Category: Military

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

If you would like to help me in my recovery efforts, feel free to hit the tip jar in the upper right or the fundraiser at A New Life on GiveSendGo. Getting hit by lightning is not fun, and it is thanks to your gifts and prayers that I am still going. Thank you.

Nuclear 201: A Bit More C&C

The raid on MAL by the FBI, and the subsequent leak to the Washington Post (where democracy dies in darkness and they are taking out the lights as fast as they can) that “nuclear” secrets were involved rather clearly demonstrated several things. One is that many people don’t have a clue about how nuclear weapons are released. I’ve been told we may get another guest post or two on the subject, but I’m going to do a quick overview this morning on some high-level basics.

Seriously, if you know someone who was screaming about how Trump was selling/had sold/etc. nuclear launch codes/nuclear secrets to Russia et al — do not take financial advice from them, and don’t consider business partnerships with them or anyone who hires them; but, do consider playing poker with them as they are likely to try to draw to an inside straight even when most of the cards they need have already been played. The entire concept of “Q” level materials is a post for another day. For today, let’s look at how things are supposed to work with high-level nuclear command and control.

Guess what: the President can’t just wake up one morning in a grumpy mood, pick up the phone, and give the codes to launch the missiles and bombers. One, he really doesn’t have those codes and has no way to talk to the silos, etc. anyway. He has the codes that releases the weapons to the military and authorizes their use, but not the actual launch codes that would go to the subs and silos.

When it comes to nuclear weapons, America eats, sleeps, and breathes the two-man rule. In some cases it’s even the multiple man rule as more than two are involved.

In the case of POTUS, they are given something about the size of a credit card that is referred to by some as “the biscuit” that not only contains the release codes, but more importantly the means to verify that it is indeed the POTUS speaking/giving the order(s). “The biscuit” is subject to being changed out on a regular basis for rather elementary security reasons. It can be updated/changed out if POTUS, 0r VPOTUS, lose their copy. And, yes, one former President (not Trump) was and is rather notorious for having lost “the biscuit” multiple times during their time in office.

In an ideal world, for POTUS to release the weapons and authorize their use, what happens is that there is an attack conference, which can include a truly impressive number of people. The odds of there being time for such aren’t good, but if there is time there is supposed to be a good bit of deliberation. Then, based on that, POTUS and the SECDEF then give the appropriate codes and verifications to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and the National Military Command Center. This would include the appropriate targeting information (“attack options”) per the Strategic Integrated Operation Plan (SIOP). The NMCC then contacts Strategic Command, who then carries out the orders.

Yes, it is a little more complex than that. Reality often is. If the attack conference is not taking place as a result of an attack on/threat to the U.S., the whole ‘sound of mind and body’ thing comes up. Even if things are going south rapidly, those participating can elect not to confirm the order. For fictional treatment of such, see Tom Clancy’s The Sum of All Fears for a good scene. In reality, well, let’s hope we never find out. This article and this article contain some decent information.

Also, there are plans in place for surprise/sneak attacks, including options that see POTUS (and/or successors) removed from the chain. If you search the term “SNAPCOUNT” you can find some good (and some horrible) information. Just keep in mind that even then the two-man rule applies. From the release of weapons to the actual launch, at least two people are always involved.

Oh, if you’ve ever seen any footage or pictures from the command capsule of a missile field, ever wonder why the seats are a distance apart and the consoles set up the way they are? Pretty simple, really. Even with a mechanical aid, no one person can turn both keys simultaneously even if they could input all the correct commands to get to that point. At every step it takes at least two to tango.

Also, if for any reason somehow (not very likely IMO) a “biscuit” were to leave DC with a former POTUS or VPOTUS (or other somehow), guess what? It isn’t valid and has no real utility to anyone except as a novelty (though it’s not a good idea to leave them around where others can study them to try to detect patterns and such). The codes and challenges have already been replaced as the new POTUS takes office.

Again, a very high-level overview of nuclear C&C. I’m hoping we do get a guest post or two on other aspects, as C&C is a fascinating and not well-understood aspect of nuclear strategy.

*****

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

Nuclear 201: Will You Be My PAL?

A guest post by John Donovan, the Armorer of Castle Arrgghhh (and Lizzie)

Nuke weapons design and policy are governed by the need for safety and control. PALs are a component of control.

What is a PAL? PAL stands for Permissive Action Link. The purpose of the PAL is not to prevent unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon by rogue elements of the US military command. We do that via the EMAS (Emergency Message Authentication System) and NRAS (Nuclear Release Authentication System) systems and the imposition of strict two-person control (at a minimum) at each step of the process.

Some of those processes can be longer than others, depending on whether the weapons involved are “first strike deterrent” weapons like the USAF ballistic missiles and the USN SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) or further down the chain like the manned bombers, cruise missiles and formerly, US Army tactical nuclear missiles and artillery. PALS are also distinct from
safeties. Safeties are intended to prevent premature or accidental initiation or partial initiation of a warhead.

PALS have a different niche.

NATO airbase, mid-sixties. NATO fighter-bomber, fully fueled and armed, sits on “strip alert,” pilot strapped in. A lone US Airman armed with an M1 carbine stands guard. He is literally the only thing standing between chaos and disaster should that non-US NATO pilot decide (or get told by his government) to light up his jet and go bomb a target. Soviet or not. (1)

US Army Warhead Detachment, Mid-70s. NATO ally army trucks and some tanks roll up to the Detachment’s gate. The purpose of the detachment is to secure and maintain nuclear warheads (missile or artillery) stored in NATO nations that are there for either US units, or, upon authorization, NATO
units. Tensions are erupting between the ally and another nation and signals intelligence indicates that the ally’s generals have been talking to each other about taking some of the warheads to use as a lever against the other belligerent. While the confrontation at the gate never happened, the conversations did. (2)

Hey, NATO Ally – are you my buddy, my pal right now? No? That is why have PALs. To prevent unauthorized people from using US-provided nukes without express authorization from the President of the United States. The problem with both of those scenarios is that besides being scary as hell, it was (and still is) contrary to US law about control of US nukes, i.e., only we could give release, no one could take one of our weapons and use them unilaterally. Only we get to do that.

Yet, we gave nuclear-capable weapon systems to allies – the Nike-Hercules air defense missiles, various US Army tactical missiles like Honest John, Lance, and Pershing, and 155mm and 203mm nuclear artillery projectiles. And many NATO aircraft were nuke-delivery capable. And all that had to be scattered around Central Europe so that those nations could quickly employ them if things got ugly on the North German Plain and the rolling hills of Bavaria along the Czechoslovakian border. Same was true of bombs, and NATO aircraft on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA).

We needed something better than the Airman 1st Class-Mounted M1 Carbine Nuke Weapon Disabler. There are four types of PALs (at least that are acknowledged publicly these days) that are variations on a theme. They are either electrical/digital and integral to the weapon, buried inside where it is hard to get to them, and they interfere with the arming/initiation process until unlocked from an external code transmitted to them, or they are like combination locks that must be unlocked with a code thoughtfully provided by a two-man US warhead team acting under orders with the codes received via the NRAS system. Mechanically removing them will take time, and, most likely, render the warhead inoperative.

Giving hopefully cooler heads time to intervene. A balance between the profound need to control release and the tactical realities of modern combat
“Bypassinag a PAL should be, as one weapons designer graphically put it, about as complex as performing a tonsillectomy while entering the patient from the wrong end.” (3)

Acknowledgements and further reading, if you want further unclassified details.

