Welcome to the first entry of the Nuclear 201 series. While this is still a high-level approach to learning about nuclear war and related issues, it’s time to take a bit more detailed look at some of the issues. In fact, if anyone out there is interested in contributing a guest post on a relevant topic, drop me an e-mail at the address in the upper right. If some things work out, hope to have at least a couple, if not more, guest posts and/or related.
To understand where we are requires some history. The thing is, the history of the nuclear age is fascinating and there are many, many rabbit holes down which we could dive. There are tales of brilliance, stupidity, treachery, and honor. Some are humorous if terrifying, such as scientists and engineers placing bets on if a certain bomb was going to involve the atmosphere in its reaction and reduce the Earth to a cinder — even as the detonation countdown was underway.
While Einstein’s famous equation E=MC2 (squared) started the ball rolling, it wasn’t until the 1930s that people got serious about the idea of nuclear power and nuclear explosives. It really was the fact that Nazi Germany was looking into things that spurred the U.S. into pursuing its own research after the famous Einstein letter (which he signed but did not write) of 1939.
The history of this period is complex and fascinating. There were competing theories on how to achieve various milestones, and each group seemingly went its own way. Germany decided on one approach that required heavy water, and the successful effort by the Norwegian underground to deny them what they needed may well have kept them from being first with a bomb. I wish I could remember the name of the book I read on the Norwegian effort that I found excellent, and there was another on the German nuclear program that was accurate and entertaining. Stupid lightning. Trust me, reading up on these efforts, as well as the work of the Four Hungarians of the Apocalypse on the Manhattan Project is well worth your time.
For our Nuclear 201 purposes, one bit of important history is that the Manhattan Project (and quite possibly the Nazi project) were penetrated by the Soviets pretty much from the start. No, the Rosenbergs were not the be-all and end-all of nuclear espionage. Again, several good books out there (beware some recent revisionist histories). Net result was that Stalin was not surprised when Truman revealed The Bomb to him as he was fully briefed and pushing a secret effort of his own to catch up using the info coming in from the various moles in the program.
In the brief window of time where the U.S. was the sole nuclear power on Earth, there were some who thought that status could be made to last forever; some others who thought it could be made to last for years if not decades; and, a few who pointed out that it wouldn’t last long. Since some of their spiritual descendants are active today, let’s take a very quick look at the major schools of thought.
First, there were those who felt that for anyone to develop The Bomb they would have to go through the entire Manhattan Project (or Nazi counterpart) to do so. Even if they did get a few nuclear secrets, the steps had to be repeated and those efforts, especially the need for high-speed centrifuges, would be easily detectable. Warn the country, and if not heeded, take out the project with either conventional or nuclear weapons.
Second, there were those who said that most of the project could be skipped with the right knowledge. Or espionage. This would save years of effort, and the key signs would be the centrifuges and other large-scale activities that would be hard to hide.
Finally, there were those who said the entire project could be skipped since the knowledge was out there, and what couldn’t be stolen could be worked out by smart people. Again, it was the centrifuges and other large-scale efforts that would be the clue that Country X was working on The Bomb.
Then the Soviet’s exploded their first bomb and put to rest the idea that the U.S. would remain the sole nuclear power for any length of time. They also sort of proved the last group right in the process. And thus the nuclear arms race was born.
In some respects, what happened is proof of the Toddler Laws school of thought. Who had the largest? Who had the most unique? Who could make the smallest? Who had the most advanced design? The race was on and both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to out do the other in every possible aspect. So much so, that at one point it is believed that the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear weapons. The U.S. was reported to have a few itself. Great Britain and France appear to have felt that a few hundred each was more reasonable. Maybe.
Now, as this was going on, a number of people questioned what was going on, and eventually various treaties were negotiated to reign things in a bit. This is a decent list of those treaties by year. We could talk for months, if not years, just about the treaties (much like the history of the original projects), but I will for now leave it up to you to decide if that is a rabbit hole you wish to explore.
Those treaties were why Boss coined his famous phrase “Trust, but verify.” I’m not saying that the Soviet Union (or later Russia) had a reputation for violating treaties of all sorts before the ink was dry, but I will say that they had (have) quite the reputation for developing some of the most interesting interpretations of various clauses in various treaties. So much so that the complexities of those interpretations twist things to the point the time-space continuum should have shattered.
What truly matters out of all of this for our 201 purposes is that right now as a result of these treaties the Russians are thought to have approximately 6,257 nuclear warheads with 1,458 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. The U.S. is reported to have approximately 5,550 warheads with 1,389 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. Three sites with information on all nuclear countries are here, here, and here.
The thing to keep in mind is that not all of these are strategic weapons. You have tactical devices and you have some specialized charges as well: shaped charges, atomic demolition munitions, and other oddities. We’ll get more into that soon enough.
Meantime, here’s a bit on how the Soviets used nuclear weapons to put out some oil field fires. Makes me wonder what Red Adair could have done with a few nukes…
Yes, there is a LOT more that we could cover today. Again, trying to keep it high level and point towards places (and topics) for exploration. Neat thing is, more and more keeps coming out about the early days, here and elsewhere, and it just adds more fascinating material to an already interesting field of study. We may well jump back into some of this as Nuclear 201 continues. For now, however, this gives you enough overview to understand what is to come.
SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:
Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:
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Russia/Ukraine Posts:
Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine
Your Must Read For The Day On Russia
The Puzzles In Play, And The Missing Pieces
Quick Thoughts On Ukraine/Putin
Missing Pieces And Surprise Pieces
Accuracy, Reliability, And More
Putin, Trump, And The Coming Storm
War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come
Past, Present, And A Hungry Future
If It’s Wednesday, This Must Be Moldova
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I haven’t heard any speculation regarding the readiness of the Russian nuclear stockpile, yet it’s worth consideration. I liken it to a 1968 Jaguar, with questionable electrics, a rot-prone frame, and loose quality control being parked in a dilapidated barn near the Arctic Circle since 1991, yet the rubes believes it’s going to fire right up on demand 30 years later. Maintenance and upkeep is exorbitantly expensive, and time consuming. Yet there has been no speculation on whether these maintenance-intensive, spectacularly complicated devices have been kept in operational condition by the owners. I find it unlikely, as one could recall the condition of the Russian economy for the better part of two decades was in shambles. Are there any sources that can verify the veracity of the Russian stockpile? Would make a nice Nuclear 301 lesson.
Touched on this very briefly in the 101, and plan to do a more in-depth exploration in the 201 series. There are sources that say that it has been very well maintained, is in good shape, etc. There are other sources that disagree with that. Love that analogy! And it applies to our own as well. Short version for now, I’m not entirely sure either side is up to snuff. I also don’t want to find out via live fire. 🙂 More on this very, very important topic soon.
I am fairly sure that the US program, at least in the early days, relied on gaseous diffusion for enrichment, not centrifuges. I know enough to say that centrifuges are more energy efficient than diffusion, more SWUs/kilowatt-hr, say. The Pakistanis got their centrifuges by stealing from the Dutch. I hazard a guess that they made improvements of their own. The Iranians benefited from the Paks and then made improvements of their own. Whatever became of our centrifuge projects? I stopped hearing about it several years ago, when it was still a “public-private partnership”?
Yes, they did. And, the full story of the TVA and the Manhattan Project is one of those fascinating rabbit holes one can dive down for months. Whether or not TVA was started in anticipation of things (which I doubt), it truly did make possible the Manhattan Project and later the Arnold Engineering Development Center near Tullahoma, TN. Because of the size, power requirements, and specialized materials requirements for diffusion, early on there were those who anticipated that others would opt for centrifuges as the easier and less technically challenging. Though, to be fair, I suspect the intel people were keeping an eye out for both. As for our public-private, I’ve not heard anything in a while either. Will have to look into that soon. Oh, since it is public domain, another thing intel types keep an eye out for is certain materials/electronic components that are highly specialized and have only one real use, and are purportedly hard to make. Further point on the Iranians: no doubt they got a lot from Pakistan, but it appears the people to push them over the goal line on nuclear and missile technology are the Chinese. There is some speculation that the original COVID strain that hit Iran came in via some of the clandestine flights and exchanges. If true, a bit of poetic justice.
“The U.S. is reported to have approximately 5,550 warheads with 1,389 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc.”
By themselves these numbers can be misleading. To be meaningful, we must have the ability to deliver the weapons and our ability to deliver each different weapon type is limited.
If you need to use your hand-gun for self defense, the number of rounds you have on the shelf back home is not relevant.
For example we have only 400 or so ICBMs. Originally we had many more of them and they could carry three warheads each. (Peacekeeper could carry ten!) But many ICBMs have been consumed in flight testing and the remainder have now been de-MIRVed to carry only singles. While we used to be able to deliver about 1500 warheads via ICBM, we are now down to about 400. We still have the warheads that were removed but we no longer can deliver them. Re-MIRVing would take years. And there are other important limitations that I don’t want to go into here.
(Conversely, in the START treaties, bombers each count as “1” even though a B-52 can carry 20 nuclear-armed cruise missiles. It’s a weird subject area. Rabbit holes indeed.)
(400 ICBMs may seem like a lot, but part of the rationale behind needing so many is to use them as a sponge for adversary nukes, and a survivable force against everyone but Russia. If an adversary takes out say 300 of them — which requires a LOT of nukes — we would still have 100 with which to retaliate. SSBNs are also expected to be survivable because their locations are unknown, but a technical breakthrough that can locate and kill SSBNs would leave the residual ICBMs as the only survivable force.)
In recent years the US has tried to “hedge” against “technological surprise” (e.g., discovering problems in our front-line weapons requiring us to substitute) and “adversary breakout” (i.e., competitors surging their nuclear stockpiles forcing us to keep up. Not sure I agree, but that’s the thinking.)
US retains many weapons as a hedge, and other weapons that we no longer want, but have not yet been able to dismantle. (Taking weapons apart is not as high a priority as building and maintaining the front-line ones. There is only one place we dismantle nukes and it is the same place we build and life-extend them.) Many we no longer have the ability to use. Some others we could use only if we swapped them with on-alert weapons — for each one we add, we take another away.
https://www.acq.osd.mil/ncbdp/nm/NMHB2020rev/chapters/chapter4.html