Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

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Really wanted a catchier title this morning, but the imagination just isn’t cooperating. In some ways, this lesson is a hodge-podge of concepts yet it really isn’t. Instead, it takes scenarios and targeting and puts them into a plan that is governed to some extent by policy including (one hopes) how and when things escalate.

Absent some serious flip-ups, the detonation of a single nuclear device, or even two, should not result in a full-scale nuclear exchange. I will note that this is dependent upon Dead Hand not being programmed/ordered to do so on the Russian side, and a couple of other minor caveats, but one or two detonations — particularly in the tactical range — should not trigger all-out nuclear war.

First up, let’s explore a couple of points of policy. Absent signs of a massive full-scale attack by any enemy, the unofficial policy of the United States has been more towards restraint and proportionality. I say unofficially as the U.S., like most nuclear powers, has been coy about discussing what it will or won’t do in response to any attack. The idea is to avoid getting locked into a set of actions that might not be the best option(s) under the circumstances. Having the maximum amount of flexibility in deciding when, where, and how to respond is a very good thing.

For all that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was and is a thing, most people with any degree of sanity really want to avoid that. After all, you flush yours and we flush ours has a degree of finality to it for all the governments of the world, and isn’t going to be that good for the world in general. So, even if highly unofficial, flexibility is preferred by leaders with a degree of sanity everywhere. Those without sanity, or highly desperate, are the reason MAD put the world at the mercy of the least stable (mentally, politically, otherwise) leader(s) anywhere.

Which does bring up a number of issues, including how does one respond to someone using tactical nuke(s), or that is using chemical, biological or other weapons. I grew up and spent years using CBN (chemical, biological, nuclear) rather than WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) or the current CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive). The latter encompasses a much broader range of nastiness, though I think WMD does cover things from a legal standpoint. Despite what some may think, the U.S. is not party to any treaty that bans the use of Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE), thermobaric, or other weapons. Reminds me, there is someone I need to ping to see if they might be willing to do a guest post on the various Geneva and Hague conventions and what the U.S. is, and is not, signed up to.

It was long the position of the United States that anyone using any type of WMD (CBRNE, MNOPQRS, or whatever) was effectively using a nuke and would be responded to as if they HAD used a nuke. The policy had the desired effect in that it made rogue states (and others) think twice and at least openly avoid using any type of WMD. It also gave the Soviet Union some pause in regards its doctrines calling for the use of various WMD in military operations. That it may also have helped to lead to some treaties limiting biological and other bits of nastiness is a plus in my book.

However, back in the Obama administration we got the famous “red line in the sand” incident involving Syria and Russia. If you are not familiar with what happened, you do need to look it up. From where I sit, it turns out the lines weren’t red and were indeed written in the sand as there was no real response to the (alleged) use of chemical weapons by Syria and/or Russia.

Which does put the Biden administration in a bit of a bind. If Russia uses WMD in the Ukraine, does it hold to the stated policy or, once again, let it slide? If chemical or other, there is undoubtably going to be a LOT of pressure to let it slide. But, what if it is nuclear? My bet is lots of pressures from a lot of different directions, including from Vladimir with his “escalate to de-escalate” idiocy. Given that Biden reportedly told Vladimir well before the invasion of the Ukraine of his terror at the thought of a nuclear exchange, much less a nuclear war, who knows how either will react.

Which leads us (hopefully) to SIOP. The Strategic Integrated Operations Plan builds on all those scenarios discussed (or at least alluded to) yesterday. Within it are a series of responses to almost any set of circumstances that arise. This includes major and minor targets/target packages per each circumstance. In this case, Biden should already have been briefed in on SIOP when he was VP and should have taken part in some exercises that are designed to get those involved familiar with protocols, options, and other good things. This should have been updated when he because POTUS. Problem is, as Tom Clancy noted in his works, you can get administrations who blow those exercises off…

For our 201-level discussion, let’s start with the idea of Vladimir and Biden staring at each other with steely gazes and firm resolve over the Ukraine. As they jut their jaws and double down on showing firm resolve, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick uses Iran and Pakistan to attack the U.S. (or NATO) while everyone is looking with bated breath at Vladimir and Biden.

Got news for you, it doesn’t mean that everything we have launches at Vladimir. In fact, as a missile officer explained to me many years ago, the only time everything is aimed at one location is right before launch. In fact, he used the analogy of Countries A and B being in a fight (or ready for one) and Country C coming up and shooting Country A in the back. Do you shoot B because C shot you in the back? No. You turn around and shoot Country C.

In this case, it’s obvious pretty quickly what has happened. As a result, SIOP provides options that result in the President choosing target package MOUSE 7 which sends the appropriate weapons by the appropriate means to the assigned targets in those countries (and elsewhere) as needed. In this case, elsewhere could include the cruise liner charted by the Duchy to take its population out to sea so as to survive retaliation. Too bad they didn’t do more OPSEC on that…

SIOP is intended to provide a range of options for each scenario so that POTUS (or successor) can choose the right response given the situation. Within that is some flexibility in regards major and minor targets. The idea is, in part, to keep things equitable if you will. The problem with that, however, is that people are people. Leaders can miscalculate, they can misinterpret data or what is being said to them by their opposite number(s), and they can just flat out flip-up. A good example is in the movie By Dawn’s Early Light where the Russian launch at China is mistaken for another attack on the U.S., which leads to an escalation. That really should have been taken care of by notification through the hot line teletype, but it makes for decent movie…

In short, communications are the key. It’s why in the past a LOT of effort has gone into establishing and maintaining both official and unofficial lines of communications between governments and administrations. It’s why efforts were made to ensure the leaders had some understanding of each other. It’s why even when seconds count, people usually try to communicate. When they don’t is when you get things like the massive flip-up that was the weather rocket incident. Thought for the day: you can never have enough communications and redundant communications. No matter how much you have, there is always someone who does NOT get the word. Plan on it.

For all that the use of WMD, including tactical nuclear weapons, does not have to mean escalation to a larger nuclear exchange, I am concerned that such will happen. When you have one leader who not only threatens such on a regular basis, but has members of his administration talk about total nuclear war and how ready they are for it to the media and others (and even the animals at the zoo as enthusiastically as they go about it), it does not make fertile ground for restraint or for the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” to work as planned. In fact, it pretty much ensures that it won’t work. Throw in an opposite number of advanced age and concerns over mental competence, who spends a good bit of his time threatening and running down the majority of his own citizens, and it is a recipe for something nasty, not tasty and good. It creates a situation ripe for misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

To be honest, the best we can do right now is hold on, hope that the systems on both sides are weighted toward restraint, pray, and prepare. Anyone who says that Russian use of non-nuclear WMD is different from the use of nuclear, well, either doesn’t know history and historical policy, or is just a flippin idiot whistling past the graveyard. Things do NOT have to escalate, but it does depend on reasonable, competent, and frankly brave leadership on every side. May the situation never arise, but if it does, may the leadership on each side rise to the occasion.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Some History

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 201: Scenarios

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

Nuclear What?

Nuclear 101: Weapons

Nuclear 101: Delivery

Nuclear 101: Now What?

Nuclear 101: Targeting

Nuclear 101: Scenarios

Nuclear 101: Survival

Some Quick Thoughts

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2 thoughts on “Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation”

  1. In addition to possible response to CBRNE attack, US has also stated policy that we may use nuclear weapons as part of response to cyber attack. Cyber and nuclear are deeply intertwined.

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