A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
Steven M. Bellovin Permissive Action Links (columbia.edu) A useful unclassified and easy-to-read discussion of PALs.
A drier, more technical discussion of both Safety and Control. Subscription to the Bulletin is required to access the archived articles.
U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features To cite this article: (1991) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Safety and Control Features, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 47:8, 48-49, DOI: 10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025 https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.1991.11460025

Notes
(1) Stein, Peter and Feaver, Peter. Assuring Control of Nuclear Weapons. University Press, 1987
(2) Reed, Thomas C. At the Abyss: An Insider’s History of the Cold War. Presidio Press/Ballantine Books,
2004.
(3) Caldwell, Dan and Zimmerman, Peter D., “Reducing the Risk of Nuclear War with Permissive Action
Links”, in Technology and the Limitation of International Conflict, Blechman, Barry M., ed., Johns
Hopkins Foreign Policy Institute, 1989.

Acknowledgement: The author wishes to acknowledge the sharp eye and excellent editorial instincts of Lizzie, a feline of great discernment. Not only did she keep him company and offer encouragement, she added stray characters and deleted random paragraphs to test this scribbler’s skill. Sic Semper Felinus.

Acknowledgement II: This old wolf wishes to thank John for coming out of blogging retirement, as it were, to add to the Nuclear 201 series and to Lizzie for her contributions as well.

*****

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

Uh Oh

Yesterday, I think I missed the boat even though I saw the lights. In writing about Darya Dugina, I spent too much time covering all the possibilities for who wanted her dead, and missed a couple of signs of what was to come. Between the time I wrote that in the morning, and got up this morning, a LOT has been made clear. In fact, I should have caught one thing earlier in terms of the lauding of her.

Her murder came via the FSB and the Putin camp. Of that much I am fully convinced. Putin needs something to rally the people, to overcome the reluctance (and even possible mutinies in the armed forces) to mobilize more fully if not fully to deal with the Ukraine. A pretext for that and/or crackdowns in Russia.

Ms. Dugina had become problematic in terms of her presentations to the West, discussions in public of what she would do if she was the defense minister versus her cynical reversals in private, and even attempts to usurp her father. Neither are the close Putin allies they portrayed themselves as being, as I noted yesterday that is a thing of the West, not Russia.

While I’m not quite (yet) prepared to agree fully with Kamil Galeev’s take on the matter, he makes some good points. One not raised directly is that the Kremlin was ready to roll with the propaganda even before the smoke cleared. That means advanced planning, which means she was sacrificed. Think the maskirova of the children in Tom Clancy’s Red Storm Rising.

Almost immediately a senior leader in occupied territory extolled her as a true Russian. That led to a chorus of praise for a person who, in practical terms was a nobody even if a “golden child.” You can look them up (here’s a start and here’s more on her rapid memorial service and praise), but it amounts to equating her to be a personification of the Rodina, of Russia. The maiden who was murdered by a foul fallen woman of the cowardly enemy who fled immediately. The maiden who serves as the modern Russian version of the medieval dame belle sans reproach. Or, a sacrifice that rather eerily is foreshadowed by this article by her father (in Russian here), the maiden who mourns her virginity as she dies before she can give birth. In this case, to children for the Rodina, is how I expect to see it played. I have to wonder if this was what gave Putin/FSB the idea for dealing with her.

She was no maiden. She was no innocent. She was at best cynically manipulative and didn’t care who died so long as she could advance towards power and wealth. For all that she was problematic, she was nobody in the true circles of power which means her sacrifice will not create powerful enemies. As for her father, this will bring him further to heel and the fact that he could have died (and those behind the assassination would not have objected to that at all) is a point that is not lost on him. One wonders why he switched cars at the last minute: was it luck or does he have a further role to play?

Why now?

Ukraine’s independence day is this week. U.S. Citizens were already being urged to leave the Ukraine ahead of the day as it was anticipated that Russia would engage in attacks on civilians/civilian infrastructure. Given what is coming out of Moscow in regards revenge for the death of the martyr, I’m thinking the barbarity shown to civilians before is nothing in comparison to what is to come. The only question I have is if it will now be the main thrust since purely military operations are not going well (pretty badly in fact).

Which leads to the longer-term questions: will her death be used for internal crackdown, for fuller or full mobilization to deal with the threat, or both? Right now, based on what I am seeing/hearing, I suspect both. Dugina had called in public for more troops and to quit messing around. Her death gives Putin et cie the perfect excuse to do that, and to whip the public up in support (and to crush those who refuse). For who will stand against Putin honoring her “dying” wish to expand the war and achieve victory?

The only fly-in-the-ointment is that within Russia she is such a complete non-entity. For all her efforts to unite various non-Kremlin factions, she’s not well known and then mostly because of being her father’s daughter. If they can turn her into the epitome of the ultimate Russian martyr, the maiden who died for Russia, then I expect to see full mobilization and a truly impressive crackdown. If they can’t pull that off, but public sentiment remains charged, expect to see a limited mobilization. In either event, expect to see brutality against civilians in the Ukraine on a scale unimaginable to many in the West.

More thoughts soon.

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

Russia/Ukraine Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

Couple Of Quick Thoughts

*****

Nuclear 201: Some History

Welcome to the first entry of the Nuclear 201 series. While this is still a high-level approach to learning about nuclear war and related issues, it’s time to take a bit more detailed look at some of the issues. In fact, if anyone out there is interested in contributing a guest post on a relevant topic, drop me an e-mail at the address in the upper right. If some things work out, hope to have at least a couple, if not more, guest posts and/or related.

To understand where we are requires some history. The thing is, the history of the nuclear age is fascinating and there are many, many rabbit holes down which we could dive. There are tales of brilliance, stupidity, treachery, and honor. Some are humorous if terrifying, such as scientists and engineers placing bets on if a certain bomb was going to involve the atmosphere in its reaction and reduce the Earth to a cinder — even as the detonation countdown was underway.

While Einstein’s famous equation E=MC2 (squared) started the ball rolling, it wasn’t until the 1930s that people got serious about the idea of nuclear power and nuclear explosives. It really was the fact that Nazi Germany was looking into things that spurred the U.S. into pursuing its own research after the famous Einstein letter (which he signed but did not write) of 1939.

The history of this period is complex and fascinating. There were competing theories on how to achieve various milestones, and each group seemingly went its own way. Germany decided on one approach that required heavy water, and the successful effort by the Norwegian underground to deny them what they needed may well have kept them from being first with a bomb. I wish I could remember the name of the book I read on the Norwegian effort that I found excellent, and there was another on the German nuclear program that was accurate and entertaining. Stupid lightning. Trust me, reading up on these efforts, as well as the work of the Four Hungarians of the Apocalypse on the Manhattan Project is well worth your time.

For our Nuclear 201 purposes, one bit of important history is that the Manhattan Project (and quite possibly the Nazi project) were penetrated by the Soviets pretty much from the start. No, the Rosenbergs were not the be-all and end-all of nuclear espionage. Again, several good books out there (beware some recent revisionist histories). Net result was that Stalin was not surprised when Truman revealed The Bomb to him as he was fully briefed and pushing a secret effort of his own to catch up using the info coming in from the various moles in the program.

In the brief window of time where the U.S. was the sole nuclear power on Earth, there were some who thought that status could be made to last forever; some others who thought it could be made to last for years if not decades; and, a few who pointed out that it wouldn’t last long. Since some of their spiritual descendants are active today, let’s take a very quick look at the major schools of thought.

First, there were those who felt that for anyone to develop The Bomb they would have to go through the entire Manhattan Project (or Nazi counterpart) to do so. Even if they did get a few nuclear secrets, the steps had to be repeated and those efforts, especially the need for high-speed centrifuges, would be easily detectable. Warn the country, and if not heeded, take out the project with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Second, there were those who said that most of the project could be skipped with the right knowledge. Or espionage. This would save years of effort, and the key signs would be the centrifuges and other large-scale activities that would be hard to hide.

