Category: Current Events

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

While I still hope to go back for some further discussion on communications and control, the time has come to talk of mice and men, of targets and targeting. While we did a brief overview in Nuclear 101, it’s time to get a bit further into the weeds.

In many respects, there are three levels of target: Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary.

Primary are those things that if you are to have any chance of pulling off a successful (for values of successful) attack, you have to take those targets out. Such targets can include weapons systems, especially land-based systems; bases from which various systems can operate or be controlled; and, your command and control systems ranging from the NMCC in the Pentagon to the Nightwatch and TACAMO planes in the air. If you can take out the command and control (and communications nodes) centers, you can prevent (or reduce) the retaliation for your attack. If you can damage or destroy the missiles and planes, again, you reduce or eliminate the ability to retaliate. In short, primary targets are those things that can seriously hurt you.

Secondary targets are the “nice to do” targets if you will. They can’t hurt you immediately, but long-term are a problem. For example, tanker aircraft and the bases they fly from may not be a primary target, but you want to take them out in order to prevent refueling of bombers, fighters, and other craft. They can be secondary command and control nodes, military or civilian. RUMINT had state capitals as Soviet secondary targets (bomber targets) unless said city had a major military base/center that would make it a primary target.

Tertiary targets are sort-of the “eh, if we can we will” targets. These tend to be administrative centers and operations that keep the bureaucracy moving as it were. It could be something like Ft. Ben was/is in Indianapolis (want your money? Be nice to Ft. Ben!), to Fort Huachua which is home to a number of commands including the Army Intelligence Center. One can spend some time arguing where any given base or center falls in the rankings. Honestly, a lot comes down to how the given enemy views that location.

Why does it matter? Simple. There are limits to the number of nuclear weapons in the world, and there is a limit to the number of delivery systems. Some of the commenters on earlier posts have already dived head-first into those waters (or potentially even started scuba diving). For today, I’m going to keep it largely hypothetical with just a few dashes of reality.

Let’s start with that dash of reality. The U.S. land-based ICBM of choice is the LGM-30G Minuteman III. The Russian missile on which we will focus is the Satan 2/RS-28 Sarmat, which is in the process of replacing the Satan-1 missiles. Originally scheduled to be completed around 2018, this is still in process which suggests a few things. For all that I’m concentrating for now on Russia and the U.S., you may want to check out what’s going on with the Chinese as they could easily take over as the top threat from Russia. As within hours to be honest.

For our purposes today, we are going to go with some assumptions which may or may not be precise, but work for the points of this exercise. First, for U.S. weapons we are going to go with 400 missiles, each capable of carrying 3 independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (range 1,100 miles though not part of today’s exercise). For Russia, we are going to go with the same number of Satan-2 missiles, but for purposes of the exercise we will limit it to 11 re-entry vehicles (possible mix of light, heavy, HGV; range 11,000 miles).

Now, to set the final stage of the exercise, let’s limit each side to just 1,500 nuclear weapons. Close to treaty, though how close to reality is something very different. Reality is that some on each side are going to be other-than-strategic, with the Russians having (again, according to RUMINT) a significantly larger stockpile of tactical/other-than-strategic. For exercise purposes, treat all 1,500 as strategic weapons of various sizes.

Now, go back to the discussions on reliability and let’s go with the (ludicrous) position of 80 percent success. My very cynical view on reliability is that one would be far better going with a 20 percent success rate, but let’s be optimistic for the exercise. Let’s assume that 80 percent of the missiles will launch; 80 percent of the nuclear weapons will work as advertised; and, that 80 percent of the aircraft will make it into the air and not be sidelined by mechanical or other issues.

Which means that the missiles on either side are reduced to 320 missiles. Which reduces the U.S. to 960 effective warheads via missiles and the Russians to 3,520 warheads. Ooops. Is anyone spotting a problem here? Well, it’s a problem and one of the issues in regards START and related treaties — no one really knows how many ICBMS Russia has. No one knows how many nuclear weapons they truly have either. One set of estimates is here and another is here. You might notice that there is a wide range on the total number of nuclear weapons Russia (and even the U.S.) are reported to have ready to go. As noted earlier, the 40,000+ warheads attributed to the Soviet Union is not reality today. Even so, there is a lot of “wiggle room” and that is what makes planning so much fun!

