The raid on MAL by the FBI, and the subsequent leak to the Washington Post (where democracy dies in darkness and they are taking out the lights as fast as they can) that “nuclear” secrets were involved rather clearly demonstrated several things. One is that many people don’t have a clue about how nuclear weapons are released. I’ve been told we may get another guest post or two on the subject, but I’m going to do a quick overview this morning on some high-level basics.
Seriously, if you know someone who was screaming about how Trump was selling/had sold/etc. nuclear launch codes/nuclear secrets to Russia et al — do not take financial advice from them, and don’t consider business partnerships with them or anyone who hires them; but, do consider playing poker with them as they are likely to try to draw to an inside straight even when most of the cards they need have already been played. The entire concept of “Q” level materials is a post for another day. For today, let’s look at how things are supposed to work with high-level nuclear command and control.
Guess what: the President can’t just wake up one morning in a grumpy mood, pick up the phone, and give the codes to launch the missiles and bombers. One, he really doesn’t have those codes and has no way to talk to the silos, etc. anyway. He has the codes that releases the weapons to the military and authorizes their use, but not the actual launch codes that would go to the subs and silos.
When it comes to nuclear weapons, America eats, sleeps, and breathes the two-man rule. In some cases it’s even the multiple man rule as more than two are involved.
In the case of POTUS, they are given something about the size of a credit card that is referred to by some as “the biscuit” that not only contains the release codes, but more importantly the means to verify that it is indeed the POTUS speaking/giving the order(s). “The biscuit” is subject to being changed out on a regular basis for rather elementary security reasons. It can be updated/changed out if POTUS, 0r VPOTUS, lose their copy. And, yes, one former President (not Trump) was and is rather notorious for having lost “the biscuit” multiple times during their time in office.
In an ideal world, for POTUS to release the weapons and authorize their use, what happens is that there is an attack conference, which can include a truly impressive number of people. The odds of there being time for such aren’t good, but if there is time there is supposed to be a good bit of deliberation. Then, based on that, POTUS and the SECDEF then give the appropriate codes and verifications to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Military Command Center. This would include the appropriate targeting information (“attack options”) per the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). The NMCC then contacts Strategic Command, who then carries out the orders.
Yes, it is a little more complex than that. Reality often is. If the attack conference is not taking place as a result of an attack on/threat to the U.S., the whole ‘sound of mind and body’ thing comes up. Even if things are going south rapidly, those participating can elect not to confirm the order. For fictional treatment of such, see Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears for a good scene. In reality, well, let’s hope we never find out. This article and this article contain some decent information.
Also, there are plans in place for surprise/sneak attacks, including options that see POTUS (and/or successors) removed from the chain. If you search the term “SNAPCOUNT” you can find some good (and some horrible) information. Just keep in mind that even then the two-man rule applies. From the release of weapons to the actual launch, at least two people are always involved.
Oh, if you’ve ever seen any footage or pictures from the command capsule of a missile field, ever wonder why the seats are a distance apart and the consoles set up the way they are? Pretty simple, really. Even with a mechanical aid, no one person can turn both keys simultaneously even if they could input all the correct commands to get to that point. At every step it takes at least two to tango.
Also, if for any reason somehow (not very likely IMO) a “biscuit” were to leave DC with a former POTUS or VPOTUS (or other somehow), guess what? It isn’t valid and has no real utility to anyone except as a novelty (though it’s not a good idea to leave them around where others can study them to try to detect patterns and such). The codes and challenges have already been replaced as the new POTUS takes office.
Again, a very high-level overview of nuclear C&C. I’m hoping we do get a guest post or two on other aspects, as C&C is a fascinating and not well-understood aspect of nuclear strategy.
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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:
Nuclear 201 Posts In Order
Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?
Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:
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Ooh, let me guess! Is the biscuit shaped like a cigar?
“… ever wonder why the seats are a distance apart and the consoles set up the way they are? Pretty simple, really. Even with a mechanical aid, no one person can turn both keys simultaneously even if they could input all the correct commands to get to that point. ”
This philosophy that no one can launch an ICBM on their own extends beyond the confines of the Launch Control Center.
Within each group of 50 missiles, five Launch Control Centers also watch each other’s commands. Launch preparation commands are alarmed in the other four LCCs. A single Launch Control Center can initiate a launch, but the sequence includes an enforced delay allowing time for other LCCs to respond before the launch occurs. During that delay, another Launch Control Center can either approve the launch and end the delay, or two other LCCs working together can prevent the launch and cut-off the rogue LCC. It takes two LCCs to launch without a delay, and two LCCs can stop a launch in progress by another LCC.
For aircraft, a lot of protection is provided by preventing the upload of nuclear weapons onto the aircraft. (This is why the accidental upload and flight from Minot to Barksdale was of special concern.)
SSBNs are fully capable of launch on their own. Basic assumption is launches are complex — a lot has to happen (bring boat to depth and speed, open tubes, etc.) requiring cooperative efforts from many people — and there won’t be enough cooperation to successfully complete a rogue launch.
The US Nuclear Command, Control and Communication (NC3) system may be worth some discussion.
It is the key to control of US nuclear forces, yet the system is archaic, having evolved erratically to be a system composed of Frankensteined sub-systems. Modernization of parts of the system requires backwards compatibility with 1950s-60s technology.
Everyone owns their own piece. No one wants to own the whole thing. “That’s not my problem.” “It’s not my end of the boat that’s sinking.”
Overlaying the archaic mish-mash and lack of national prioritization with modern cybersecurity concerns results in a witches brew of national security risks.