Finally, there were those who said the entire project could be skipped since the knowledge was out there, and what couldn’t be stolen could be worked out by smart people. Again, it was the centrifuges and other large-scale efforts that would be the clue that Country X was working on The Bomb.

Then the Soviet’s exploded their first bomb and put to rest the idea that the U.S. would remain the sole nuclear power for any length of time. They also sort of proved the last group right in the process. And thus the nuclear arms race was born.

In some respects, what happened is proof of the Toddler Laws school of thought. Who had the largest? Who had the most unique? Who could make the smallest? Who had the most advanced design? The race was on and both the U.S. and the Soviet Union sought to out do the other in every possible aspect. So much so, that at one point it is believed that the Soviet Union had more than 40,000 nuclear weapons. The U.S. was reported to have a few itself. Great Britain and France appear to have felt that a few hundred each was more reasonable. Maybe.

Now, as this was going on, a number of people questioned what was going on, and eventually various treaties were negotiated to reign things in a bit. This is a decent list of those treaties by year. We could talk for months, if not years, just about the treaties (much like the history of the original projects), but I will for now leave it up to you to decide if that is a rabbit hole you wish to explore.

Those treaties were why Boss coined his famous phrase “Trust, but verify.” I’m not saying that the Soviet Union (or later Russia) had a reputation for violating treaties of all sorts before the ink was dry, but I will say that they had (have) quite the reputation for developing some of the most interesting interpretations of various clauses in various treaties. So much so that the complexities of those interpretations twist things to the point the time-space continuum should have shattered.

What truly matters out of all of this for our 201 purposes is that right now as a result of these treaties the Russians are thought to have approximately 6,257 nuclear warheads with 1,458 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. The U.S. is reported to have approximately 5,550 warheads with 1,389 ready to launch via missiles, bombers, etc. Three sites with information on all nuclear countries are here, here, and here.

The thing to keep in mind is that not all of these are strategic weapons. You have tactical devices and you have some specialized charges as well: shaped charges, atomic demolition munitions, and other oddities. We’ll get more into that soon enough.

Meantime, here’s a bit on how the Soviets used nuclear weapons to put out some oil field fires. Makes me wonder what Red Adair could have done with a few nukes…

Yes, there is a LOT more that we could cover today. Again, trying to keep it high level and point towards places (and topics) for exploration. Neat thing is, more and more keeps coming out about the early days, here and elsewhere, and it just adds more fascinating material to an already interesting field of study. We may well jump back into some of this as Nuclear 201 continues. For now, however, this gives you enough overview to understand what is to come.

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

*****

Russia/Ukraine Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

Couple Of Quick Thoughts

*****

Nuclear 101: Scenarios

NOTE: If you had problems getting to the site, thank you for persevering and I will simply state that my hosting provider, Dreamhost, sucks. If I had the time and money I’d switch immediately at this point. Don’t, so can’t, but suggestions on good hosting providers most welcome. Given that I usually have a short time in which to write these posts, if the occasional typo/autocorrect error makes you meltdown, you might want to skip. These posts are high-level overviews, and if you want to discuss details, special cases, one-offs, etc. feel free but keep it civil and don’t pretend non-inclusion is a world-ending mistake to give yourself ego-boo. For all those (the majority of you) making good, solid, and thoughtful comments: THANK YOU! Such are very much appreciated.

Well, I had planned to spend today discussing tactical weapons/atomic demolition munitions and then explore some scenarios. However, Winnie The Poo himself, Xi, has done something incredibly stupid even by his standards which sort of highlights that desperation thing I’ve talked about a few times.

In the epic temper-tantrum and meltdown being pitched by Xi and company over Granny WineBox’s visit to Taiwan, Xi approved the launch of several ballistic missiles: over Taiwan. Even better, according to reports now hitting the media, they landed in Japan’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Now, leaving aside the toddler-level histrionics of the tantrum, doing this would appear to be in violation of more than one international convention, possibly one or more treaties, and is ill-considered to say the least. It does, however, give a good intro to exploring a scenario of how a political leader being an idiot can start WWIII.

For all that it is a tired trope in fiction, I personally find it to be one of the more likely scenarios. Fact is, people make mistakes and sometimes those mistakes snowball. Ego gets in the way of rationality and you also have to consider the toddler-model of governmental interaction (short version: governments tend to behave like toddlers in a room full of toys).

Okay, let’s say one of the missiles had a malfunction, so that it went short and the warhead hit in a major city on Taiwan. Even if a dummy, it’s moving at speeds that start to make it a Kinetic Energy Vehicle (KEV) that could, potentially, have the impact of a small nuke. Safe to say, things are going to get tense and given that the Chinese military is already out acting like a bully having a tantrum and looking for a target, you get good odds of things escalating.

Now, let’s consider a malfunction that causes a missile to go long and off course. What if it hit actual Japanese territory, or say a passenger ship? Do you really think Japan’s going to be terribly understanding? Or that Xi and company might actually think and try to de-escalate the situation? Yeah, I don’t give good odds on that. And, for the record, this is a hypothetical and I know Japan is not a nuclear power and for obvious reasons doesn’t like nuclear weapons. That said, it does have allies who are, and Japan also knows it is on Xi’s list.

Given the amount of air traffic flying over Taiwan (that area is a MAJOR air corridor), let’s think about something that actually could have happened. Back when I was getting my pilot’s license many years ago, one of my cross country solo flights took me through military airspace. Had all the appropriate permissions and such, but as I was in that airspace traffic control came on and told me to turn to a new course immediately. I was making the turn even as I acknowledged the order (crazy I may be, stupid I try to avoid). As I made my turn, I saw artillery firing and could even see some of the shells as they rose up to and through the altitude I was flying.

Like those shells, ballistic missiles, warheads, re-entry vehicles, etc. don’t care that you are there. Unlike those shells, they are moving at speeds that make it almost impossible for them to be spotted and a plane maneuver out of the way. Now, imagine that through sheer bad luck one of those missiles had hit an American passenger jet as it flew through that heavily congested airspace. Shades of KAL007. Except that in this case, as we send in aircraft and ships for search and rescue/recovery efforts, one or more of them are attacked because someone on the Chinese side fucked up.

Situations like that can get out of hand fast. The late Fred Thompson’s line in the Hunt For Red October is true and prophetic. It’s one reason for having tight control of nuclear weapons, and things like Permissive Action Links (PALs, sometimes referred to in older documents/fiction as Presidential Initiative Device, PID) and release codes. Problem is, the smaller the weapon the more likely someone at a lower level could do something like staging it for ready use if they think the order might come. Let’s say the skipper of an attack sub thinks that a release order is coming or that war has already started. He then uses a torpedo (or more) with nuclear warhead(s) to attack one or more U.S. ships coming in for search and rescue/recovery efforts. That whole “least stable” thing I keep talking about with leaders? It goes down the chain as well, and it can fall on a simple seaman hitting the button when they shouldn’t just like in the fictional The Bedford Incident.

In fact, since continuing to think on the imbecilic bone-headed (insert more choice words here) actions of Xi and company is not helping my blood pressure, let’s turn to a potentially fun way of exploring different scenarios. Let’s look at fiction, good and bad.

One of the first books I ever read on nuclear war and surviving afterwards is the highly recommended Alas Babylon by Pat Frank. It is one book I recommend having as a paper copy as it is not just a good story but an excellent primer on on preparedness. It is fairly realistic (esp. for its time) and optimistic.

If you want to get into more nihilistic fantasy with the fanatical commies willing to live underground for 50+ years to take over the world (except for the U.S. which will be a radioactive wasteland with no life of any type), go for Triumph by Philip Wylie. The concepts of special nuclear weapons discussed is interesting, as are the aspects of bunker/shelter design raised. I’m not a fan of the book, to be honest, though it did help inspire a high school science fair project on designing a shelter to keep X number of people alive and communicating for at least five years.