Again, for purposes of the exercise, let’s ignore reality and limit both sides to 960 effective warheads. Now, which ones are they? Are they on the missiles that don’t launch? How many are on missiles that do launch? Welcome to the sub-lesson Paranoia 101 in target selection! You can’t just assign one warhead to a crucial primary target. You have to figure on at least two warheads, on different missiles, to have a shot at one hitting on target. Really critical targets (such as The Hole, Pentagon/NMCC, etc.) are going to get 3-4 warheads via missiles, and then one or two via bomber.

You can get away with targeting one weapon per missile silo (odds aren’t good on catching it in the ground anyway) or even control capsules (and, yes, the Russians and others pretty much know where they are). Your major command and control nodes? You need to plan on 3-5 warheads for each target. Oh, and to make the planning even more fun, you can’t have all the warheads arrive at once. There’s a thing called nuclear fratricide which could have one nuke take out, or mitigate the effects of, the other nukes if they all hit about the same time. If you want to know more on the topic, do a search of “Dense Pack” and nuclear.

Now, for this exercise, let’s just keep it simple and go with each nuke being a large device. The fact is, as a commenter noted a while back, 4-40 KT bombs can be far more effective than a single 400 KT device. This being a 201-level exercise, we won’t get into size and placement. Presume each device is the same and we are using airburst rather than ground or ground-penetration blasts. FYI, going back to a comment, an underground test is not supposed to breach the surface (though such is reported to have happened), and even the so-called theoretical deep-penetrating warheads are going to send boom upwards and out — and frankly produce some nasty fallout in the process. It will NOT stay all underground.

Okay, now: pick your targets. If you want, you can play Russia and pick targets in the U.S., or you can pick targets in Russia. Up to you. Just you have to stay within the numbers above. In fact, if you like, since this is just an exercise, go with only missiles. Adding in bombers, sea-launch, and other delights really is a 301- or higher level course.

Ready? Go.

In some respects, there are no right or wrong answers for this highly theoretical exercise. The primary purpose is to get you to thinking about what constitutes a target so that you can understand current events. It also allows you to assess things such as if you live in a target zone, and if so what can you do to improve your odds of survival. Despite a number of movies and breathless television dramas, you can survive. Much depends on the level of target near you, distance to that target, and other factors.

For example, currently living in Indianapolis (and please help me get out of here!), I rate us as a secondary target. It’s not like it was years back when you had Ft. Ben as a bit more than just an admin center, major manufacturing, and some other things. Back then, one could make a case that Indy was targeted for at least four weapons. Today, with logistics being the dominant industry here, Ft. Ben reduced, and the critical wartime manufacturing pretty much gone, a good case could be made for a single weapon.

Then the debate turns to how large and where. The argument I put forth earlier in the series looked at a 1 MT device airburst over the state capitol. Such an attack would take out several major interstate highways, a major airport, potentially cripple midwest rail operations, air and ground cargo operations, and state government. An equally good case can be made for targeting the airport (which would take out the state capitol in the process). Frankly, I don’t like either choice as while I am outside the total destruction zone, I would still be in the conflagration zone. Much better odds with the airport, but… Rough (very rough) rule of thumb on a 1 MT airburst: 4 mile radius total/near-total destruction, 2-4 mile additional radius for fire after damage. Not perfect, but gives you something to work with on damage assessment.

Again, this is all a higher level course but it is something about which you do need to think.

Oh, one final thought to share in selecting your targets for this exercise. If you choose to play Vladimir and target the United States, there is one other major consideration when looking at the number of missiles and warheads: you don’t want to use them all. You need to keep a reserve because it’s not just the U.S. and Russia. If you are playing Russia and use all your nukes and missiles on the U.S., Xi is going to be over on the side going ‘youuuuu soooo stuuuppppiiiddddd!’ as you just gave up your ability to deter him from taking some valuable chunks out of your empire.

