you are using liquid engines, you have to load fuel before launch. If someone is reading your mail, and they know you’ve ordered all rockets to load fuel, a process that is not instantaneous though faster than it was I’ve heard, and that you’ve taken steps to prevent detection of said loading, what happens? Do you think they might launch attacks that can hit your sites before load and launch is complete? Using sea- and air-launched assets could take out the attack before it gets started, and reserves the crucial land-based launch capabilities for either last-ditch or follow-on operations.

So, you want to have a robust system to prevent bad things and ensure that things work. Do we have such? No. As a commenter pointed out earlier (think it was The Drill Sergeant) we do not, and in fact some of what we have is reported (widely) to still use floppy discs. On the good news front, as someone noted in an article elsewhere, it uses technology that is so old it pretty much precludes modern hackers from getting inside it. For a number of reasons, I invite you to research this on your own as it is yet another area where we need to be making some serious changes and upgrades.

On that happy note, enjoy your weekend!

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

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Seems like a good idea, I’m sure

What do we think will happen if the G-7 attempts to force Russia and the shipping companies that ship Russian oil to limit prices?

I wonder if this will be able to break the economic law that price caps result in shortages. Especially curious if it will work when they’re targeting their price caps at a country, not just a commodity, and it’s a country that’s already using energy as part of an economic warfare plan.

G-7 Rolls Out Plan to Cap Price of Russian Oil
The Group of Seven wealthy nations rolled out a plan to cap the price of Russian oil on global markets, committing to a novel new sanctions plan aimed at limiting Russia’s revenue from oil sales as its invasion of Ukraine grinds on.
WSJ

Posting Delay?

Any serious posting may be delayed until this afternoon at the earliest. I’m scrambling on several fronts, not including bills and other delights.

The other delights. Well, they are interesting. I rent a room in an older home. In fact, when my landlord bought the home I was asked if I wanted to move with him to the new place. I did, though I really wasn’t thrilled with the location but it is larger, inexpensive, and overall the landlord and I get along okay. Perfect, no. Good enough, yes.

However, I mentioned older. As in we discovered that the sewer drains were original terra cotta. That the relative he bought from had done a lot of “repair and upgrade” work themselves. I will simply note that even if buying from family getting a reputable inspector to look the place over is a good idea. We’ve had flooding issues in the basement where my room is located because of the drain issues. Thankfully it only got into my room once, but that was once too many in my book. Replacing the line out to the property line was pricey, but along with an emergency sump pump strategically placed (outside) to handle rain/flooding we’ve not flooded since.

Monday saw flash flood warnings in the area and the weather was indeed interesting. Since then, we’ve had kitchen sink drain issues that may or may not be related. The long-needed sealing/resurfacing of the driveway is underway. There are some other minor things going on as well. As in I’m having to make some hard decisions on a couple of different issues. One of which involves social security in light of some of the ongoing issues from being hit by lightning. I will admit to being very pleasantly surprised at how nice and friendly the lady at social security I spoke to was during our talk. One of her suggestions truly surprised me, as it was not what I expected. The good plumber my landlord found will be out today to work on the drains.

And before I forget, there has been concrete work done (much needed) on an exposed porch and some other repair work as well. All in all an interesting week that has us parking all over the neighborhood (can’t use the driveway until Saturday or Sunday) and other delights. Also, I really need to go take a good walk today while the weather is nice. In fact, may take a long walk as I’m not getting enough exercise thanks to the weather, and I can’t afford the gas to go walk at a mall.

So, more soon. Just not sure how soon.

UPDATE: This is likely it today. Went on my walk and decided to explore a trail I’ve not been down before. One thing I will give Indy (and it pre-dates the current admin FYI) is that there are a lot of urban trails that follow old railroad lines. Instead of my normal 3+ mile walk, I ended up doing between 7-8 miles (forgot to cut on my walking map app until halfway through). I feel good, though body is letting me know I have not been doing this enough lately.

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Into The Light: Mikhail Gorbachev

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. For those in the West, we were indeed not only in a good time, but heading into a golden age in many respects. For those not in the West, particularly behind the Iron Curtain, the times truly sucked on a scale that few today can conceive. That so many now look back on the time with nostalgia says something about how fucked up things are today…

I noted yesterday that I have mixed emotions on the passing of Gorbachev. That is being polite. The man was the enemy, on more than one level. Yet, I have come to have respect for the man, for reasons and because Boss had respect for him.

It was that respect, along with understanding, that allowed Reagan to run the board. To use information from a number of sources, including Agent Farewell, to put Gorbachev into a position where he had no choice to but to bow to the inevitable. Make no mistake: the man fought long and hard to keep the CCCP going, and remained a Leninist, if not a Marxist, to his dying day. He was murderous, vicious, and more.

Yet, he did two things that indicated a moral clarity, or at least honesty, that I’m not sure to this day if any other Soviet/Russian leader has the capacity to do. One, well, rather than a certain former astronaut Gorbachev may be responsible for my first silver hairs, and the other is the fact that at the end, he realized that he and Soviet communism had lost and accepted it. Not easily, not well on some levels, but he had lost and he knew it. He then worked towards making it a soft landing, at least for some. That doing so helped others [see the (in) famous Pizza Hut commercial] may or may not have been an intended benefit.

I admit that now I wish I had taken the opportunity to hear him speak. Perhaps even in a small group setting, as it would have allowed a different, perhaps better, understanding of some of what is happening today. Thing is, Gorbachev was/is despised by most current Kremlin leadership (including Vladimir) because he was NOT a slavophile, but looked to the West. He felt very strongly that the best future for Russia lay with and through engagement with the West and adopting Western modes and thoughts. Word from various sources is that he was, er, not happy, with Vladimir for destroying “his legacy” of engagement with the West.

That said, I also admit that in many ways rather than sharing a cognac with Gorbachev I would much rather have had a beer or three with Lech Walesa, some time with Vaclav Havel, or the honor of a meeting with John Paul II. For all I would like to understand more of how the loss was handled, I feel that there is an even greater need — particularly now and not just with the Russia/Ukraine war — to understand all the ways that led to us winning. If the West and its legacy of thought is to be saved, we need look to these men (and Boss).

To steal from another classic, I come here today not to praise Gorbachev, but to bury him. Would that we could and were burying the murderous legacy of communism and socialism along with him. Sadly, we are not and even as we deal with the hopefully dying heads of the hydra that is the legacy of Marx and Lenin there are lessons to be learned from his life.

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Vladimir And The Ukraine

Your Must Read For The Day On Russia

The Puzzles In Play, And The Missing Pieces

Quick Thoughts On Ukraine/Putin

The Thing Behind The Curtain

Missing Pieces And Surprise Pieces

Accuracy, Reliability, And More

Putin, Trump, And The Coming Storm

Three Futures For Russia

Quick Thoughts

Saturday Update

Mismatched Locomotives

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

Past, Present, And A Hungry Future

Huge Grain Of Salt

The Moskva

Retribution Inbound

Uncertainty And Preparation

Honest Question

Monday Morning Quick Brief

War Of The Memes

A Little Free Ice Cream

Rumors Of War

Three Times Is…

If It’s Wednesday, This Must Be Moldova

Going Nuclear

How To Spy On The Russians

Here’s Hoping I’m Wrong

Pins And Needles Time

Mock Away

Intel Wars

The Revenge Of HUMINT

A Funny Thing Happened

Rumors of Rumors

Ukraine, Uvalde, Oh My

Very Interesting

A Quick Russia/Ukraine Update

Russia/Ukraine/Lithuania

Hmmmm

Hmmmm Follow-Up

Ukraine/Russia Tidbit

If You Think

Couple Of Quick Thoughts

Uh Oh

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Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

The raid on MAL by the FBI, and the subsequent leak to the Washington Post (where democracy dies in darkness and they are taking out the lights as fast as they can) that “nuclear” secrets were involved rather clearly demonstrated several things. One is that many people don’t have a clue about how nuclear weapons are released. I’ve been told we may get another guest post or two on the subject, but I’m going to do a quick overview this morning on some high-level basics.

Seriously, if you know someone who was screaming about how Trump was selling/had sold/etc. nuclear launch codes/nuclear secrets to Russia et al — do not take financial advice from them, and don’t consider business partnerships with them or anyone who hires them; but, do consider playing poker with them as they are likely to try to draw to an inside straight even when most of the cards they need have already been played. The entire concept of “Q” level materials is a post for another day. For today, let’s look at how things are supposed to work with high-level nuclear command and control.

Guess what: the President can’t just wake up one morning in a grumpy mood, pick up the phone, and give the codes to launch the missiles and bombers. One, he really doesn’t have those codes and has no way to talk to the silos, etc. anyway. He has the codes that releases the weapons to the military and authorizes their use, but not the actual launch codes that would go to the subs and silos.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, America eats, sleeps, and breathes the two-man rule. In some cases it’s even the multiple man rule as more than two are involved.

In the case of POTUS, they are given something about the size of a credit card that is referred to by some as “the biscuit” that not only contains the release codes, but more importantly the means to verify that it is indeed the POTUS speaking/giving the order(s). “The biscuit” is subject to being changed out on a regular basis for rather elementary security reasons. It can be updated/changed out if POTUS, 0r VPOTUS, lose their copy. And, yes, one former President (not Trump) was and is rather notorious for having lost “the biscuit” multiple times during their time in office.

In an ideal world, for POTUS to release the weapons and authorize their use, what happens is that there is an attack conference, which can include a truly impressive number of people. The odds of there being time for such aren’t good, but if there is time there is supposed to be a good bit of deliberation. Then, based on that, POTUS and the SECDEF then give the appropriate codes and verifications to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Military Command Center. This would include the appropriate targeting information (“attack options”) per the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). The NMCC then contacts Strategic Command, who then carries out the orders.

Yes, it is a little more complex than that. Reality often is. If the attack conference is not taking place as a result of an attack on/threat to the U.S., the whole ‘sound of mind and body’ thing comes up. Even if things are going south rapidly, those participating can elect not to confirm the order. For fictional treatment of such, see Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears for a good scene. In reality, well, let’s hope we never find out. This article and this article contain some decent information.

Also, there are plans in place for surprise/sneak attacks, including options that see POTUS (and/or successors) removed from the chain. If you search the term “SNAPCOUNT” you can find some good (and some horrible) information. Just keep in mind that even then the two-man rule applies. From the release of weapons to the actual launch, at least two people are always involved.

Oh, if you’ve ever seen any footage or pictures from the command capsule of a missile field, ever wonder why the seats are a distance apart and the consoles set up the way they are? Pretty simple, really. Even with a mechanical aid, no one person can turn both keys simultaneously even if they could input all the correct commands to get to that point. At every step it takes at least two to tango.

Also, if for any reason somehow (not very likely IMO) a “biscuit” were to leave DC with a former POTUS or VPOTUS (or other somehow), guess what? It isn’t valid and has no real utility to anyone except as a novelty (though it’s not a good idea to leave them around where others can study them to try to detect patterns and such). The codes and challenges have already been replaced as the new POTUS takes office.

Again, a very high-level overview of nuclear C&C. I’m hoping we do get a guest post or two on other aspects, as C&C is a fascinating and not well-understood aspect of nuclear strategy.

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Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

A guest post by John Donovan, the Armorer of Castle Arrgghhh (and Lizzie)

Nuke weapons design and policy are governed by the need for safety and control. PALs are a component of control.

What is a PAL? PAL stands for Permissive Action Link. The purpose of the PAL is not to prevent unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon by rogue elements of the US military command. We do that via the EMAS (Emergency Message Authentication System) and NRAS (Nuclear Release Authentication System) systems and the imposition of strict two-person control (at a minimum) at each step of the process.

Some of those processes can be longer than others, depending on whether the weapons involved are “first strike deterrent” weapons like the USAF ballistic missiles and the USN SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) or further down the chain like the manned bombers, cruise missiles and formerly, US Army tactical nuclear missiles and artillery. PALS are also distinct from
safeties. Safeties are intended to prevent premature or accidental initiation or partial initiation of a warhead.

PALS have a different niche.

NATO airbase, mid-sixties. NATO fighter-bomber, fully fueled and armed, sits on “strip alert,” pilot strapped in. A lone US Airman armed with an M1 carbine stands guard. He is literally the only thing standing between chaos and disaster should that non-US NATO pilot decide (or get told by his government) to light up his jet and go bomb a target. Soviet or not. (1)

US Army Warhead Detachment, Mid-70s. NATO ally army trucks and some tanks roll up to the Detachment’s gate. The purpose of the detachment is to secure and maintain nuclear warheads (missile or artillery) stored in NATO nations that are there for either US units, or, upon authorization, NATO
units. Tensions are erupting between the ally and another nation and signals intelligence indicates that the ally’s generals have been talking to each other about taking some of the warheads to use as a lever against the other belligerent. While the confrontation at the gate never happened, the conversations did. (2)

Hey, NATO Ally – are you my buddy, my pal right now? No? That is why have PALs. To prevent unauthorized people from using US-provided nukes without express authorization from the President of the United States. The problem with both of those scenarios is that besides being scary as hell, it was (and still is) contrary to US law about control of US nukes, i.e., only we could give release, no one could take one of our weapons and use them unilaterally. Only we get to do that.

Yet, we gave nuclear-capable weapon systems to allies – the Nike-Hercules air defense missiles, various US Army tactical missiles like Honest John, Lance, and Pershing, and 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery projectiles. And many NATO aircraft were nuke-delivery capable. And all that had to be scattered around Central Europe so that those nations could quickly employ them if things got ugly on the North German Plain and the rolling hills of Bavaria along the Czechoslovakian border. Same was true of bombs, and NATO aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA).

We needed something better than the Airman 1st Class-Mounted M1 Carbine Nuke Weapon Disabler. There are four types of PALs (at least that are acknowledged publicly these days) that are variations on a theme. They are either electrical/digital and integral to the weapon, buried inside where it is hard to get to them, and they interfere with the arming/initiation process until unlocked from an external code transmitted to them, or they are like combination locks that must be unlocked with a code thoughtfully provided by a two-man US warhead team acting under orders with the codes received via the NRAS system. Mechanically removing them will take time, and, most likely, render the warhead inoperative.

Giving hopefully cooler heads time to intervene. A balance between the profound need to control release and the tactical realities of modern combat
“Bypassinag a PAL should be, as one weapons designer graphically put it, about as complex as performing a tonsillectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end.” (3)

Acknowledgements and further reading, if you want further unclassified details.

A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
Steven M. Bellovin Permissive Action Links (columbia.edu) A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
A drier, more technical discussion of both Safety and Control. Subscription to the Bulletin is required to access the archived articles.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features To cite this article: (1991) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 47:8, 48-49, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025

Notes
(1) Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter. Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons. University Press, 1987
(2) Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War. Presidio Press/Ballantine Books,
2004.
(3) Caldwell, Dan and Zimmerman, Peter D., “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War with Permissive Action
Links”, in Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Blechman, Barry M., ed., Johns
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989.

Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge the sharp eye and excellent editorial instincts of Lizzie, a feline of great discernment. Not only did she keep him company and offer encouragement, she added stray characters and deleted random paragraphs to test this scribbler’s skill. Sic Semper Felinus.

Acknowledgement II: This old wolf wishes to thank John for coming out of blogging retirement, as it were, to add to the Nuclear 201 series and to Lizzie for her contributions as well.

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