In the same vein, you have On The Beach by Nevil Shute. If emotions are your thing, enjoy. If a thoughtful and realistic novel is your desire, this is about as realistic IMO as Triumph, which is to say not at all.

To get back to books I can recommend, you need a paper copy of Pulling Through by Dean Ing. If you have not read his fiction, I highly recommend it. If you have not read his non-fiction, including his work on preparedness, I HIGHLY recommend it. He and the late Jerry Pournelle wrote a lot of very good material on preparedness and related topics. Get it. If you have to, get it electronic and print it out. Pulling Through is half fiction and half non-fiction, and both halves are chock full of good and important information. Get this book!

When it comes to movies, there’s just not a lot out there that looks realistically at preparedness and survival in the aftermath. Most, IMO, tend to be rather nihilistic and pessimistic as well as heavily political. If inevitable death is your thing, go for The Bedford Incident, Fail-Safe, and a host of lesser movies. Even the enjoyable Dr. Strangelove has the world end. I will note that the movie Damnation Alley shared only a title and a couple of character names with Roger Zelazny’s good novel.

Two movies I do/did enjoy, though realistic is not necessarily a word I would associate with them, are WarGames and By Dawn’s Early Light. WarGames frankly was just some good, fun, escapism in which I could ignore the politics and not have to deal with suspension of disbelief issues because it was so unrealistic. The Mad magazine satire of it was excellent, with everyone including the computer asking Matthew Broderick’s character why he was playing with the computer instead of Ally Sheedy. At the end of the movie, you see the computer going through a variety of scenarios and playing them out. And, yes, the category for these articles is a play on the “Would you like to play a game?” from the movie.

By Dawn’s Early Light is one of those movies I almost hate to like. For certain values of correct, it actually got a few things right. The performances by Powers Boothe, James Earl Jones, and Martin Landau were such that I could/can ignore the anti-Christian, evil Army colonel, grrrlllll power, and one-dimensional patriot aspects as well as some massive plot holes. I admit that I tend to hear Peter MacNicol’s repeated line as ‘Mr. President, please don’t torture yourself, that’s my job!’ All that said, it does offer a more optimistic take on things, and reminds us that people can dial it back under the right circumstances.

The only thing on television that I can even halfway recommend was The Day After. Sorta.

With that, I will call it a day. Tomorrow I plan to start talking about preparedness and survival.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

*****

Nuclear 101: Targeting

NOTE: If you had problems getting to the site, thank you for persevering and I will simply state that my hosting provider, Dreamhost, sucks. If I had the time and money I’d switch immediately at this point. Don’t, so can’t, but suggestions on good hosting providers most welcome. Given that I usually have a short time in which to write these posts, if the occasional typo/autocorrect error makes you meltdown, you might want to skip. Same for anyone melting down about the number of spaces after a period: I was raised two, WordPress keeps trying to change that to one, and so far the battle between us is a draw. These posts are high-level overviews, and if you want to discuss details, special cases, one-offs, etc. feel free but keep it civil and don’t pretend non-inclusion is a world-ending mistake to give yourself ego-boo. For all those (the majority of you) making good, solid, and thoughtful comments: THANK YOU! Such are very much appreciated.

So, we’ve scratched the surface (barely) on weapons, means of delivery, and philosophy. Today, we will focus on the philosophy of reality: targeting. Again, I’m not planning to get into the weeds on this and I’m also, for now, probably only going to focus on a few of the thousands of possible scenarios. While not exhaustive, it will provide enough understanding to help people make decision on preparedness and survival.

While it can be sort of fun in a war game (or if you are trying to create panic in the public) to have an Oprah moment and declare ‘you’re a target, you’re a target, everything’s a target’ it doesn’t really work that way. At least not now, though some do argue that was the case a few decades back. So, what does make a good target for a full-scale attack?

First up, your enemy’s command and control systems. Yep the systems that control the nukes are indeed a prime target, as if you can take them out, it will limit, or possibly, maybe, prevent retaliation. No leaders, no means to communicate, huge amounts of confusion, and you should have time to act with a degree of impunity.

Second, your enemy’s atomic weapons and delivery systems. The emphasis is going to be on getting the first strike weapons such as missiles, boomers/missile subs, cruise missile launchers/launch sites, etc. Within that, you are going to target bomber and other bases to try and take out those nuclear weapons as well. You also want to prevent fighters from launching to prevent them from shooting down your bombers and you don’t want the tankers to launch as they can keep fighters, command planes, and other platforms fueled and up.

What makes a good secondary target? Going back to the days of the Soviet Union, that could/would/did include state capitols, manufacturing centers, ground-force bases, harbors, naval bases that weren’t first strike targets, and other delights.

The basic idea is to use your missiles (cruise missiles, etc.) to take out your enemy’s ability to use their nuclear weapons on you. You do this by getting inside their communications loops (in terms of time and, if possible, the actual signals) or outright eliminating their leadership and those communication systems and loops before they can be used. You do this by destroying the missiles, bombs, and weapon depots before they can be used/utilized. With those systems removed, you go in and attack the secondary targets using aircraft and other means.

Can you have a less-than-full-scale exchange? Theoretically, yes. One class of scenarios involves having a weak-willed enemy who for various reasons chooses not to retaliate at all to a limited strike. Another class involves someone who agrees to limit retaliation to the same level of damage. Yet another class of scenarios is based off having your enemy fuck up by the numbers and give you clear targets that also eliminate the means of retaliation. Could happen. Maybe. Has happened conventionally, so…

The most likely form of limited attack, in my opinion, is likely to be a terrorist or rogue state attack. For a number of good reasons, they are not likely to have/have access to a large number of weapons. In such a case, odds are pretty good they will go after more symbolic targets though some scenarios look at them hitting targets that have a chance of creating situations messier than a nuclear device alone. No, not going to get into more details on that, they have enough ideas as it is and I may have been banned from being OPFOR more than once.

Actually, the scariest scenario out there — to my mind–involves only a single weapon. It’s a scenario that is often associated with surprise first strikes, but just by itself has the potential to put us back to a 1600s level of technology and food production. That scenario is a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) attack.

This version of a FOBS attack essentially has a large warhead (possibly a special warhead to boot) masquerade as a harmless satellite launch. As the device heads up towards orbit, it passes over the center of the United States, and detonates. The resulting Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) will take out not only the electrical grid, but fry every computer and/or electronic device in the continental United States. Only shielded systems will survive. Hate to break it to you, but your car with multiple computers (the newer the more it has), your cell phone, your radio, your stove, your microwave, your toaster, your computer/laptop/tablet, even a large number of medical devices are not shielded. Say bye to them and to your heating/cooling, municipal water, well pumps, sump pumps, and all the features of modern life.

For a nation dependent on just-in-time shipping, it means stores will be rapidly out of food, medicines, clothing, and anything else not locally made. The food in your freezer or refrigerator? Cook and eat it fast, as even if there was power they are still controlled by electronics that are now fried. Even if every train in every museum could be brought back on line and wood/coal/other fuel for them obtained, it’s not even a fraction of one percent of what is carried by train and truck today.

Now, really want to lose sleep? Think about Iran having not only a bomb (courtesy of a lot of help from Pakistan and China apparently) but a proven ability to launch a satellite (again, word is you can thank the CCP, the assholes). Yep, did it a while back and if corporate media covered the story, it tended to be along the lines of ‘nuclear ambitions thwarted, Iran has joined the peaceful use of space club’ type story. Think about the fact that the Mullahs are facing the strongest opposition and uprisings since the revolution; and, that they are committed to bringing about the return of the hidden Imam to Earth — which happens to require an apocalypse. Remember yesterday when I mentioned how MAD placed the safety of the world in the hands of the least stable leader? Can you really look at Putin, Xi, Biden, and the Mullahs and say any of them are in a secure position such that they feel safe and secure about remaining in power? You’re welcome.

A few more points need to be brought up in regards targeting. These are factors that planners (and those seeking to thwart said plans) have to consider.

First up, where do you explode the bomb? Exploding it above ground is going to allow the weapon to destroy or damage a larger area. It also tends to produce less fallout, making it a cleaner weapon.

If you really need to take out a particular structure or location for whatever reason, a ground burst may be the better option to ensure total destruction of that target. Because it is a ground burst, there is going to be a larger amount of fallout since the bomb will be vaporizing/pulverizing soil, structures, etc. and sending it up into the atmosphere and on its way.

The final option is a sub-surface burst. Hardened structures such as bunkers, or even some surface structures, are designed to withstand direct hits and/or near misses. Using ground-penetrating systems increases the chance that even a deeply buried bunker, or massive surface structure, can be destroyed or at least taken off line. Nasty fallout, but I’m also told that it is more limited, at least in terms of the spread. If the boffins from whom I got that information are wrong, I hope it’s on the nastiness of the fallout.

Now, there are two things to consider in regards the statement “How much do you hate that target?” The first is technical in nature, the second one is political in nature.

Your enemy, like you, has a primary control center located well away from other targets like the capital city. It may or may not be a “secret” base or center, but it is likely to be solidly built and deep underground or even inside a mountain. Since The Hole and the Cheyenne Mountain Complex are far from secret and have had their exteriors star on film and television (and rumor is those who worked at both wish the interiors had been as nice as Hollywood portrayed), I’m going to use them for examples. Yes, they did shut down the Cheyenne Mountain Complex for a while, and the Stargate program (annoyed about that still) in the dummy missile silo below the NORAD center (cough, choke, wheeze). While it is not what it was, still makes a good example.

Let’s face it, anyone who wants to attack the United States of America hates The Hole. They don’t just want to knock it offline, they want to destroy it. When first constructed, it was extremely survivable given the accuracy of the times. Now, I don’t know anyone who truly considers it to be survivable. A shaped nuclear charge in a ground penetrator on the most accurate delivery vehicle possible… Think the movies in this case have it right: the orders have to be given and command delegated before it gets hit.

Now, let’s look at the Mountain. Again, when it was built the design was amazingly good. For those who aren’t familiar, the tunnel opening you always see on television and in the movies runs all the way through the mountain. The idea was that if a bomb went off nearby, the blast would go through and not directly impact the doors and such inside. Net result was that the Mountain could ride out even very large blasts.

While there are a couple of tricks that could be tried to simply collapse any and all chambers in the Mountain, I think changing times could easily turn a key defense into an Achilles heel. If you used a cruise missile or hypersonic glide vehicle to put a warhead into the tunnel, the complex is not designed to withstand that. Now, I can think of a couple of ways to prevent that, but…

Now for the political considerations. By and large, the U.S. has focused on developing “clean” weapons. There are a number of reasons for that including but not limited to the fact that I have yet to meet anyone on our side who wants to live underground for a few decades. As long as the weapons are relatively clean, I don’t think it will come to that or any other bad science fiction nihilistic apocalyptic trope.

But, not everyone feels that way about cleaner is better. In fact, an argument can be made that some targets require a dirty weapon because you don’t want ANYONE going into that area for decades. Someone completely unhinged could even desire to make every bomb a dirty bomb to make an enemy the new Carthage. Doing so is easier than many would care for: simply jacket the bomb in cobalt (nasty radiation, long lasting) or some other element or elements that give the desired level of radiation and a decay rate that meets your plan. Someone brought the cobalt bomb up in comments, my thanks to them.

I didn’t cover special weapons in detail the other day as this series is primarily intended for people who have thought little or not at all about the unthinkable. I really don’t want to overwhelm, as my hope is that they will then want to start digging into things and that is when you can start getting into details and precision. Right now, accurate and high-level works. Getting into extreme details on weapons design, orbital mechanics, polar launches, and the many variables on FOBS is counter-productive to the reasons and goals for this series. Feel free to add details and even trivia in the comments, just keep it polite and unclassified.

However, I do feel that I need to mention the nuclear “torpedo” that Russia is allegedly developing as the warhead and the delivery vehicle itself can be considered to fall into the special category. According to the marketing hype, the warhead is massive and dirty, which puts it into the special weapons category. The delivery vehicle, which from the marketing hype would appear to be the size of a small submarine, may either be a form of underwater cruise missile or a drone. Detecting such a vehicle before it hits Norfolk, Pearl Harbor, or other major base could be a challenge. Something to keep an eye on.

The final thing I’m going to bring up in targeting today is the need for multiple attacks on major targets. Why? Simple. When was the last time you saw a complex distributed system where everything worked perfectly when cut on?

Planners tend to be a pessimistic bunch, with good reason, when it comes to reliability. What do you think the odds are of every missile we have igniting, launching successfully, and sending every one of those independent re-entry vehicles on their way with no problems? Planners have to plan for rockets not to launch, problems with the re-entry vehicles, and the fact that a number of the bombs are not going to detonate. They have to plan on planes not starting, having maintenance issues in flight, and that some of their bombs may be duds. Same considerations apply to submarines as well. Also don’t forget that they do have to plan for anti-missile defenses as well.

So, as you look at targets and targeting, keep in mind that a target may get hit multiple times to be sure it is taken out. Trick is, making sure that all the weapons don’t hit too close together, as that tends to work in the targets favor courtesy of one presentation of nuclear fratricide. Multiple hits by multiple means ensures that the target is hit at least once, and odds favor more than once. For example, Washington D.C. could be hit by a sea-launched missile, which if launched off the coast could arrive in 8-15 minutes — not a lot of time. Yes, I’m ignoring for now that DC actually has multiple targets within it. The DC area even more. Sea launched, ground-launched, and aircraft will be headed there. Let’s get people thinking about the unthinkable, then add in the details later when they are better able to handle it.

To end this on a somewhat lighter note, I’m going to bring up a point that may have been rather injudiciously brought up around those who were, possibly, easily offended.

In military operations, there is a concept of selective elimination, to be blunt assassination. The idea is to take out the enemy’s effective commanders and leave the less competent (complete incompetents) alone. However amusing, or true, it is not diplomatic to suggest that Vladimir wants to hurt us, not help us, and as such has elected not to destroy Washington D.C. and state capitals like Albany, Sacramento, Indianapolis, Olympia, Salem, or a few others. Thus concludes both targeting and today’s free diplomacy lesson.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

*****

Nuclear 101: Now What?

It truly is the eternal question: Now What? In 1945, it was the question asked as we realized we were on the back of the bull/tiger/dragon/colorful metaphor of your choice and needed to hang on. It’s still the question today, and we will get to it here in time.

In 1945, the United States was the most powerful nation on Earth, with a temporary monopoly on the power of the atomic bomb. While some felt that we could hold onto that power indefinitely, reality as always intruded. The Soviets had known about the Manhattan Project from the start and were already at work on creating their own bombs. This was spurred along, no doubt, by reports that some were pushing to use the bomb to take out the Soviet Union, nip Mao in the bud, and do other world-cleaning events. There were indeed such pushes, given that both politicians and generals had been quite vocal about the need to go ahead and take on the Soviet Union with the conventional forces already in place in Europe.

In those early days, there was what we would now consider an amazing lack of knowledge about atomic weapons. Radiation, contamination, fallout, and more were learned about somewhat on the fly. Aside from the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S. and Soviet troops were exposed to blasts, marched through blast zones within hours, and treated to other delights. A surprising number of military and civilian leadership/elites apparently truly thought there would be little to no effect on the troops, despite what was being seen in Japan with survivors. Yet others simply saw this as an opportunity to learn what would happen.

As it began to sink in that atomic munitions were not something to be used like extra-powerful conventional bombs, there came a spate of serious proposals that read like bad science fiction. Of course they wanted atomic-powered planes, rockets, and more. There were also serious proposals for armored/shielded land crawlers that would dwarf a Jawa sand crawler, giant robots, and more. It can be a lot of fun to go back and look at some of these proposals.

At the same time, strategic concepts were being developed for the use of atomic weapons. The ridiculous idea that they would pre-empt and prevent conventional war was quickly disproven by Korea and a host of smaller conflicts around the world. At the same time, people began to realize that as more countries got more and more bombs, that a nuclear war would be/could be devastating on a scale never before seen. Pretty much every country of any significance began upgrading its air defenses as planes were the primary means of delivery at that time. As rockets and missiles came to the fore, work began on anti-missile defenses.

As things progressed, concepts were developed for the use of weapons and fighting an atomic war. In some respects, the focus was on preventing the use of atomic weapons and limiting exchanges between parties (really between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.). Thus was developed the moral abomination of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which simply was that if the U.S. were attacked, we might be destroyed but we guarantee you will as well. Both sides had the means to destroy the other, potentially a few times over, and would do so at need. Since each side could do so, neither would attack the other. At least that was the theory, though it really didn’t consider independent powers that weren’t part of the two major power blocks. Worst, it put the safety of the world in the hands of the least stable leader with nukes.

Yet, planning continued on “limited” nuclear war and, to be honest, how to get around MAD and various treaties. After all, if you could come up with a way to take out your enemy’s atomic arms and/or the command and control of same, you’d win, wouldn’t you?

To get a better idea of the ideas involved, allow me to recommend reading Herman Kahn’s Thinking About The Unthinkable and Thinking About The Unthinkable In The 80s. There are other books out there, some of which are quite good, but these two capture a great deal of the philosophies of nuclear war, and avoiding same. NOTE: This is not an endorsement of or agreement with everything espoused by Herman Kahn. Agree or disagree, it is a fascinating window to this world.

They also provide a window into the concept of limited nuclear war. In such an event, only a small number of weapons — perhaps even only one — would be used and then both sides would stand down from further use of atomic weapons. Two problems, IMO, with that are human nature and clarity. Human nature says that even if a limited strike is executed on Country A by Country B, Country A is going to want to strike back and if they feel an existential threat they are going to be inclined to strike back as hard as possible. Clarity, in this case means that you know what you are doing and that you want to limit things, but the country you are attacking, and any allies, aren’t mind readers and are likely to be taking any announcements from you with a grain of salt. To be polite.

Is a single missile being launched a harmless weather sounding mission? Is it a satellite launch? Or, is it a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that will detonate over the target country and take out pretty much all electronics with a burst of EMP so a surprise attack can be launched? Even the use of tactical devices on the battlefield runs a real risk of escalation. If one uses such against a city with military and political headquarters, you have just put your cities at risk.

It was the U.S. position for decades that the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons would be regarded as first use of nuclear weapons, and would be responded to in kind. Those particular red lines have been severely eroded, which may have unfortunately emboldened enemies and given the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” an undeserved air of legitimacy. For those who are not regular readers, this is a Russian concept that they could use a special weapons/tactical device or devices on the battlefield and prevent retaliation by threatening to go strategic (full exchange) if anyone fires back. Sort of a ‘you know I’m crazy because I’ve used a nuke, if you retaliate I’m crazy enough to launch them all’ scenario. I have my doubts about how well that’s going to work…

Tomorrow, I think we discuss targeting and may start looking at some scenarios; but, for today, let’s close out with two very important considerations: Command and Control, and defenses.

Command and Control is how the President (or civilian authority in line of succession) gives orders to our nuclear forces. It’s also how the military shares information with the President, so he can make the decision(s) on how to respond to an event or events. There are such command and control systems/structures for every atomic power.

In the case of the U.S. we have bases, airborne command posts, and perhaps some other things devoted to detecting threats and responding to them. There are dedicated communications networks for these purposes, for all that the Chinese seem to be potentially trying to spoke them. No, I’m not happy about those Chinese land purchases that also seem to come with all sorts of interesting electronics, though I expect little to be done for now. Just keep in mind, as I’ve noted before, the majority of our detection systems are older tech and focused pretty much entirely on ballistic missiles. Much broader threat envelope today…

The Russians also have detection, command posts, and airborne command posts. However, the Soviet Union back in the day realized the communications nets sucked so they devised a system to work around it. For all that we joke about the President pushing the button, the Soviet-now-Russian system is pretty close to that. It has an official name (Perimeter) but is best known as “Dead Hand.” The idea being that a dead hand can still launch a retaliatory strike.

I wrote about the system before at Blackfive years back (can’t find the link, sadly) but the basics are that the system monitors cities, seismic data, and more and if it detects information indicating an attack on Russia, a duty officer is notified and they can decide next steps. Also, if they get the launch orders from the special control system that is usually near Putin (or previous leaders), they can act. Either way, they make a decision on target packages and then launch a missile that as it rises up broadcasts a radio signal to the nuclear armed forces that gives them the launch orders. Once that rocket goes up, the Russian missiles will launch. Which is why we should all celebrate Col. Stanislav Petrov, who when a major warning system malfunctioned, made the decision to ignore the false information and prevented 1983 from being the year of WWIII. The system also came close to being activated by Boris Yeltsin when a weather rocket launched from Norway was mistaken for a first strike.

The British, French, Chinese, and others all have their systems and those systems reflect their governments. With the British, we have a good deal of sharing and it used to be fairly common to see British liaison officers at NORAD and other facilities I’m told.

Now, a little on defense. While Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems get a lot of play, there are a variety of options. Passive defenses include bunkers, such as The Hole or Cheyenne Mountain Complex. Active defenses can include ABMs, projectile systems, or potentially space-based systems. Work on lasers and other directed energy devices is advancing according to industry publications and RUMINT. For a number of reasons, I’m not able to comment on a lot on this work, but will admit I find it frustrating when told (usually by an over-educated idiot) that some or all of it won’t work. You might look up Dean Ing’s discussion on accidentally directly intercepting a missile in flight. It was decades ago, and the idea apparently was to have a near miss so they could get the data to allow a direct hit. Ooops.

Sadly, a lot of our defensive efforts have been prevented/gutted/etc. by people who seem to feel it is immoral and improper to defend yourself. Or possibly because they agree with the enemy. I do wonder some days. And, yes, there is a group that feels that because of MAD we have a moral duty to die without defending ourselves since that might undermine MAD. My thoughts on them I leave to your imaginations.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

*****

Nuclear 101: Delivery

Once again, this is a high-level overview. Part of that is because the only means of delivery I’ve never heard seriously discussed (over adult beverages may be a different issue) is using a kite. Everything from balloons to human assets has been discussed, proposed, and possibly even implemented.

Given the size and weight, the original bombs were designed to be delivered by aircraft. To get the bombs to the airfield, however, required ships. My father actually slept on top of the Hiroshima bomb, not knowing what it was, onboard the Indianapolis. Story for another day, but the first bombs were huge, crude (by today’s standards) and low-yield compared to modern thermonuclear devices.

As size and weight came down, the types of planes that could be used for delivery increased. While the big bombers (B-52, etc.) are still the primary delivery vehicle, even fighter bombers and small aircraft can technically carry a bomb. A fact that tends to give planning staff ulcers given some of the scenarios that enables.

Outside of suicide scenarios, the key is the ability to support the bomb and bombing run, and the ability for the plane to be a safe distance away when the bomb goes off. This can mean anything from bombing at high altitude to ensure enough distance; coming in at high speed and lower altitude; or doing a lob toss (idiot’s loop) where the pilot flies a course that releases the bomb onto a ballistic arc to the target while the pilot does a 180 and redlines the engine(s) to get to a safe distance before it goes off.

Rather, those used to be the only options for aircraft. Today, however, you have the ability to use Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), glide vehicles, and RUMINT has it other options (loitering systems?) are either here or in work. The key to all of these from the U.S. perspective is protecting the expensive highly-trained crew for future use by sending in unmanned systems from a distance. Not every country/power shares that concern.

For years, bombing was the only real option and it remained the most accurate option once the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) became an option. The rocket attacks on London by Germany in WWII were the first use of modern ballistic missiles in war. While they did a good deal of damage and killed a fair number of civilians, they anything but precise and were aimed only in the crudest sense of the word. Even if targeted at a specific landmark, you were doing good just to have it hit in the greater-London area. The inertial navigation systems used on the rockets were not very good, which is not surprising in a first generation system. Yes, yes, they were in use on planes, but no one had ever designed one that could be fitted in a rocket.

When the ICBM came into the picture as a means of nuclear delivery, there had been some improvements to the system, but you still had a Circular Error Probability (CEP) measured in miles. As in the warhead would impact up to several miles off target. As a hypothetical, a U.S. warhead might hit up to a mile off target, while Soviet systems of the day may have had a tendency to hit 10 or so miles off target.

The U.S. response to this was to improve the guidance systems to reduce the CEP such that it was measured in yards, then feet. As seen in non-nuclear use in Iraq and elsewhere, modern guidance systems for missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and loitering munitions can in a number of cases be measured in inches. The problem is that the Minuteman system, our ground-based launch component, is mid-1960s tech. Our Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) are newer than that, but still are based on technology that is 40-50 years old. More on this as we get into strategies and related discussions in the days ahead.

The Soviet response to having such large CEPs was typical. Given problems with manufacturing and technology, they simply made their nuclear weapons more powerful. Didn’t matter if they were a few miles off target, if the bomb was large enough to take it out anyway, along with a hell of a lot of additional real-estate. One of the terms for them you may come across is “city busters.” Even after they stole, bought, or developed improved guidance systems, they have retained that tendency to go for larger warheads — which may say something about the real accuracy of their systems as opposed to what the marketing brochures say…

A brief aside: their problems with technology still persist, and it is telling that the Russians are heavily dependent upon Western companies (looking at you Germany. Though they are not the only government turning a blind eye to companies providing such to Russia, they are the leading one) to provide the components needed for precision guidance in every type of munition.

A couple of other important points to keep in mind when discussing ICBMs. First, they require silos or other launch support. Silos are fixed, expensive, and a target. Mobile launch systems are not as robust but are harder to find/keep track of by an enemy. Silos, because such are very precisely surveyed locations, offer a higher degree of initial accuracy to the guidance system. Mobile launchers tend not to have that precision on launch point since planners rarely count on GPS and other systems being available. Great if it is available, but never count on it.

The second point is that there are two types of missile: solid fueled and liquid fueled. While it is technically possible to make a solid propellant engine I’m told, it’s not a thing with ICBMs.

Solid propellants are limited for the most part to motors: you can start it and it goes until all the fuel is gone. You have no start/stop capability. The advantages to solid fuel pretty much comes down to instant use capability. The disadvantages are that solid motors have a definite lifetime, and require inspection and testing during that time to be sure problems haven’t developed. Cracks and voids are very bad things.

Liquid fuel engines are the alternative to solid motors. While there are arguments to be made over thrust, specific impulse, and other things near and dear to rocket people, the key from an ICBM viewpoint is that they are reliable, easy to maintain, and have a very different inspection and testing regime. Theoretically you also have the ability to start/stop the engines as an additional means of flying an evasive course. A downside to them is that you don’t have instant launch capability, as you have to load the fuel just before launch.

And, yes, you do want to do it just before launch. Attempts to keep them fueled constantly have not worked out well for anyone in the past, just as attempts to use hypergolic fuels have ended badly. In Saturday’s discussion on weapons, remember the comments on designing weapons so that fire, explosions, and other things don’t accidentally set off the weapon? There are good reasons for that other than planes crashing, as it’s quite the faux pas to nuke your own silo(s). Even though having a missile cook off inside it while closed up pretty well takes it out anyway.

It is worth noting that the U.S. has gone with solid motors for pretty much all its missiles. The Soviet Union, then the Russians, have primarily gone with liquid engines for ground-launch. With proper maintenance and testing, both work just fine and can do the job. The key is the maintenance and testing, and I’m trying to decide if I should start in on the history of nuclear war theories tomorrow or do a discussion/rant on the need for testing and what I regard as the abysmal state of America’s nuclear preparedness.

Aside from missiles and aircraft, nuclear weapons can be delivered via glide vehicles, cruise missiles, drones, artillery, and other means. At various points the U.S. and others have explored shoulder-launched systems, human strike teams, and even more far-fetched ideas.

Glide vehicles are not new, and may have even originated as far back as the days of balloons. The idea is simple: create something that has wings/surfaces that will induce motion even as the object drops. Light the fuse and drop it so it heads towards the enemy. Glide bombs were used during WWII, and modern versions can be used for bombing and (one-way primarily) recon. I’m not aware of anyone seriously using them, but they are an option where advanced tech may be limited. The exception to this is the idea of a hypersonic glide vehicle, which is an option reportedly being pursued by the Russians. If successful, it would be a major game changer.

Cruise missiles have been around a while (see the Navaho, aka NeverGo, cruise missile for an early attempt) and with the advent of the drone revolution, have continued to advance. For purposes of our discussions, cruise missiles differ from drones because they operate independent of human control. Drones are flown and while they may have (depending on model) some auto-pilot capability there is usually a human in the loop. Cruise missiles have the ability to come in low and fast, thus evading early warning systems which were (on both sides) primarily developed to detect ballistic missiles. Drones are often stealthy, which opens some interesting possibilities.

Artillery can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. While mostly reserved for tactical weapons, it is theoretically possible for modern systems to launch a strategic weapon. The trick, as always, is to ensure that the launch system is OUTSIDE the blast radius of the device being launched. And, yes, that actually was an issue early on.

While not in use anywhere that I know of, pretty much everyone around the world has looked into some form of man-portable launch system, with at least one shoulder-fired system developed. Problem was, such systems had issues including the slight downside of the person launching the weapon being inside (potentially well inside) the blast zone. Oddly, not a favorite with the troops.

Also, pretty much everyone has looked into the idea of small teams who can be inserted with a weapon into an area (most often by air) who will then place the weapon where needed and then high-tail it out of Dodge with the weapon timed to go off after they are safe. If all goes well.

Finally, you can put a bomb in a van or small truck (might want to beef up the suspension), and drive it to a target that can be reached via roads. Tom Clancy, John Ringo, and others have covered this quite well. Not great for a mass attack, but when we get into strategies it is another concept that can give planners ulcers. Same holds true for large boats/small ships.

So, that concludes a very quick, high-level overview of common, not so common, and even a couple of improbable delivery systems. I wasn’t joking when I said the only delivery system I haven’t heard seriously discussed was kites…

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

*****

Nuclear 101: Weapons

UPDATED to correct typo, sure there’s at least one more in there…

While the primary focus is on nuclear weapons and war, I’m going to talk a bit about other types of special weapons as they can and do play a role in a nuclear war and nuclear strategy. So, let’s start by taking a look at the basic weapons.

First up, the original weapon that opened the nuclear age. Fission weapons derive their energy from breaking apart the atom. To be a bit more precise, a neutron is used to break apart a single atom into two smaller atoms which releases energy and more neutrons which then break apart yet more atoms in a sustained chain reaction. This releases a large amount of energy, which is then measured in kilotons (1 kiloton = 1,000 tons of TNT [note: typo corrected! Thanks for pointing it out]) or megatons (1 megaton = 1,000,000 tons of TNT). Note that pretty much all fission weapons stay in the kiloton range.

In terms of operating systems, there are two types of fission weapons: gun-type and implosion. In a gun-type fission weapon, conventional explosives drive two masses of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) into each other to produce what is called a criticality: the chain reaction necessary for the bomb to function. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a gun-type device.

The implosion device uses a core, or pit, of plutonium surrounded by conventional explosives. The sophisticated explosives create a uniform compression of the plutonium which creates the criticality which then ensures the chain reaction with some form of neutron initiator. If you want more details, you will need to look it up yourself and I note that there is a lot of information out there, a good bit of which is accurate. I will note that you can use HEU as the pit instead of plutonium. In fact, the UN reports that Iraq was doing just that back in the bad old days. It should also be noted that the world’s first nuclear explosion at Alamagordo and the Nagasaki bomb were both implosion devices.

Brief aside, gun devices are easier to build from a technological standpoint but tend to be rather large. Implosion devices are much more technologically challenging on almost every level, but allow a great deal of power in a smaller device.

The next level of weapons are fusion devices. Whereas fission splits, fusion brings deuterium and tritium together to form helium and a whole bunch of energy. Hence the name, hydrogen bomb as deuterium and tritium are isotopes of hydrogen. Edited for clarity and to fix a typo. The energy output of a fusion weapon is much (much much even) higher than a fission weapon.

In discussion on nuclear war, you are going to hear the term “thermonuclear weapons” used. What are they? Simply put, they are a combination of fission and fusion weapon. In grossly over simplistic terms, the fission weapons can be “boosted” by adding in a fusion component. The majority of nuclear weapons in use by major powers today are in fact thermonuclear devices.

Regardless of type, conventional warheads tend to be divided into two areas: Strategic and Tactical. Strategic are mated to longer-ranged delivery systems and are of larger yield. Tactical are intended for use with short-ranged systems and have a much smaller yield. Strategic are intended to take out large areas/targets and tactical are designed to take out a small/limited target and minimize damage outside a limited area. Cough, cough.

There are some specialized types of nuclear weapons. One that hit the news a few decades back was the so-called neutron bomb. This was a device designed to do minimum damage to an area (though it could be argued that it was intended to focus damage to a specific area/target) and neutralize the surrounding area via a massive dose of neutron radiation. That burst of radiation would result in the death of humans (and other animals) hit by it, but leave the infrastructure intact and non-radioactive.

Are there other types of specialized warhead? RUMINT, of course, says yes. Everything from enhanced/tuned EMP to signals to the aliens waiting just outside the solar system. May have to pull some of them into some fiction I need to write, but for purposes of our current discussion the only ones that, if they exist, would have any impact would be enhanced EMP.

No discussion of nuclear weapons would be complete without discussion of issues of criticality and fizzles. Criticality is essential to enabling the chain reaction that is a nuclear explosion. It’s when you get it without wanting to set of such a chain reaction that it becomes a not-so-minor issue.

One way to get an accidental criticality is to bring two masses of material, be it HEU or plutonium, close enough together that a reaction starts. This has happened, in more than one country, when people handling such materials either brought them too close together as part of an experiment (or manufacturing process) and got a flash criticality. This was a short-term event because the materials were immediately separated, though the flash was most often a terminal event for those present.

The other way it can happen is if a fire or other catastrophe some or all of the conventional explosives in a nuclear device. I will simply note that modern weapons make use of specialized explosives and explosives design/layout to minimize the risk of such.

Then there are fizzles. While most of the discussions of learned types focus on boosted weapons, they technically can happen to any type of nuclear explosive. In short, a fizzle is simply an incomplete reaction. In a boosted weapon, the boost doesn’t happen. In a single-type weapon, the chain reaction is not sustained to the planned extent. At worst/best (worse from the user standpoint, best case from the view of the target), the explosion is not as large as planned. RUMINT suggests that there can be odd effects from a fizzle, including some potentially nasty material for clean-up.

You can also have duds. For whatever reason, the bomb does not go off. The conventional explosives may or may not go off, but the core of the bomb does not even reach fizzle status. If nothing goes off, it does make clean-up and containment easier. If the conventional explosives do go off, it can spread radioactive materials around.

Which gives a nice segue into other types of special weapons. In the parlance in which I grew up, CBN for Chemical, Biological, Nuclear.

Chemical covers a range of nastiness from nerve agents to simple caustic compounds. They are intended to incapacitate or otherwise neutralize large groups of ground forces. For those who have not served, having to operate in MOPP gear is hot, nasty, and cumbersome to be polite I am told. I include it here because one of the best ways to deny an enemy use of nuclear weapons is to hit the appropriate storage depots with chemical (or biological) weapons. This prevents ready use and preserves them in case you want to secure them or use them for your own purposes (don’t judge). By the time someone can secure, decontaminate, verify, and then deploy — well, it’s most likely things are already over for the time being.

Biological weapons also cover a range of options. Most people think of killer plagues, and yes there has been research into such (and some countries continue on that to this day). It also includes other vectors designed to incapacitate enemy leadership. Again, there’s a range and if you are really interested, dive in and explore. I include it here primarily because it is a factor that needs to be mentioned, though one scenario may come up in later discussions.

Non-explosive nuclear are best represented by dirty bombs. That is, using conventional explosives to contaminate as large an area as possible by spreading some form of nuclear material including nuclear waste. If, like me, you’ve had the joy of going through the FEMA Weapons of Mass Destruction Course, even a very large and effective dirty bomb is only going to cover a limited area. Pick the right area though, and… While not necessarily practical, you could potentially use a non-explosive criticality to take out key enemy leadership with the right assets. This may or may not get discussed later.

Now, to the topic that generates large amounts of wailing and gnashing of teeth: testing. Yes, testing is needed.

Before computer modeling and simulations because practical, most nuclear weapons design was based on mathematical probabilities and a certain degree of trial and error. Want to know if a new design worked, and worked as planned? Build it and try it.

With the advent of truly advanced computer design and simulations, there came a group who said we no longer needed to do testing of any sort, above ground, underground, or even deep space. There’s just one problem that the smug SOBs who say that computer simulations are all we need don’t get: GIGO. Garbage In, Garbage Out.

Simulations, while often quite good, are no replacement for reality. They can limit the amount of real-world testing required, but they can’t replace it any more than they can replace the need for manual checks of the weapons to detect corrosion in the pits or elsewhere, damage to components from radiation, or any of the other things that need to be checked. They can suggest a schedule of such checks, and maybe even where to spend extra time checking, but they can’t replace the checks, or the tests.

Question for the class: when was the last time we tested either a new or existing design to be sure they either worked as planned or still worked as designed and tested?

Given how much of our nuclear forces are still using designs and components from the mid-1960’s, it’s kind of an important question. Especially since we are at a point where we not only need to modernize our weapons and forces, we need to look at a variety of new warhead and delivery vehicle options to meet new and different threats.

On that note, I think I will stop for the day and on Monday pick up with delivery vehicles and systems. Today is a very quick and broad overview of the weapons, now it’s time to look at how they get from point A to point B.

Yes, I’ve very deliberately not gone into detail on any number of areas and issues. You can write massive tomes and dissertations on any facet of everything brought up today. It suffices to get get some basic information out and avoids becoming a primer if you will.

There are plenty of such out there, and some are fascinating reading. For the purposes of this series of posts, however, the high view should be sufficient.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine