Category: Shall We Play The Game?

Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

Nuclear 201: Effects

Nuclear 201: Radiation

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Radiation

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Back in the day when I taught basic science at a small college part time, I would walk into class the day of the lecture on radiation holding a “device” in one hand and announcing that radiation had been detected. I would then reveal the device to be a radio, and use that as the launching point for the lesson. Today, were I to do that I would probably be met with absolute panic instead of eye rolls.

The fact is, we are surrounded by radiation pretty much every moment of every day. Light, radio waves, and other beneficial delights enrich our lives. Radiation, in and of itself, is not a bad thing. I’m going to skip the part of the lesson on the electromagnetic spectrum and get to the meat of today’s lesson.

The type of radiation you really need to be concerned about is ionizing radiation. That’s the nasty stuff that can damage the body and/or kill you. As always, this is a 201-level course and not a 500 or higher physics course.

Ionizing radiation gets its name because the subatomic particle or electromagnetic wave in question can strip electrons from a stable bond or state. By doing so, it converts items into ions (an atom or atoms that have gained or lost electrons), hence the name ionizing radiation. As with other portions of the electromagnetic spectrum, some types of ionizing radiation can have beneficial uses (X-rays for example) when applied in a controlled/limited amount. It’s when the dosage and type of ionizing radiation is not controlled that things get interesting.

Most texts, especially lower-level texts, break ionizing radiation down into three types: Alpha, Beta, and Gamma. Gamma is in many ways a “catch all” as neutrons, X-rays, and even cosmic radiation fall into that category.

Alpha is the easiest to deal with. Basically, two neutrons and two protons bound together, though that’s really not critical info for this lesson. The fact is, a piece of paper can stop alpha radiation. Most clothing blocks it, and the skin has as one of its functions stopping alpha radiation. It is, however, strongly ionizing.

Beta radiation is basically an electron or positron moving at high speed. It is actually less ionizing that Alpha, though more than Gamma. A thin sheet of aluminum (note, not foil) will stop beta radiation, though it is not a good idea to use it. Fact is, some forms of beta radiation can have enough energy to create gamma radiation when they hit such a shield.

Gamma radiation is not just gamma, but also pretty much the rest of the electromagnetic spectrum. To protect against it (that which you can protect against — there are some subatomic particles out there that pass through the entire Earth basically undiminished and are a bear to detect and study) takes serious shielding, such as concrete, lead, or special materials that combine layers of shielding.

Keep in mind that we are naturally exposed to some ionizing radiation every day. The atmosphere protects us from a good bit, but if you spend a lot of time in airplanes you are getting a higher exposure than you would if you stayed on the ground. It is also in the ground and otherwise around us. That’s one reason it’s a good idea to have your basement, or even crawl space, checked in certain parts of the country. The key is limiting the exposure.

To wrap up for the day, let’s talk radioactive materials. Radioactive materials are ones that are unstable in terms of their atomic structure, and as such give off energy (heat, ionizing radiation, etc.) as they “decay” into more stable materials. Yeah, yeah, there’s a lot more to it than that, again, this is a 201-level course. Don’t tell me your primary school introductory science course included bond types, valences, and other delights, especially since you were lucky to get baking soda and vinegar right…

Radioactive elements have what is called a half-life: the amount of time it takes for one half of the material in question to go away (change into a different form). For example, tritium (critical for nuclear weapons) has a half life of 12.3 years, while cobalt-60 (used in radiotheraphy/radiation treatments) has a half life of 5.26 years. Others, however, have half lives that can be measured in thousands if not millions of years, or, in fractions of a second.

This is important for our purposes as a nuclear bomb exploding is going to interact with the atmosphere, structures, and the ground in such a way that it will effectively convert non-radioactive materials into radioactive materials. Some of these materials will have a blessedly short (though energetic) half-life. Some are going to be around for a long time to come. In addition to radioactive contamination of the blast site, the nuclear explosion (and fires that follow) are going to send this radioactive material up into the air where it will eventually fall back to Earth. This is known as fallout, and it will be a significant part of survival after a nuclear explosion.

Tomorrow I think we will get into survival, preparedness, and some of the realities of radiation exposure.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

Nuclear 201: Effects

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Effects

For those who have persevered and gotten through: THANK YOU! My hosting provider Dreamhost sucks. Think I’ve been down more than I’ve been up the last few months. I’m now talking with two other providers to find out what it will cost to get their help migrating to an actual hosting provider. Particularly one that can handle basic blogging. I will add that to the fundraiser (getting hit by lightning and being out of work this long sucks even worse than Dreamhost, and that’s going some) and see what can be done.

Okay, in Nuclear 101 we sort of glossed over the effects and just went with a form of “bad” to describe them. We’ve alluded to some effects in 201, but now is the time to start exploring what happens when a bomb detonates. So, today we are going to get into what happens and what it means to you.

There is a good bit of information out there, though on a personal basis I tend to avoid anything from the Union of Confused Scientists (or those that travel with them). If someone is focusing on the politics and max damage, check out another site. Also, watch for the use of the “terror terms” like ‘zone of total destruction’ and those describing massive radiation effects. Remind me and I will get more into the types of ionizing radiation (the bad stuff) next week when looking at practical preparedness. For a fictional but accurate account, see Tom Clancy’s Sum of All Fears.

If you could somehow watch the process, as the bomb detonates you would see a massive burst of radiation. While X-rays are part of the detonation cycle, what results from the reaction is a wave of neutrons. This pulse is going to fry any and all electronics nearby, including the bio-electric computer that is the human nervous system. Immediately after is a burst of heat. Well, to describe it as intense heat is a bit of understatement.

Immediately thereafter is the pressure wave. Referred to as overpressure, this blast takes the damage up and can devastate a large area. How large depends on the size and type of bomb, as well as where it detonates. More on that in a bit. Now, also depending on the type and size, you can get a preliminary vacuum effect where the blast first sucks in all the air around it, then sends it back out again with the pressure wave. Look at some of the old above-ground test footage to see that in action.

Now, along with all this, you are going to get various types of radiation spreading out as well. This is going to come, in large measure, from incomplete reactions within the bomb and the surroundings it consumes. Again, next week we will get a bit more into this and the concepts of radiation versus ionizing radiation.

I admit this is rather simplistic. Then again, this is the 201-level course and not physics 990.

What it means is that what we have to consider in planning is:

An initial wave of neutron radiation, for 201 purposes we will assign this the smallest area of effect;

An intense burst of heat, potentially several hundred million degrees, in a larger area; and,

A pressure wave that will race out and damage a significantly larger area.

Now, thanks to the heat and pressure, you are also going to have an area subject to (potentially massive) fires.

An easy way to think of it is as an onion. The core area is the initial burst of radiation. Just out from it you have the area subject to the intense heat. The next area out from that is what is damaged by the overpressure. Out from that, you have an area that between that blast of intense heat and damage short-of-massive-destruction is probably going to catch fire and burn. There is a concept known as firestorm that is really a 301- or even a 401-level course that suggests large cities are going to basically go up in flames, particularly if thermonuclear weapons are used.

Now, does this mean you can sit down to a map and plot out a uniform damage area no matter the target? No. Not only does the radius of those bits of “onion” change with the size and type of device, it also changes with the location of detonation.

If you want to cause the most damage to the widest possible area, you set your nuclear bomb to go off in the air, what is called an air burst. For each size of bomb, there is an optimum height above ground for detonation to ensure maximum damage to the largest area. This is why I went, in previous discussions, with an airburst attack on Indianapolis. Doing an airburst will do the widest possible destruction, ensuring that interstates, rail, air, etc. are taken out even as leadership and corporate leadership based downtown are destroyed as well. To be honest, my worst-case estimates of such an attack have pretty much everything within 465 as toast given the potential for fires. If Indiana is lucky, 465 may serve as a firebreak on all but the south side.

Now, let’s say that Vladimir likes High Tax Holcomb about as much as most voters, and learns that he has a bunker stocked with caviar, fois gras and champagne in the basement of the circle jerk (state government complex) so that he can ride things out in style while the peasants get what they deserve. In that case, he might use a ground-burst. In that case, the nuclear device would explode at ground level. This will maximize destruction downtown, but limit the blast zone. While downtown will be heavily damaged/destroyed, the areas out from there are not as likely to suffer blast damage and/or fires afterwards though fallout is going to be much heavier.

Now, let’s say that High Tax Holcomb’s WEF buddies chipped in and got him a deep bunker to ride out riots, revolutions, or war. In that case, Vladimir might opt for a deep-penetration vehicle which would take the bomb deep underground before detonation. Unlike an underground nuclear test, such a detonation will breach the surface. Thing is, there will be little of the traditional effects above ground, though an area (size depending on the size of the bomb, depth, etc.) is going to rise up and then subside. Overpressure and thermal damage will be minimized at the surface, though fallout could be massive depending on how much of the blast does make it out. To get an idea of what the ground will do, check this out.

Now, when you read about zones of total destruction and the like, keep in mind that all explosions, including nuclear, are peculiar beasts. Various things, including atmospheric phenomena, can alter or shape blast fronts. If you look at Hiroshima, you can see a toroid-effect around the exact center of the blast where things were heavily damaged but not completely destroyed/vaporized. Even with an airburst, structures on the ground may shield areas. As I noted earlier, I’ve seen some amazing things happen with blast fronts.

Surviving in the immediate zone of damage/destruction depends in large measure on luck, on being underground (deep even), and well protected. The closer you are to the target, the deeper you need to be. You also better be prepared to dig yourself out and get out. The further away from ground zero the better the odds of your survival.

Next week, we will start taking a look at what is needed to survive in a nuclear environment. Keep in mind that quite a lot can be done to prepare within the precepts of practical preparedness, as while there are an almost infinite number of potential disasters, there are less than five types of damage. Makes planning and preparation much, much easier.

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Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

Really wanted a catchier title this morning, but the imagination just isn’t cooperating. In some ways, this lesson is a hodge-podge of concepts yet it really isn’t. Instead, it takes scenarios and targeting and puts them into a plan that is governed to some extent by policy including (one hopes) how and when things escalate.

Absent some serious flip-ups, the detonation of a single nuclear device, or even two, should not result in a full-scale nuclear exchange. I will note that this is dependent upon Dead Hand not being programmed/ordered to do so on the Russian side, and a couple of other minor caveats, but one or two detonations — particularly in the tactical range — should not trigger all-out nuclear war.

First up, let’s explore a couple of points of policy. Absent signs of a massive full-scale attack by any enemy, the unofficial policy of the United States has been more towards restraint and proportionality. I say unofficially as the U.S., like most nuclear powers, has been coy about discussing what it will or won’t do in response to any attack. The idea is to avoid getting locked into a set of actions that might not be the best option(s) under the circumstances. Having the maximum amount of flexibility in deciding when, where, and how to respond is a very good thing.

For all that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was and is a thing, most people with any degree of sanity really want to avoid that. After all, you flush yours and we flush ours has a degree of finality to it for all the governments of the world, and isn’t going to be that good for the world in general. So, even if highly unofficial, flexibility is preferred by leaders with a degree of sanity everywhere. Those without sanity, or highly desperate, are the reason MAD put the world at the mercy of the least stable (mentally, politically, otherwise) leader(s) anywhere.

Which does bring up a number of issues, including how does one respond to someone using tactical nuke(s), or that is using chemical, biological or other weapons. I grew up and spent years using CBN (chemical, biological, nuclear) rather than WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) or the current CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive). The latter encompasses a much broader range of nastiness, though I think WMD does cover things from a legal standpoint. Despite what some may think, the U.S. is not party to any treaty that bans the use of Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE), thermobaric, or other weapons. Reminds me, there is someone I need to ping to see if they might be willing to do a guest post on the various Geneva and Hague conventions and what the U.S. is, and is not, signed up to.

It was long the position of the United States that anyone using any type of WMD (CBRNE, MNOPQRS, or whatever) was effectively using a nuke and would be responded to as if they HAD used a nuke. The policy had the desired effect in that it made rogue states (and others) think twice and at least openly avoid using any type of WMD. It also gave the Soviet Union some pause in regards its doctrines calling for the use of various WMD in military operations. That it may also have helped to lead to some treaties limiting biological and other bits of nastiness is a plus in my book.

However, back in the Obama administration we got the famous “red line in the sand” incident involving Syria and Russia. If you are not familiar with what happened, you do need to look it up. From where I sit, it turns out the lines weren’t red and were indeed written in the sand as there was no real response to the (alleged) use of chemical weapons by Syria and/or Russia.

Which does put the Biden administration in a bit of a bind. If Russia uses WMD in the Ukraine, does it hold to the stated policy or, once again, let it slide? If chemical or other, there is undoubtably going to be a LOT of pressure to let it slide. But, what if it is nuclear? My bet is lots of pressures from a lot of different directions, including from Vladimir with his “escalate to de-escalate” idiocy. Given that Biden reportedly told Vladimir well before the invasion of the Ukraine of his terror at the thought of a nuclear exchange, much less a nuclear war, who knows how either will react.

Which leads us (hopefully) to SIOP. The Strategic Integrated Operations Plan builds on all those scenarios discussed (or at least alluded to) yesterday. Within it are a series of responses to almost any set of circumstances that arise. This includes major and minor targets/target packages per each circumstance. In this case, Biden should already have been briefed in on SIOP when he was VP and should have taken part in some exercises that are designed to get those involved familiar with protocols, options, and other good things. This should have been updated when he because POTUS. Problem is, as Tom Clancy noted in his works, you can get administrations who blow those exercises off…

For our 201-level discussion, let’s start with the idea of Vladimir and Biden staring at each other with steely gazes and firm resolve over the Ukraine. As they jut their jaws and double down on showing firm resolve, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick uses Iran and Pakistan to attack the U.S. (or NATO) while everyone is looking with bated breath at Vladimir and Biden.

Got news for you, it doesn’t mean that everything we have launches at Vladimir. In fact, as a missile officer explained to me many years ago, the only time everything is aimed at one location is right before launch. In fact, he used the analogy of Countries A and B being in a fight (or ready for one) and Country C coming up and shooting Country A in the back. Do you shoot B because C shot you in the back? No. You turn around and shoot Country C.

In this case, it’s obvious pretty quickly what has happened. As a result, SIOP provides options that result in the President choosing target package MOUSE 7 which sends the appropriate weapons by the appropriate means to the assigned targets in those countries (and elsewhere) as needed. In this case, elsewhere could include the cruise liner charted by the Duchy to take its population out to sea so as to survive retaliation. Too bad they didn’t do more OPSEC on that…

SIOP is intended to provide a range of options for each scenario so that POTUS (or successor) can choose the right response given the situation. Within that is some flexibility in regards major and minor targets. The idea is, in part, to keep things equitable if you will. The problem with that, however, is that people are people. Leaders can miscalculate, they can misinterpret data or what is being said to them by their opposite number(s), and they can just flat out flip-up. A good example is in the movie By Dawn’s Early Light where the Russian launch at China is mistaken for another attack on the U.S., which leads to an escalation. That really should have been taken care of by notification through the hot line teletype, but it makes for decent movie…

In short, communications are the key. It’s why in the past a LOT of effort has gone into establishing and maintaining both official and unofficial lines of communications between governments and administrations. It’s why efforts were made to ensure the leaders had some understanding of each other. It’s why even when seconds count, people usually try to communicate. When they don’t is when you get things like the massive flip-up that was the weather rocket incident. Thought for the day: you can never have enough communications and redundant communications. No matter how much you have, there is always someone who does NOT get the word. Plan on it.

For all that the use of WMD, including tactical nuclear weapons, does not have to mean escalation to a larger nuclear exchange, I am concerned that such will happen. When you have one leader who not only threatens such on a regular basis, but has members of his administration talk about total nuclear war and how ready they are for it to the media and others (and even the animals at the zoo as enthusiastically as they go about it), it does not make fertile ground for restraint or for the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” to work as planned. In fact, it pretty much ensures that it won’t work. Throw in an opposite number of advanced age and concerns over mental competence, who spends a good bit of his time threatening and running down the majority of his own citizens, and it is a recipe for something nasty, not tasty and good. It creates a situation ripe for misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

To be honest, the best we can do right now is hold on, hope that the systems on both sides are weighted toward restraint, pray, and prepare. Anyone who says that Russian use of non-nuclear WMD is different from the use of nuclear, well, either doesn’t know history and historical policy, or is just a flippin idiot whistling past the graveyard. Things do NOT have to escalate, but it does depend on reasonable, competent, and frankly brave leadership on every side. May the situation never arise, but if it does, may the leadership on each side rise to the occasion.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Scenarios

First, for those who have persevered and gotten through: THANK YOU! My hosting provider Dreamhost sucks. Think I’ve been down more than I’ve been up the last few months. I’m now talking with two other providers to find out what it will cost to get their help migrating to an actual hosting provider. Particularly one that can handle basic blogging. I will add that to the fundraiser (getting hit by lightning and being out of work this long sucks even worse than Dreamhost, and that’s going some) and see what can be done.

Yesterday we got into the next level of targeting. Still a high level, even though I notice the comments are already pushing you to not just scuba, but go nitrox deep (smile). Before we go much further, I am being a bit of a bastard to you if you are new to all this. It’s for your own good, but still…

In teaching any subject, but particularly science, there are times when certain concepts almost need to be taught at the same time, but for a number of reasons they can’t be. Not easily at any rate. There are some who argue that in discussing nuclear strategy, you should start with scenarios then get into targeting. I take the tack that you need to start thinking about targeting first, as it is a good intro into the complexities involved. Since yesterday started introducing you to the complexities, let’s kick it up a notch and start talking about scenarios.

For all that I need to get into escalation tomorrow (note to self), why the flip are we going nuclear, and how are we doing it? This being a 201-level course, we’re going to sort of skip over the whole why thing for right now, and look more at the how for today.

In “entertainment” (using that term loosely) it’s usually because some bad guy thinks that they can take out their enemy (ies) without consequences (or at least with few for themselves). The madman who unleashes armageddon (deliberately not capitalized) upon a horrified world that has renounced nuclear evil. Sigh. One dimensional characters and threats. Second most popular trope is the religious nutcase unleashing holy war (funny how jihad is now never, ever mentioned in Hollyweird). Until recently (cough, Iran, cough) none of these terrorist organizations were likely to have more than a couple of weapons which put them to terrorism rather than war. Third most common trope is a madman or group that conspires to have the major nuclear powers (usually U.S. and Russia, funny how China is still getting a pass) get into a nuclear exchange so they can come out on top.

For all that they are tropes, and not even necessarily that good, I guarantee you they have been gamed out. Somewhere in the vaults of DoD (perhaps in the same warehouse as the Arc of the Covenant), there is a scenario for the U.S. to attack (or be attacked by) the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Yes, you do want to look that up, for all that it is far left it is a grand farce that manages to hit some interesting and even important points.

And, yes, the idea of Russia deciding to attack for no other reason than that Vladimir thinks he can win (just as he did in the Ukraine, cough) is a scenario. So are various scenarios where people on both sides miscalculate in response to events. If you’ve read your Clancy, you already know that a number of such war games take place so that people can get to know each other, and figure out how to respond to things. Rumor has it that such “games” have not been done in a while, at least on a senior level. If that is true, I think it a huge mistake. One of my larger concerns for escalation involves Russian doctrine and the asinine concept of “escalate to de-escalate.” For a number of reasons, I can see bumbling incompetence on both sides taking things a lot further than they should.

Where you can really start to have fun is in getting away from the traditional doomsday scenario. That’s when you can truly start to get sneaky and explore options that don’t tend to slag the world. At least not immediately.

For example, we’ve already had a comment on yesterday’s post looking at shipping containers in ports. Valid. Gamed even I believe. But, why stop there? What if a “terrorist group” (cough, cough) smuggled in multiple devices and literally drove them into positions? Given all the various uranium sales and such, the ability to analyze the bomb and figure out who it belonged to may not be as easy as it used to be. Yes, that can be done. Which means that if someone parked multiple devices around the U.S., it would take time to figure out where the devices originated. Meantime, if those locations included Sunnyvale, Peterson, Offutt (does building 500 have a loading dock?), Capitol Hill, the White House, the Pentagon, and maybe a couple of others — congratulations you just carried out a dream-level decapitation strike.

Of the leadership that is left, they are scrambling trying to figure out what has happened, how it has happened, and initiate search and rescue efforts. In short, a bit busy and if there is confusion that the attack(s) may have been with our own devices… Gee, if Vladimir and Xi were to decide to use special weapons and/or push on multiple fronts in that time…

Reality is that we should be looking for bad actors to take advantage of the situation, and there is going to be more than a little suspicion that anyone so doing was involved. There are already options in place for such. Problem is, which option is chosen and who does the choosing? There are operations in place to ensure continuity of government and civilian control of the military, yes, including designated survivors. In his Black Tide series John Ringo is basing his NCCC off reality.

I’ve also already discussed the scenario of exploding a device over the U.S. to take out the electrical grid and more. Exploring this option and variants has occupied more than a little bit of time.

But why look at scenarios? Simple. It allows you to develop defenses and responses that don’t necessarily involve destroying the world. Oh, someone can do X? Let’s make it where they can’t do X. If someone does Y, what can we do in response? Let us count the ways and costs involved in those responses. It also allows you to figure out what works best for you in different circumstances.

For example, someone picked up on something I wrote yesterday about targeting the individual missile silos. Why hit them if they are empty? Well, there can be some very good reasons to do so. There can also be good reason to go for them, especially if you’ve created a scenario where you can get in and hit them before they have a chance to launch, such as the fueling scenario I mentioned.

Even the most outrageous scenarios provide information and food for thought. From war with England to sneaking a device into Vladimir’s special toilet system (where a deliberate squib event might not set off Deadhand and render a bunker useless), it makes people think and get creative. Thus are valid defenses and response options born.

For you, my readers, scenarios let you explore and evaluate your security as well as that of the nation. For example, instead of that dream decapitation strike discussed above, what if you wanted to cripple logistics in the U.S. for a long, long time? Think about that comment on shipping containers in the ports, and then look at two devices hidden in Memphis and Indianapolis. You’ve just taken out our ability to bring goods in from overseas, and you’ve just crippled both air, rail, and road logistics for most of the U.S. Really want to flip things up, and I would add one to two targets more to the West.

If all goes to plan, tomorrow I hope to talk escalation and why I’m cringing at the statements from one OSINT analyst. Then, I want to start getting deeper into how to determine your level of threat and what you can do to survive it. For me, I have two plans. One involves continued support via the Tip Jar in the upper right and the fundraiser so I can move. One involves general preparation, because when you come down to it the disaster doesn’t matter: it’s the type damage it does and that, unlike disasters, is a limited set.

*****

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

While I still hope to go back for some further discussion on communications and control, the time has come to talk of mice and men, of targets and targeting. While we did a brief overview in Nuclear 101, it’s time to get a bit further into the weeds.

In many respects, there are three levels of target: Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary.

Primary are those things that if you are to have any chance of pulling off a successful (for values of successful) attack, you have to take those targets out. Such targets can include weapons systems, especially land-based systems; bases from which various systems can operate or be controlled; and, your command and control systems ranging from the NMCC in the Pentagon to the Nightwatch and TACAMO planes in the air. If you can take out the command and control (and communications nodes) centers, you can prevent (or reduce) the retaliation for your attack. If you can damage or destroy the missiles and planes, again, you reduce or eliminate the ability to retaliate. In short, primary targets are those things that can seriously hurt you.

Secondary targets are the “nice to do” targets if you will. They can’t hurt you immediately, but long-term are a problem. For example, tanker aircraft and the bases they fly from may not be a primary target, but you want to take them out in order to prevent refueling of bombers, fighters, and other craft. They can be secondary command and control nodes, military or civilian. RUMINT had state capitals as Soviet secondary targets (bomber targets) unless said city had a major military base/center that would make it a primary target.

Tertiary targets are sort-of the “eh, if we can we will” targets. These tend to be administrative centers and operations that keep the bureaucracy moving as it were. It could be something like Ft. Ben was/is in Indianapolis (want your money? Be nice to Ft. Ben!), to Fort Huachua which is home to a number of commands including the Army Intelligence Center. One can spend some time arguing where any given base or center falls in the rankings. Honestly, a lot comes down to how the given enemy views that location.

Why does it matter? Simple. There are limits to the number of nuclear weapons in the world, and there is a limit to the number of delivery systems. Some of the commenters on earlier posts have already dived head-first into those waters (or potentially even started scuba diving). For today, I’m going to keep it largely hypothetical with just a few dashes of reality.

Let’s start with that dash of reality. The U.S. land-based ICBM of choice is the LGM-30G Minuteman III. The Russian missile on which we will focus is the Satan 2/RS-28 Sarmat, which is in the process of replacing the Satan-1 missiles. Originally scheduled to be completed around 2018, this is still in process which suggests a few things. For all that I’m concentrating for now on Russia and the U.S., you may want to check out what’s going on with the Chinese as they could easily take over as the top threat from Russia. As within hours to be honest.

For our purposes today, we are going to go with some assumptions which may or may not be precise, but work for the points of this exercise. First, for U.S. weapons we are going to go with 400 missiles, each capable of carrying 3 independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (range 1,100 miles though not part of today’s exercise). For Russia, we are going to go with the same number of Satan-2 missiles, but for purposes of the exercise we will limit it to 11 re-entry vehicles (possible mix of light, heavy, HGV; range 11,000 miles).

Now, to set the final stage of the exercise, let’s limit each side to just 1,500 nuclear weapons. Close to treaty, though how close to reality is something very different. Reality is that some on each side are going to be other-than-strategic, with the Russians having (again, according to RUMINT) a significantly larger stockpile of tactical/other-than-strategic. For exercise purposes, treat all 1,500 as strategic weapons of various sizes.

Now, go back to the discussions on reliability and let’s go with the (ludicrous) position of 80 percent success. My very cynical view on reliability is that one would be far better going with a 20 percent success rate, but let’s be optimistic for the exercise. Let’s assume that 80 percent of the missiles will launch; 80 percent of the nuclear weapons will work as advertised; and, that 80 percent of the aircraft will make it into the air and not be sidelined by mechanical or other issues.

Which means that the missiles on either side are reduced to 320 missiles. Which reduces the U.S. to 960 effective warheads via missiles and the Russians to 3,520 warheads. Ooops. Is anyone spotting a problem here? Well, it’s a problem and one of the issues in regards START and related treaties — no one really knows how many ICBMS Russia has. No one knows how many nuclear weapons they truly have either. One set of estimates is here and another is here. You might notice that there is a wide range on the total number of nuclear weapons Russia (and even the U.S.) are reported to have ready to go. As noted earlier, the 40,000+ warheads attributed to the Soviet Union is not reality today. Even so, there is a lot of “wiggle room” and that is what makes planning so much fun!

Again, for purposes of the exercise, let’s ignore reality and limit both sides to 960 effective warheads. Now, which ones are they? Are they on the missiles that don’t launch? How many are on missiles that do launch? Welcome to the sub-lesson Paranoia 101 in target selection! You can’t just assign one warhead to a crucial primary target. You have to figure on at least two warheads, on different missiles, to have a shot at one hitting on target. Really critical targets (such as The Hole, Pentagon/NMCC, etc.) are going to get 3-4 warheads via missiles, and then one or two via bomber.

You can get away with targeting one weapon per missile silo (odds aren’t good on catching it in the ground anyway) or even control capsules (and, yes, the Russians and others pretty much know where they are). Your major command and control nodes? You need to plan on 3-5 warheads for each target. Oh, and to make the planning even more fun, you can’t have all the warheads arrive at once. There’s a thing called nuclear fratricide which could have one nuke take out, or mitigate the effects of, the other nukes if they all hit about the same time. If you want to know more on the topic, do a search of “Dense Pack” and nuclear.

Now, for this exercise, let’s just keep it simple and go with each nuke being a large device. The fact is, as a commenter noted a while back, 4-40 KT bombs can be far more effective than a single 400 KT device. This being a 201-level exercise, we won’t get into size and placement. Presume each device is the same and we are using airburst rather than ground or ground-penetration blasts. FYI, going back to a comment, an underground test is not supposed to breach the surface (though such is reported to have happened), and even the so-called theoretical deep-penetrating warheads are going to send boom upwards and out — and frankly produce some nasty fallout in the process. It will NOT stay all underground.

Okay, now: pick your targets. If you want, you can play Russia and pick targets in the U.S., or you can pick targets in Russia. Up to you. Just you have to stay within the numbers above. In fact, if you like, since this is just an exercise, go with only missiles. Adding in bombers, sea-launch, and other delights really is a 301- or higher level course.

Ready? Go.

In some respects, there are no right or wrong answers for this highly theoretical exercise. The primary purpose is to get you to thinking about what constitutes a target so that you can understand current events. It also allows you to assess things such as if you live in a target zone, and if so what can you do to improve your odds of survival. Despite a number of movies and breathless television dramas, you can survive. Much depends on the level of target near you, distance to that target, and other factors.

For example, currently living in Indianapolis (and please help me get out of here!), I rate us as a secondary target. It’s not like it was years back when you had Ft. Ben as a bit more than just an admin center, major manufacturing, and some other things. Back then, one could make a case that Indy was targeted for at least four weapons. Today, with logistics being the dominant industry here, Ft. Ben reduced, and the critical wartime manufacturing pretty much gone, a good case could be made for a single weapon.

Then the debate turns to how large and where. The argument I put forth earlier in the series looked at a 1 MT device airburst over the state capitol. Such an attack would take out several major interstate highways, a major airport, potentially cripple midwest rail operations, air and ground cargo operations, and state government. An equally good case can be made for targeting the airport (which would take out the state capitol in the process). Frankly, I don’t like either choice as while I am outside the total destruction zone, I would still be in the conflagration zone. Much better odds with the airport, but… Rough (very rough) rule of thumb on a 1 MT airburst: 4 mile radius total/near-total destruction, 2-4 mile additional radius for fire after damage. Not perfect, but gives you something to work with on damage assessment.

Again, this is all a higher level course but it is something about which you do need to think.

Oh, one final thought to share in selecting your targets for this exercise. If you choose to play Vladimir and target the United States, there is one other major consideration when looking at the number of missiles and warheads: you don’t want to use them all. You need to keep a reserve because it’s not just the U.S. and Russia. If you are playing Russia and use all your nukes and missiles on the U.S., Xi is going to be over on the side going ‘youuuuu soooo stuuuppppiiiddddd!’ as you just gave up your ability to deter him from taking some valuable chunks out of your empire.

Again, while it is a higher level course, keep in mind that Vladimir does not have the luxury of just targeting the U.S. He’s got to target NATO and more. Again, that’s higher level, but keep in mind the deeper you get into this the more targets you need to think about for your weapons. You also have to think about which weapons you want to hold in reserve, and how.

Finally, there should be some computer games/simulations out there. Years back, I remember one called (I think, stupid lightning) “Nuke War” that was a limited (only 3 or so dimensions) study that worked you through the Triad (planes, missiles, sub-launched) where you had to choose how to spend your defense budget for same and build up a nuclear capability. It also, at random, would decide to kick off a nuclear exchange. Think there were or are some others. If you know a good one, speak up in the comments.

Ah, that’s the other point I wanted to make today: Nuclear Winter. At worst, it will be nuclear autumn. Keep in mind that the original study on Nuclear Winter used a literally two-dimensional model of the Earth to come up with it’s conclusions. If memory serves, I think 16-24 dimensions are required just to start getting the atmosphere (much less what it does) correct. Caught an earful from a rather annoyed scientist at a major government lab over that one day. Enjoyed the info, though I enjoyed playing with an early version of the holodeck even more.

So, have fun and take a look at your list then tuck it away. If we keep going with this, you will need it again as we once again kick targeting up a level.

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Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

While I still hope for a further guest post or two, today I want to lay out a few further thoughts on nuclear communications. We’ve got into some of the how, and why, they are done the way they are to prevent problems. Another point to consider is that you don’t want any enemy or potential enemy to be able to read your mail.

The fact is, anyone with a functional brain does tests of their command and control systems. You check things out, try to find and correct problems, and test the reliability of the system in all aspects. Thing is, you don’t want those who don’t like you to know what you do and how you do it as it gives them both information and options.

There is a lot of discussion on preventing or eliminating that command and control communications. If you can do that, you can keep release and launch orders from going out. Thing is, even better, if you can get the right info and access the right things you can do something even worse: you can take over that net. Imagine if someone got inside the net, sent the necessary targeting info, then launched your missiles for you — at targets inside your own country/forces.

Shades of a bad James Bond movie? Not entirely, and there are rumors that such has been gamed out.

Going back to reading the mail, keep in mind that different countries/powers use different systems. We tend to go with solid rocket motors, while others go for liquid engines. If you are using liquid engines, you have to load fuel before launch. If someone is reading your mail, and they know you’ve ordered all rockets to load fuel, a process that is not instantaneous though faster than it was I’ve heard, and that you’ve taken steps to prevent detection of said loading, what happens? Do you think they might launch attacks that can hit your sites before load and launch is complete? Using sea- and air-launched assets could take out the attack before it gets started, and reserves the crucial land-based launch capabilities for either last-ditch or follow-on operations.

So, you want to have a robust system to prevent bad things and ensure that things work. Do we have such? No. As a commenter pointed out earlier (think it was The Drill Sergeant) we do not, and in fact some of what we have is reported (widely) to still use floppy discs. On the good news front, as someone noted in an article elsewhere, it uses technology that is so old it pretty much precludes modern hackers from getting inside it. For a number of reasons, I invite you to research this on your own as it is yet another area where we need to be making some serious changes and upgrades.

On that happy note, enjoy your weekend!

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Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

The raid on MAL by the FBI, and the subsequent leak to the Washington Post (where democracy dies in darkness and they are taking out the lights as fast as they can) that “nuclear” secrets were involved rather clearly demonstrated several things. One is that many people don’t have a clue about how nuclear weapons are released. I’ve been told we may get another guest post or two on the subject, but I’m going to do a quick overview this morning on some high-level basics.

Seriously, if you know someone who was screaming about how Trump was selling/had sold/etc. nuclear launch codes/nuclear secrets to Russia et al — do not take financial advice from them, and don’t consider business partnerships with them or anyone who hires them; but, do consider playing poker with them as they are likely to try to draw to an inside straight even when most of the cards they need have already been played. The entire concept of “Q” level materials is a post for another day. For today, let’s look at how things are supposed to work with high-level nuclear command and control.

Guess what: the President can’t just wake up one morning in a grumpy mood, pick up the phone, and give the codes to launch the missiles and bombers. One, he really doesn’t have those codes and has no way to talk to the silos, etc. anyway. He has the codes that releases the weapons to the military and authorizes their use, but not the actual launch codes that would go to the subs and silos.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, America eats, sleeps, and breathes the two-man rule. In some cases it’s even the multiple man rule as more than two are involved.

In the case of POTUS, they are given something about the size of a credit card that is referred to by some as “the biscuit” that not only contains the release codes, but more importantly the means to verify that it is indeed the POTUS speaking/giving the order(s). “The biscuit” is subject to being changed out on a regular basis for rather elementary security reasons. It can be updated/changed out if POTUS, 0r VPOTUS, lose their copy. And, yes, one former President (not Trump) was and is rather notorious for having lost “the biscuit” multiple times during their time in office.

In an ideal world, for POTUS to release the weapons and authorize their use, what happens is that there is an attack conference, which can include a truly impressive number of people. The odds of there being time for such aren’t good, but if there is time there is supposed to be a good bit of deliberation. Then, based on that, POTUS and the SECDEF then give the appropriate codes and verifications to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Military Command Center. This would include the appropriate targeting information (“attack options”) per the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). The NMCC then contacts Strategic Command, who then carries out the orders.

Yes, it is a little more complex than that. Reality often is. If the attack conference is not taking place as a result of an attack on/threat to the U.S., the whole ‘sound of mind and body’ thing comes up. Even if things are going south rapidly, those participating can elect not to confirm the order. For fictional treatment of such, see Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears for a good scene. In reality, well, let’s hope we never find out. This article and this article contain some decent information.

Also, there are plans in place for surprise/sneak attacks, including options that see POTUS (and/or successors) removed from the chain. If you search the term “SNAPCOUNT” you can find some good (and some horrible) information. Just keep in mind that even then the two-man rule applies. From the release of weapons to the actual launch, at least two people are always involved.

Oh, if you’ve ever seen any footage or pictures from the command capsule of a missile field, ever wonder why the seats are a distance apart and the consoles set up the way they are? Pretty simple, really. Even with a mechanical aid, no one person can turn both keys simultaneously even if they could input all the correct commands to get to that point. At every step it takes at least two to tango.

Also, if for any reason somehow (not very likely IMO) a “biscuit” were to leave DC with a former POTUS or VPOTUS (or other somehow), guess what? It isn’t valid and has no real utility to anyone except as a novelty (though it’s not a good idea to leave them around where others can study them to try to detect patterns and such). The codes and challenges have already been replaced as the new POTUS takes office.

Again, a very high-level overview of nuclear C&C. I’m hoping we do get a guest post or two on other aspects, as C&C is a fascinating and not well-understood aspect of nuclear strategy.

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Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

A guest post by John Donovan, the Armorer of Castle Arrgghhh (and Lizzie)

Nuke weapons design and policy are governed by the need for safety and control. PALs are a component of control.

What is a PAL? PAL stands for Permissive Action Link. The purpose of the PAL is not to prevent unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon by rogue elements of the US military command. We do that via the EMAS (Emergency Message Authentication System) and NRAS (Nuclear Release Authentication System) systems and the imposition of strict two-person control (at a minimum) at each step of the process.

Some of those processes can be longer than others, depending on whether the weapons involved are “first strike deterrent” weapons like the USAF ballistic missiles and the USN SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) or further down the chain like the manned bombers, cruise missiles and formerly, US Army tactical nuclear missiles and artillery. PALS are also distinct from
safeties. Safeties are intended to prevent premature or accidental initiation or partial initiation of a warhead.

PALS have a different niche.

NATO airbase, mid-sixties. NATO fighter-bomber, fully fueled and armed, sits on “strip alert,” pilot strapped in. A lone US Airman armed with an M1 carbine stands guard. He is literally the only thing standing between chaos and disaster should that non-US NATO pilot decide (or get told by his government) to light up his jet and go bomb a target. Soviet or not. (1)

US Army Warhead Detachment, Mid-70s. NATO ally army trucks and some tanks roll up to the Detachment’s gate. The purpose of the detachment is to secure and maintain nuclear warheads (missile or artillery) stored in NATO nations that are there for either US units, or, upon authorization, NATO
units. Tensions are erupting between the ally and another nation and signals intelligence indicates that the ally’s generals have been talking to each other about taking some of the warheads to use as a lever against the other belligerent. While the confrontation at the gate never happened, the conversations did. (2)

Hey, NATO Ally – are you my buddy, my pal right now? No? That is why have PALs. To prevent unauthorized people from using US-provided nukes without express authorization from the President of the United States. The problem with both of those scenarios is that besides being scary as hell, it was (and still is) contrary to US law about control of US nukes, i.e., only we could give release, no one could take one of our weapons and use them unilaterally. Only we get to do that.

Yet, we gave nuclear-capable weapon systems to allies – the Nike-Hercules air defense missiles, various US Army tactical missiles like Honest John, Lance, and Pershing, and 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery projectiles. And many NATO aircraft were nuke-delivery capable. And all that had to be scattered around Central Europe so that those nations could quickly employ them if things got ugly on the North German Plain and the rolling hills of Bavaria along the Czechoslovakian border. Same was true of bombs, and NATO aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA).

We needed something better than the Airman 1st Class-Mounted M1 Carbine Nuke Weapon Disabler. There are four types of PALs (at least that are acknowledged publicly these days) that are variations on a theme. They are either electrical/digital and integral to the weapon, buried inside where it is hard to get to them, and they interfere with the arming/initiation process until unlocked from an external code transmitted to them, or they are like combination locks that must be unlocked with a code thoughtfully provided by a two-man US warhead team acting under orders with the codes received via the NRAS system. Mechanically removing them will take time, and, most likely, render the warhead inoperative.

Giving hopefully cooler heads time to intervene. A balance between the profound need to control release and the tactical realities of modern combat
“Bypassinag a PAL should be, as one weapons designer graphically put it, about as complex as performing a tonsillectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end.” (3)

Acknowledgements and further reading, if you want further unclassified details.

A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
Steven M. Bellovin Permissive Action Links (columbia.edu) A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
A drier, more technical discussion of both Safety and Control. Subscription to the Bulletin is required to access the archived articles.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features To cite this article: (1991) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 47:8, 48-49, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025

Notes
(1) Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter. Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons. University Press, 1987
(2) Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War. Presidio Press/Ballantine Books,
2004.
(3) Caldwell, Dan and Zimmerman, Peter D., “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War with Permissive Action
Links”, in Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Blechman, Barry M., ed., Johns
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989.

Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge the sharp eye and excellent editorial instincts of Lizzie, a feline of great discernment. Not only did she keep him company and offer encouragement, she added stray characters and deleted random paragraphs to test this scribbler’s skill. Sic Semper Felinus.

Acknowledgement II: This old wolf wishes to thank John for coming out of blogging retirement, as it were, to add to the Nuclear 201 series and to Lizzie for her contributions as well.

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Nuclear 201: Some History

Welcome to the first entry of the Nuclear 201 series. While this is still a high-level approach to learning about nuclear war and related issues, it’s time to take a bit more detailed look at some of the issues. In fact, if anyone out there is interested in contributing a guest post on a relevant topic, drop me an e-mail at the address in the upper right. If some things work out, hope to have at least a couple, if not more, guest posts and/or related.

To understand where we are requires some history. The thing is, the history of the nuclear age is fascinating and there are many, many rabbit holes down which we could dive. There are tales of brilliance, stupidity, treachery, and honor. Some are humorous if terrifying, such as scientists and engineers placing bets on if a certain bomb was going to involve the atmosphere in its reaction and reduce the Earth to a cinder — even as the detonation countdown was underway.

While Einstein’s famous equation E=MC2 (squared) started the ball rolling, it wasn’t until the 1930s that people got serious about the idea of nuclear power and nuclear explosives. It really was the fact that Nazi Germany was looking into things that spurred the U.S. into pursuing its own research after the famous Einstein letter (which he signed but did not write) of 1939.

The history of this period is complex and fascinating. There were competing theories on how to achieve various milestones, and each group seemingly went its own way. Germany decided on one approach that required heavy water, and the successful effort by the Norwegian underground to deny them what they needed may well have kept them from being first with a bomb. I wish I could remember the name of the book I read on the Norwegian effort that I found excellent, and there was another on the German nuclear program that was accurate and entertaining. Stupid lightning. Trust me, reading up on these efforts, as well as the work of the Four Hungarians of the Apocalypse on the Manhattan Project is well worth your time.

For our Nuclear 201 purposes, one bit of important history is that the Manhattan Project (and quite possibly the Nazi project) were penetrated by the Soviets pretty much from the start. No, the Rosenbergs were not the be-all and end-all of nuclear espionage. Again, several good books out there (beware some recent revisionist histories). Net result was that Stalin was not surprised when Truman revealed The Bomb to him as he was fully briefed and pushing a secret effort of his own to catch up using the info coming in from the various moles in the program.

In the brief window of time where the U.S. was the sole nuclear power on Earth, there were some who thought that status could be made to last forever; some others who thought it could be made to last for years if not decades; and, a few who pointed out that it wouldn’t last long. Since some of their spiritual descendants are active today, let’s take a very quick look at the major schools of thought.

First, there were those who felt that for anyone to develop The Bomb they would have to go through the entire Manhattan Project (or Nazi counterpart) to do so. Even if they did get a few nuclear secrets, the steps had to be repeated and those efforts, especially the need for high-speed centrifuges, would be easily detectable. Warn the country, and if not heeded, take out the project with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Second, there were those who said that most of the project could be skipped with the right knowledge. Or espionage. This would save years of effort, and the key signs would be the centrifuges and other large-scale activities that would be hard to hide.

Finally, there were those who said the entire project could be skipped since the knowledge was out there, and what couldn’t be stolen could be worked out by smart people. Again, it was the centrifuges and other large-scale efforts that would be the clue that Country X was working on The Bomb.

Then the Soviet’s exploded their first bomb and put to rest the idea that the U.S. would remain the sole nuclear power for any length of time. They also sort of proved the last group right in the process. And thus the nuclear arms race was born.

In some respects, what happened is proof of the Toddler Laws school of thought. Who had the largest? Who had the most unique? Who could make the smallest? Who had the most advanced design? The race was on and both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to out do the other in every possible aspect. So much so, that at one point it is believed that the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear weapons. The U.S. was reported to have a few itself. Great Britain and France appear to have felt that a few hundred each was more reasonable. Maybe.

Now, as this was going on, a number of people questioned what was going on, and eventually various treaties were negotiated to reign things in a bit. This is a decent list of those treaties by year. We could talk for months, if not years, just about the treaties (much like the history of the original projects), but I will for now leave it up to you to decide if that is a rabbit hole you wish to explore.

Those treaties were why Boss coined his famous phrase “Trust, but verify.” I’m not saying that the Soviet Union (or later Russia) had a reputation for violating treaties of all sorts before the ink was dry, but I will say that they had (have) quite the reputation for developing some of the most interesting interpretations of various clauses in various treaties. So much so that the complexities of those interpretations twist things to the point the time-space continuum should have shattered.

What truly matters out of all of this for our 201 purposes is that right now as a result of these treaties the Russians are thought to have approximately 6,257 nuclear warheads with 1,458 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. The U.S. is reported to have approximately 5,550 warheads with 1,389 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. Three sites with information on all nuclear countries are here, here, and here.

The thing to keep in mind is that not all of these are strategic weapons. You have tactical devices and you have some specialized charges as well: shaped charges, atomic demolition munitions, and other oddities. We’ll get more into that soon enough.

Meantime, here’s a bit on how the Soviets used nuclear weapons to put out some oil field fires. Makes me wonder what Red Adair could have done with a few nukes…

Yes, there is a LOT more that we could cover today. Again, trying to keep it high level and point towards places (and topics) for exploration. Neat thing is, more and more keeps coming out about the early days, here and elsewhere, and it just adds more fascinating material to an already interesting field of study. We may well jump back into some of this as Nuclear 201 continues. For now, however, this gives you enough overview to understand what is to come.

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