Again, while it is a higher level course, keep in mind that Vladimir does not have the luxury of just targeting the U.S. He’s got to target NATO and more. Again, that’s higher level, but keep in mind the deeper you get into this the more targets you need to think about for your weapons. You also have to think about which weapons you want to hold in reserve, and how.

Finally, there should be some computer games/simulations out there. Years back, I remember one called (I think, stupid lightning) “Nuke War” that was a limited (only 3 or so dimensions) study that worked you through the Triad (planes, missiles, sub-launched) where you had to choose how to spend your defense budget for same and build up a nuclear capability. It also, at random, would decide to kick off a nuclear exchange. Think there were or are some others. If you know a good one, speak up in the comments.

Ah, that’s the other point I wanted to make today: Nuclear Winter. At worst, it will be nuclear autumn. Keep in mind that the original study on Nuclear Winter used a literally two-dimensional model of the Earth to come up with it’s conclusions. If memory serves, I think 16-24 dimensions are required just to start getting the atmosphere (much less what it does) correct. Caught an earful from a rather annoyed scientist at a major government lab over that one day. Enjoyed the info, though I enjoyed playing with an early version of the holodeck even more.

So, have fun and take a look at your list then tuck it away. If we keep going with this, you will need it again as we once again kick targeting up a level.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

While I still hope for a further guest post or two, today I want to lay out a few further thoughts on nuclear communications. We’ve got into some of the how, and why, they are done the way they are to prevent problems. Another point to consider is that you don’t want any enemy or potential enemy to be able to read your mail.

The fact is, anyone with a functional brain does tests of their command and control systems. You check things out, try to find and correct problems, and test the reliability of the system in all aspects. Thing is, you don’t want those who don’t like you to know what you do and how you do it as it gives them both information and options.

There is a lot of discussion on preventing or eliminating that command and control communications. If you can do that, you can keep release and launch orders from going out. Thing is, even better, if you can get the right info and access the right things you can do something even worse: you can take over that net. Imagine if someone got inside the net, sent the necessary targeting info, then launched your missiles for you — at targets inside your own country/forces.

Shades of a bad James Bond movie? Not entirely, and there are rumors that such has been gamed out.

Going back to reading the mail, keep in mind that different countries/powers use different systems. We tend to go with solid rocket motors, while others go for liquid engines. If you are using liquid engines, you have to load fuel before launch. If someone is reading your mail, and they know you’ve ordered all rockets to load fuel, a process that is not instantaneous though faster than it was I’ve heard, and that you’ve taken steps to prevent detection of said loading, what happens? Do you think they might launch attacks that can hit your sites before load and launch is complete? Using sea- and air-launched assets could take out the attack before it gets started, and reserves the crucial land-based launch capabilities for either last-ditch or follow-on operations.

So, you want to have a robust system to prevent bad things and ensure that things work. Do we have such? No. As a commenter pointed out earlier (think it was The Drill Sergeant) we do not, and in fact some of what we have is reported (widely) to still use floppy discs. On the good news front, as someone noted in an article elsewhere, it uses technology that is so old it pretty much precludes modern hackers from getting inside it. For a number of reasons, I invite you to research this on your own as it is yet another area where we need to be making some serious changes and upgrades.

On that happy note, enjoy your weekend!

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

Seems like a good idea, I’m sure

What do we think will happen if the G-7 attempts to force Russia and the shipping companies that ship Russian oil to limit prices?

I wonder if this will be able to break the economic law that price caps result in shortages. Especially curious if it will work when they’re targeting their price caps at a country, not just a commodity, and it’s a country that’s already using energy as part of an economic warfare plan.

G-7 Rolls Out Plan to Cap Price of Russian Oil
The Group of Seven wealthy nations rolled out a plan to cap the price of Russian oil on global markets, committing to a novel new sanctions plan aimed at limiting Russia’s revenue from oil sales as its invasion of Ukraine grinds on.
WSJ

Into The Light: Mikhail Gorbachev

It was the best of times, it was the worst of times. For those in the West, we were indeed not only in a good time, but heading into a golden age in many respects. For those not in the West, particularly behind the Iron Curtain, the times truly sucked on a scale that few today can conceive. That so many now look back on the time with nostalgia says something about how fucked up things are today…

I noted yesterday that I have mixed emotions on the passing of Gorbachev. That is being polite. The man was the enemy, on more than one level. Yet, I have come to have respect for the man, for reasons and because Boss had respect for him.

It was that respect, along with understanding, that allowed Reagan to run the board. To use information from a number of sources, including Agent Farewell, to put Gorbachev into a position where he had no choice to but to bow to the inevitable. Make no mistake: the man fought long and hard to keep the CCCP going, and remained a Leninist, if not a Marxist, to his dying day. He was murderous, vicious, and more.

Yet, he did two things that indicated a moral clarity, or at least honesty, that I’m not sure to this day if any other Soviet/Russian leader has the capacity to do. One, well, rather than a certain former astronaut Gorbachev may be responsible for my first silver hairs, and the other is the fact that at the end, he realized that he and Soviet communism had lost and accepted it. Not easily, not well on some levels, but he had lost and he knew it. He then worked towards making it a soft landing, at least for some. That doing so helped others [see the (in) famous Pizza Hut commercial] may or may not have been an intended benefit.

I admit that now I wish I had taken the opportunity to hear him speak. Perhaps even in a small group setting, as it would have allowed a different, perhaps better, understanding of some of what is happening today. Thing is, Gorbachev was/is despised by most current Kremlin leadership (including Vladimir) because he was NOT a slavophile, but looked to the West. He felt very strongly that the best future for Russia lay with and through engagement with the West and adopting Western modes and thoughts. Word from various sources is that he was, er, not happy, with Vladimir for destroying “his legacy” of engagement with the West.

That said, I also admit that in many ways rather than sharing a cognac with Gorbachev I would much rather have had a beer or three with Lech Walesa, some time with Vaclav Havel, or the honor of a meeting with John Paul II. For all I would like to understand more of how the loss was handled, I feel that there is an even greater need — particularly now and not just with the Russia/Ukraine war — to understand all the ways that led to us winning. If the West and its legacy of thought is to be saved, we need look to these men (and Boss).

To steal from another classic, I come here today not to praise Gorbachev, but to bury him. Would that we could and were burying the murderous legacy of communism and socialism along with him. Sadly, we are not and even as we deal with the hopefully dying heads of the hydra that is the legacy of Marx and Lenin there are lessons to be learned from his life.

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

Couple Of Quick Thoughts

Uh Oh

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Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

A guest post by John Donovan, the Armorer of Castle Arrgghhh (and Lizzie)

Nuke weapons design and policy are governed by the need for safety and control. PALs are a component of control.

What is a PAL? PAL stands for Permissive Action Link. The purpose of the PAL is not to prevent unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon by rogue elements of the US military command. We do that via the EMAS (Emergency Message Authentication System) and NRAS (Nuclear Release Authentication System) systems and the imposition of strict two-person control (at a minimum) at each step of the process.

Some of those processes can be longer than others, depending on whether the weapons involved are “first strike deterrent” weapons like the USAF ballistic missiles and the USN SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) or further down the chain like the manned bombers, cruise missiles and formerly, US Army tactical nuclear missiles and artillery. PALS are also distinct from
safeties. Safeties are intended to prevent premature or accidental initiation or partial initiation of a warhead.

PALS have a different niche.

NATO airbase, mid-sixties. NATO fighter-bomber, fully fueled and armed, sits on “strip alert,” pilot strapped in. A lone US Airman armed with an M1 carbine stands guard. He is literally the only thing standing between chaos and disaster should that non-US NATO pilot decide (or get told by his government) to light up his jet and go bomb a target. Soviet or not. (1)

US Army Warhead Detachment, Mid-70s. NATO ally army trucks and some tanks roll up to the Detachment’s gate. The purpose of the detachment is to secure and maintain nuclear warheads (missile or artillery) stored in NATO nations that are there for either US units, or, upon authorization, NATO
units. Tensions are erupting between the ally and another nation and signals intelligence indicates that the ally’s generals have been talking to each other about taking some of the warheads to use as a lever against the other belligerent. While the confrontation at the gate never happened, the conversations did. (2)

Hey, NATO Ally – are you my buddy, my pal right now? No? That is why have PALs. To prevent unauthorized people from using US-provided nukes without express authorization from the President of the United States. The problem with both of those scenarios is that besides being scary as hell, it was (and still is) contrary to US law about control of US nukes, i.e., only we could give release, no one could take one of our weapons and use them unilaterally. Only we get to do that.

Yet, we gave nuclear-capable weapon systems to allies – the Nike-Hercules air defense missiles, various US Army tactical missiles like Honest John, Lance, and Pershing, and 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery projectiles. And many NATO aircraft were nuke-delivery capable. And all that had to be scattered around Central Europe so that those nations could quickly employ them if things got ugly on the North German Plain and the rolling hills of Bavaria along the Czechoslovakian border. Same was true of bombs, and NATO aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA).

We needed something better than the Airman 1st Class-Mounted M1 Carbine Nuke Weapon Disabler. There are four types of PALs (at least that are acknowledged publicly these days) that are variations on a theme. They are either electrical/digital and integral to the weapon, buried inside where it is hard to get to them, and they interfere with the arming/initiation process until unlocked from an external code transmitted to them, or they are like combination locks that must be unlocked with a code thoughtfully provided by a two-man US warhead team acting under orders with the codes received via the NRAS system. Mechanically removing them will take time, and, most likely, render the warhead inoperative.

Giving hopefully cooler heads time to intervene. A balance between the profound need to control release and the tactical realities of modern combat
“Bypassinag a PAL should be, as one weapons designer graphically put it, about as complex as performing a tonsillectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end.” (3)

Acknowledgements and further reading, if you want further unclassified details.

A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
Steven M. Bellovin Permissive Action Links (columbia.edu) A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
A drier, more technical discussion of both Safety and Control. Subscription to the Bulletin is required to access the archived articles.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features To cite this article: (1991) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 47:8, 48-49, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025

Notes
(1) Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter. Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons. University Press, 1987
(2) Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War. Presidio Press/Ballantine Books,
2004.
(3) Caldwell, Dan and Zimmerman, Peter D., “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War with Permissive Action
Links”, in Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Blechman, Barry M., ed., Johns
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989.

Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge the sharp eye and excellent editorial instincts of Lizzie, a feline of great discernment. Not only did she keep him company and offer encouragement, she added stray characters and deleted random paragraphs to test this scribbler’s skill. Sic Semper Felinus.

Acknowledgement II: This old wolf wishes to thank John for coming out of blogging retirement, as it were, to add to the Nuclear 201 series and to Lizzie for her contributions as well.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Uh Oh

Yesterday, I think I missed the boat even though I saw the lights. In writing about Darya Dugina, I spent too much time covering all the possibilities for who wanted her dead, and missed a couple of signs of what was to come. Between the time I wrote that in the morning, and got up this morning, a LOT has been made clear. In fact, I should have caught one thing earlier in terms of the lauding of her.

Her murder came via the FSB and the Putin camp. Of that much I am fully convinced. Putin needs something to rally the people, to overcome the reluctance (and even possible mutinies in the armed forces) to mobilize more fully if not fully to deal with the Ukraine. A pretext for that and/or crackdowns in Russia.

Ms. Dugina had become problematic in terms of her presentations to the West, discussions in public of what she would do if she was the defense minister versus her cynical reversals in private, and even attempts to usurp her father. Neither are the close Putin allies they portrayed themselves as being, as I noted yesterday that is a thing of the West, not Russia.

While I’m not quite (yet) prepared to agree fully with Kamil Galeev’s take on the matter, he makes some good points. One not raised directly is that the Kremlin was ready to roll with the propaganda even before the smoke cleared. That means advanced planning, which means she was sacrificed. Think the maskirova of the children in Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising.

Almost immediately a senior leader in occupied territory extolled her as a true Russian. That led to a chorus of praise for a person who, in practical terms was a nobody even if a “golden child.” You can look them up (here’s a start and here’s more on her rapid memorial service and praise), but it amounts to equating her to be a personification of the Rodina, of Russia. The maiden who was murdered by a foul fallen woman of the cowardly enemy who fled immediately. The maiden who serves as the modern Russian version of the medieval dame belle sans reproach. Or, a sacrifice that rather eerily is foreshadowed by this article by her father (in Russian here), the maiden who mourns her virginity as she dies before she can give birth. In this case, to children for the Rodina, is how I expect to see it played. I have to wonder if this was what gave Putin/FSB the idea for dealing with her.

She was no maiden. She was no innocent. She was at best cynically manipulative and didn’t care who died so long as she could advance towards power and wealth. For all that she was problematic, she was nobody in the true circles of power which means her sacrifice will not create powerful enemies. As for her father, this will bring him further to heel and the fact that he could have died (and those behind the assassination would not have objected to that at all) is a point that is not lost on him. One wonders why he switched cars at the last minute: was it luck or does he have a further role to play?

Why now?

Ukraine’s independence day is this week. U.S. Citizens were already being urged to leave the Ukraine ahead of the day as it was anticipated that Russia would engage in attacks on civilians/civilian infrastructure. Given what is coming out of Moscow in regards revenge for the death of the martyr, I’m thinking the barbarity shown to civilians before is nothing in comparison to what is to come. The only question I have is if it will now be the main thrust since purely military operations are not going well (pretty badly in fact).

Which leads to the longer-term questions: will her death be used for internal crackdown, for fuller or full mobilization to deal with the threat, or both? Right now, based on what I am seeing/hearing, I suspect both. Dugina had called in public for more troops and to quit messing around. Her death gives Putin et cie the perfect excuse to do that, and to whip the public up in support (and to crush those who refuse). For who will stand against Putin honoring her “dying” wish to expand the war and achieve victory?

The only fly-in-the-ointment is that within Russia she is such a complete non-entity. For all her efforts to unite various non-Kremlin factions, she’s not well known and then mostly because of being her father’s daughter. If they can turn her into the epitome of the ultimate Russian martyr, the maiden who died for Russia, then I expect to see full mobilization and a truly impressive crackdown. If they can’t pull that off, but public sentiment remains charged, expect to see a limited mobilization. In either event, expect to see brutality against civilians in the Ukraine on a scale unimaginable to many in the West.

More thoughts soon.

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

Russia/Ukraine Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

Couple Of Quick Thoughts

*****

Nuclear 201: Some History

Welcome to the first entry of the Nuclear 201 series. While this is still a high-level approach to learning about nuclear war and related issues, it’s time to take a bit more detailed look at some of the issues. In fact, if anyone out there is interested in contributing a guest post on a relevant topic, drop me an e-mail at the address in the upper right. If some things work out, hope to have at least a couple, if not more, guest posts and/or related.

To understand where we are requires some history. The thing is, the history of the nuclear age is fascinating and there are many, many rabbit holes down which we could dive. There are tales of brilliance, stupidity, treachery, and honor. Some are humorous if terrifying, such as scientists and engineers placing bets on if a certain bomb was going to involve the atmosphere in its reaction and reduce the Earth to a cinder — even as the detonation countdown was underway.

While Einstein’s famous equation E=MC2 (squared) started the ball rolling, it wasn’t until the 1930s that people got serious about the idea of nuclear power and nuclear explosives. It really was the fact that Nazi Germany was looking into things that spurred the U.S. into pursuing its own research after the famous Einstein letter (which he signed but did not write) of 1939.

The history of this period is complex and fascinating. There were competing theories on how to achieve various milestones, and each group seemingly went its own way. Germany decided on one approach that required heavy water, and the successful effort by the Norwegian underground to deny them what they needed may well have kept them from being first with a bomb. I wish I could remember the name of the book I read on the Norwegian effort that I found excellent, and there was another on the German nuclear program that was accurate and entertaining. Stupid lightning. Trust me, reading up on these efforts, as well as the work of the Four Hungarians of the Apocalypse on the Manhattan Project is well worth your time.

For our Nuclear 201 purposes, one bit of important history is that the Manhattan Project (and quite possibly the Nazi project) were penetrated by the Soviets pretty much from the start. No, the Rosenbergs were not the be-all and end-all of nuclear espionage. Again, several good books out there (beware some recent revisionist histories). Net result was that Stalin was not surprised when Truman revealed The Bomb to him as he was fully briefed and pushing a secret effort of his own to catch up using the info coming in from the various moles in the program.

In the brief window of time where the U.S. was the sole nuclear power on Earth, there were some who thought that status could be made to last forever; some others who thought it could be made to last for years if not decades; and, a few who pointed out that it wouldn’t last long. Since some of their spiritual descendants are active today, let’s take a very quick look at the major schools of thought.

First, there were those who felt that for anyone to develop The Bomb they would have to go through the entire Manhattan Project (or Nazi counterpart) to do so. Even if they did get a few nuclear secrets, the steps had to be repeated and those efforts, especially the need for high-speed centrifuges, would be easily detectable. Warn the country, and if not heeded, take out the project with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Second, there were those who said that most of the project could be skipped with the right knowledge. Or espionage. This would save years of effort, and the key signs would be the centrifuges and other large-scale activities that would be hard to hide.

Finally, there were those who said the entire project could be skipped since the knowledge was out there, and what couldn’t be stolen could be worked out by smart people. Again, it was the centrifuges and other large-scale efforts that would be the clue that Country X was working on The Bomb.

Then the Soviet’s exploded their first bomb and put to rest the idea that the U.S. would remain the sole nuclear power for any length of time. They also sort of proved the last group right in the process. And thus the nuclear arms race was born.

In some respects, what happened is proof of the Toddler Laws school of thought. Who had the largest? Who had the most unique? Who could make the smallest? Who had the most advanced design? The race was on and both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to out do the other in every possible aspect. So much so, that at one point it is believed that the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear weapons. The U.S. was reported to have a few itself. Great Britain and France appear to have felt that a few hundred each was more reasonable. Maybe.

Now, as this was going on, a number of people questioned what was going on, and eventually various treaties were negotiated to reign things in a bit. This is a decent list of those treaties by year. We could talk for months, if not years, just about the treaties (much like the history of the original projects), but I will for now leave it up to you to decide if that is a rabbit hole you wish to explore.

Those treaties were why Boss coined his famous phrase “Trust, but verify.” I’m not saying that the Soviet Union (or later Russia) had a reputation for violating treaties of all sorts before the ink was dry, but I will say that they had (have) quite the reputation for developing some of the most interesting interpretations of various clauses in various treaties. So much so that the complexities of those interpretations twist things to the point the time-space continuum should have shattered.

What truly matters out of all of this for our 201 purposes is that right now as a result of these treaties the Russians are thought to have approximately 6,257 nuclear warheads with 1,458 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. The U.S. is reported to have approximately 5,550 warheads with 1,389 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. Three sites with information on all nuclear countries are here, here, and here.

The thing to keep in mind is that not all of these are strategic weapons. You have tactical devices and you have some specialized charges as well: shaped charges, atomic demolition munitions, and other oddities. We’ll get more into that soon enough.

Meantime, here’s a bit on how the Soviets used nuclear weapons to put out some oil field fires. Makes me wonder what Red Adair could have done with a few nukes…

Yes, there is a LOT more that we could cover today. Again, trying to keep it high level and point towards places (and topics) for exploration. Neat thing is, more and more keeps coming out about the early days, here and elsewhere, and it just adds more fascinating material to an already interesting field of study. We may well jump back into some of this as Nuclear 201 continues. For now, however, this gives you enough overview to understand what is to come.

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Russia/Ukraine Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

Couple Of Quick Thoughts

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Couple of Quick Thoughts

Though I’m not feeling great, hoping this is the first of two posts today. With luck, I will get up the first Nuclear 201 post later today. Two quick things to keep in mind when getting the news today.

First, when you see stories like this one, take them with several grains of salt. The source for this story is a single-source opposition Telegram channel. Such can be useful for intel, but they are heavily biased and, like this one, don’t have the greatest track record for accuracy. Sure, they do get some things right but they also have a vested interest in painting that which they oppose with the darkest brush possible.

As to their points, I do think Vladimir came face-to-face with his own mortality 3-5 years ago. How, I’m not sure: it could be illness or other close call. I will say that he is not the man he was, and is very much off his game. Is he vacillating on nuclear or other special weapons? Unsure, though it appears various factions in the Kremlin and out are pushing for a variety of options including tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. How seriously anyone is taking that is the real question. The magic 8-Ball says ask again later.

I am finding the assassination of Darya Dugina to be extremely interesting. Others are coming around to my take that she was indeed the target, though I strongly suspect there were have been some joy and rejoicing had both she and her father been taken out. For those who don’t know, her father is Alexandr Dugin, who is often ascribed in the West of being “Putin’s Brain,” “Putin’s Rasputin,” or just Putin’s philosopher. It should be noted that such tropes are more a thing of the West and not of Russia.

Both have played up the Putin connection, particularly in the West. She, in fact, has been trying to coordinate bringing together various factions in Russia as well as reaching out to various socialist and far-right groups in the West. This type of empire building is expected to some extent, and it brings up financial incentives as well as power plays — both of which are potential reasons for her elimination.

Her father is indeed an ultra-nationalist, by Western standards fascist (and that may be a bit of understatement), and one of the cast-of-thousands who had input into the creation of Russkiy Mir. I would posit that a certain other (thankfully dead) philosopher had more of a role in some respects, but that may be an angels on the head of a pin argument. Dugin may or may not be a part of Vladimir’s truly inner circle, though there is some reason to believe he really isn’t part of the ultimate insider’s group.

With the bomb being powerful and under the driver’s seat — her seat — and given some other factors, I think she was the target. Again, if it had gotten both of them I suspect no one behind this would have objected. Now, the question gets really interesting: who was behind it? Vladimir has been cleaning house in some respects, as the Gazprom “suicides” show. When people begin talking to those they shouldn’t, bad things happen and a “kill them all” approach is the most likely. Was she talking to people she shouldn’t? Did she perhaps engage in a bit of Vladimir-is-failing-we-need-to-save-Russia and word get back?

Did some of the Western groups with whom she had been in contact, and who may have been involved in financial dealings despite sanctions, feel ripped off? Or decide she was a loose end who needed to be taken care of before she could reveal anything in the West? Did some of the groups inside Russia decide to take her out in a power play? Did a Kremlin faction see a chance to deprive Putin of an ally in the power struggle to come? Yes, yes, I think the first stages are underway, but the real fight is yet to come.

All valid and good questions, and right now there are no good or definitive answers. Along with the reports that someone high-up is talking to the West and trying to find a way out of the Ukraine debacle (again, take with a grain or several of salt), there may be as much speculation going on inside the Kremlin and Russia as there is in the West. For all that comes up on social media in Russia, there is caution and one would love to be a fly on the wall for some of the private conversations that are taking place.

Oh, before I forget, there will be a LOT of finger-pointing at the Ukraine over this. Russia does not want to admit to this being an internal affair, and it also is a chance to unite the people for the war effort. This is believable to a number of factions as Russia had quietly blamed the British for helping Ukrainian SF conduct missions well behind the lines. In fact, early on, there were several instances where various plants and refineries had “accidents” — some well east of Moscow even — that some in the Kremlin put down to such cooperation. Add to it the fact that the Brits were onboard with helping the Ukraine literally months before the invasion and MOD and other Intel had the situation right (unlike pretty much all US intel operations), and there is a reason the Russians were so (irrationally) mad at the Brits and threatening to nuke them. So, even as fingers point at the Ukraine, don’t be surprised if the Brits have a finger pointed at them too.

Just a few thoughts to start a Monday morning. Hopefully, more to come later today.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

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Nuclear War Posts In Order: