Category: Military

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

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Nuclear War Posts In Order:

Nuclear 101: Weapons

Nuclear 101: Delivery

Nuclear 101: Now What?

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Nuclear 101: Now What?

It truly is the eternal question: Now What? In 1945, it was the question asked as we realized we were on the back of the bull/tiger/dragon/colorful metaphor of your choice and needed to hang on. It’s still the question today, and we will get to it here in time.

In 1945, the United States was the most powerful nation on Earth, with a temporary monopoly on the power of the atomic bomb. While some felt that we could hold onto that power indefinitely, reality as always intruded. The Soviets had known about the Manhattan Project from the start and were already at work on creating their own bombs. This was spurred along, no doubt, by reports that some were pushing to use the bomb to take out the Soviet Union, nip Mao in the bud, and do other world-cleaning events. There were indeed such pushes, given that both politicians and generals had been quite vocal about the need to go ahead and take on the Soviet Union with the conventional forces already in place in Europe.

In those early days, there was what we would now consider an amazing lack of knowledge about atomic weapons. Radiation, contamination, fallout, and more were learned about somewhat on the fly. Aside from the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, U.S. and Soviet troops were exposed to blasts, marched through blast zones within hours, and treated to other delights. A surprising number of military and civilian leadership/elites apparently truly thought there would be little to no effect on the troops, despite what was being seen in Japan with survivors. Yet others simply saw this as an opportunity to learn what would happen.

As it began to sink in that atomic munitions were not something to be used like extra-powerful conventional bombs, there came a spate of serious proposals that read like bad science fiction. Of course they wanted atomic-powered planes, rockets, and more. There were also serious proposals for armored/shielded land crawlers that would dwarf a Jawa sand crawler, giant robots, and more. It can be a lot of fun to go back and look at some of these proposals.

At the same time, strategic concepts were being developed for the use of atomic weapons. The ridiculous idea that they would pre-empt and prevent conventional war was quickly disproven by Korea and a host of smaller conflicts around the world. At the same time, people began to realize that as more countries got more and more bombs, that a nuclear war would be/could be devastating on a scale never before seen. Pretty much every country of any significance began upgrading its air defenses as planes were the primary means of delivery at that time. As rockets and missiles came to the fore, work began on anti-missile defenses.

As things progressed, concepts were developed for the use of weapons and fighting an atomic war. In some respects, the focus was on preventing the use of atomic weapons and limiting exchanges between parties (really between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.). Thus was developed the moral abomination of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) which simply was that if the U.S. were attacked, we might be destroyed but we guarantee you will as well. Both sides had the means to destroy the other, potentially a few times over, and would do so at need. Since each side could do so, neither would attack the other. At least that was the theory, though it really didn’t consider independent powers that weren’t part of the two major power blocks. Worst, it put the safety of the world in the hands of the least stable leader with nukes.

Yet, planning continued on “limited” nuclear war and, to be honest, how to get around MAD and various treaties. After all, if you could come up with a way to take out your enemy’s atomic arms and/or the command and control of same, you’d win, wouldn’t you?

To get a better idea of the ideas involved, allow me to recommend reading Herman Kahn’s Thinking About The Unthinkable and Thinking About The Unthinkable In The 80s. There are other books out there, some of which are quite good, but these two capture a great deal of the philosophies of nuclear war, and avoiding same. NOTE: This is not an endorsement of or agreement with everything espoused by Herman Kahn. Agree or disagree, it is a fascinating window to this world.

They also provide a window into the concept of limited nuclear war. In such an event, only a small number of weapons — perhaps even only one — would be used and then both sides would stand down from further use of atomic weapons. Two problems, IMO, with that are human nature and clarity. Human nature says that even if a limited strike is executed on Country A by Country B, Country A is going to want to strike back and if they feel an existential threat they are going to be inclined to strike back as hard as possible. Clarity, in this case means that you know what you are doing and that you want to limit things, but the country you are attacking, and any allies, aren’t mind readers and are likely to be taking any announcements from you with a grain of salt. To be polite.

Is a single missile being launched a harmless weather sounding mission? Is it a satellite launch? Or, is it a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) that will detonate over the target country and take out pretty much all electronics with a burst of EMP so a surprise attack can be launched? Even the use of tactical devices on the battlefield runs a real risk of escalation. If one uses such against a city with military and political headquarters, you have just put your cities at risk.

It was the U.S. position for decades that the use of chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons would be regarded as first use of nuclear weapons, and would be responded to in kind. Those particular red lines have been severely eroded, which may have unfortunately emboldened enemies and given the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” an undeserved air of legitimacy. For those who are not regular readers, this is a Russian concept that they could use a special weapons/tactical device or devices on the battlefield and prevent retaliation by threatening to go strategic (full exchange) if anyone fires back. Sort of a ‘you know I’m crazy because I’ve used a nuke, if you retaliate I’m crazy enough to launch them all’ scenario. I have my doubts about how well that’s going to work…

Tomorrow, I think we discuss targeting and may start looking at some scenarios; but, for today, let’s close out with two very important considerations: Command and Control, and defenses.

Command and Control is how the President (or civilian authority in line of succession) gives orders to our nuclear forces. It’s also how the military shares information with the President, so he can make the decision(s) on how to respond to an event or events. There are such command and control systems/structures for every atomic power.

In the case of the U.S. we have bases, airborne command posts, and perhaps some other things devoted to detecting threats and responding to them. There are dedicated communications networks for these purposes, for all that the Chinese seem to be potentially trying to spoke them. No, I’m not happy about those Chinese land purchases that also seem to come with all sorts of interesting electronics, though I expect little to be done for now. Just keep in mind, as I’ve noted before, the majority of our detection systems are older tech and focused pretty much entirely on ballistic missiles. Much broader threat envelope today…

The Russians also have detection, command posts, and airborne command posts. However, the Soviet Union back in the day realized the communications nets sucked so they devised a system to work around it. For all that we joke about the President pushing the button, the Soviet-now-Russian system is pretty close to that. It has an official name (Perimeter) but is best known as “Dead Hand.” The idea being that a dead hand can still launch a retaliatory strike.

I wrote about the system before at Blackfive years back (can’t find the link, sadly) but the basics are that the system monitors cities, seismic data, and more and if it detects information indicating an attack on Russia, a duty officer is notified and they can decide next steps. Also, if they get the launch orders from the special control system that is usually near Putin (or previous leaders), they can act. Either way, they make a decision on target packages and then launch a missile that as it rises up broadcasts a radio signal to the nuclear armed forces that gives them the launch orders. Once that rocket goes up, the Russian missiles will launch. Which is why we should all celebrate Col. Stanislav Petrov, who when a major warning system malfunctioned, made the decision to ignore the false information and prevented 1983 from being the year of WWIII. The system also came close to being activated by Boris Yeltsin when a weather rocket launched from Norway was mistaken for a first strike.

The British, French, Chinese, and others all have their systems and those systems reflect their governments. With the British, we have a good deal of sharing and it used to be fairly common to see British liaison officers at NORAD and other facilities I’m told.

Now, a little on defense. While Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) systems get a lot of play, there are a variety of options. Passive defenses include bunkers, such as The Hole or Cheyenne Mountain Complex. Active defenses can include ABMs, projectile systems, or potentially space-based systems. Work on lasers and other directed energy devices is advancing according to industry publications and RUMINT. For a number of reasons, I’m not able to comment on a lot on this work, but will admit I find it frustrating when told (usually by an over-educated idiot) that some or all of it won’t work. You might look up Dean Ing’s discussion on accidentally directly intercepting a missile in flight. It was decades ago, and the idea apparently was to have a near miss so they could get the data to allow a direct hit. Ooops.

Sadly, a lot of our defensive efforts have been prevented/gutted/etc. by people who seem to feel it is immoral and improper to defend yourself. Or possibly because they agree with the enemy. I do wonder some days. And, yes, there is a group that feels that because of MAD we have a moral duty to die without defending ourselves since that might undermine MAD. My thoughts on them I leave to your imaginations.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

Nuclear 101: Weapons

Nuclear 101: Delivery

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Nuclear 101: Delivery

Once again, this is a high-level overview. Part of that is because the only means of delivery I’ve never heard seriously discussed (over adult beverages may be a different issue) is using a kite. Everything from balloons to human assets has been discussed, proposed, and possibly even implemented.

Given the size and weight, the original bombs were designed to be delivered by aircraft. To get the bombs to the airfield, however, required ships. My father actually slept on top of the Hiroshima bomb, not knowing what it was, onboard the Indianapolis. Story for another day, but the first bombs were huge, crude (by today’s standards) and low-yield compared to modern thermonuclear devices.

As size and weight came down, the types of planes that could be used for delivery increased. While the big bombers (B-52, etc.) are still the primary delivery vehicle, even fighter bombers and small aircraft can technically carry a bomb. A fact that tends to give planning staff ulcers given some of the scenarios that enables.

Outside of suicide scenarios, the key is the ability to support the bomb and bombing run, and the ability for the plane to be a safe distance away when the bomb goes off. This can mean anything from bombing at high altitude to ensure enough distance; coming in at high speed and lower altitude; or doing a lob toss (idiot’s loop) where the pilot flies a course that releases the bomb onto a ballistic arc to the target while the pilot does a 180 and redlines the engine(s) to get to a safe distance before it goes off.

Rather, those used to be the only options for aircraft. Today, however, you have the ability to use Air-Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM), glide vehicles, and RUMINT has it other options (loitering systems?) are either here or in work. The key to all of these from the U.S. perspective is protecting the expensive highly-trained crew for future use by sending in unmanned systems from a distance. Not every country/power shares that concern.

For years, bombing was the only real option and it remained the most accurate option once the Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) became an option. The rocket attacks on London by Germany in WWII were the first use of modern ballistic missiles in war. While they did a good deal of damage and killed a fair number of civilians, they anything but precise and were aimed only in the crudest sense of the word. Even if targeted at a specific landmark, you were doing good just to have it hit in the greater-London area. The inertial navigation systems used on the rockets were not very good, which is not surprising in a first generation system. Yes, yes, they were in use on planes, but no one had ever designed one that could be fitted in a rocket.

When the ICBM came into the picture as a means of nuclear delivery, there had been some improvements to the system, but you still had a Circular Error Probability (CEP) measured in miles. As in the warhead would impact up to several miles off target. As a hypothetical, a U.S. warhead might hit up to a mile off target, while Soviet systems of the day may have had a tendency to hit 10 or so miles off target.

The U.S. response to this was to improve the guidance systems to reduce the CEP such that it was measured in yards, then feet. As seen in non-nuclear use in Iraq and elsewhere, modern guidance systems for missiles, cruise missiles, drones, and loitering munitions can in a number of cases be measured in inches. The problem is that the Minuteman system, our ground-based launch component, is mid-1960s tech. Our Trident Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) are newer than that, but still are based on technology that is 40-50 years old. More on this as we get into strategies and related discussions in the days ahead.

The Soviet response to having such large CEPs was typical. Given problems with manufacturing and technology, they simply made their nuclear weapons more powerful. Didn’t matter if they were a few miles off target, if the bomb was large enough to take it out anyway, along with a hell of a lot of additional real-estate. One of the terms for them you may come across is “city busters.” Even after they stole, bought, or developed improved guidance systems, they have retained that tendency to go for larger warheads — which may say something about the real accuracy of their systems as opposed to what the marketing brochures say…

A brief aside: their problems with technology still persist, and it is telling that the Russians are heavily dependent upon Western companies (looking at you Germany. Though they are not the only government turning a blind eye to companies providing such to Russia, they are the leading one) to provide the components needed for precision guidance in every type of munition.

A couple of other important points to keep in mind when discussing ICBMs. First, they require silos or other launch support. Silos are fixed, expensive, and a target. Mobile launch systems are not as robust but are harder to find/keep track of by an enemy. Silos, because such are very precisely surveyed locations, offer a higher degree of initial accuracy to the guidance system. Mobile launchers tend not to have that precision on launch point since planners rarely count on GPS and other systems being available. Great if it is available, but never count on it.

The second point is that there are two types of missile: solid fueled and liquid fueled. While it is technically possible to make a solid propellant engine I’m told, it’s not a thing with ICBMs.

Solid propellants are limited for the most part to motors: you can start it and it goes until all the fuel is gone. You have no start/stop capability. The advantages to solid fuel pretty much comes down to instant use capability. The disadvantages are that solid motors have a definite lifetime, and require inspection and testing during that time to be sure problems haven’t developed. Cracks and voids are very bad things.

Liquid fuel engines are the alternative to solid motors. While there are arguments to be made over thrust, specific impulse, and other things near and dear to rocket people, the key from an ICBM viewpoint is that they are reliable, easy to maintain, and have a very different inspection and testing regime. Theoretically you also have the ability to start/stop the engines as an additional means of flying an evasive course. A downside to them is that you don’t have instant launch capability, as you have to load the fuel just before launch.

And, yes, you do want to do it just before launch. Attempts to keep them fueled constantly have not worked out well for anyone in the past, just as attempts to use hypergolic fuels have ended badly. In Saturday’s discussion on weapons, remember the comments on designing weapons so that fire, explosions, and other things don’t accidentally set off the weapon? There are good reasons for that other than planes crashing, as it’s quite the faux pas to nuke your own silo(s). Even though having a missile cook off inside it while closed up pretty well takes it out anyway.

It is worth noting that the U.S. has gone with solid motors for pretty much all its missiles. The Soviet Union, then the Russians, have primarily gone with liquid engines for ground-launch. With proper maintenance and testing, both work just fine and can do the job. The key is the maintenance and testing, and I’m trying to decide if I should start in on the history of nuclear war theories tomorrow or do a discussion/rant on the need for testing and what I regard as the abysmal state of America’s nuclear preparedness.

Aside from missiles and aircraft, nuclear weapons can be delivered via glide vehicles, cruise missiles, drones, artillery, and other means. At various points the U.S. and others have explored shoulder-launched systems, human strike teams, and even more far-fetched ideas.

Glide vehicles are not new, and may have even originated as far back as the days of balloons. The idea is simple: create something that has wings/surfaces that will induce motion even as the object drops. Light the fuse and drop it so it heads towards the enemy. Glide bombs were used during WWII, and modern versions can be used for bombing and (one-way primarily) recon. I’m not aware of anyone seriously using them, but they are an option where advanced tech may be limited. The exception to this is the idea of a hypersonic glide vehicle, which is an option reportedly being pursued by the Russians. If successful, it would be a major game changer.

Cruise missiles have been around a while (see the Navaho, aka NeverGo, cruise missile for an early attempt) and with the advent of the drone revolution, have continued to advance. For purposes of our discussions, cruise missiles differ from drones because they operate independent of human control. Drones are flown and while they may have (depending on model) some auto-pilot capability there is usually a human in the loop. Cruise missiles have the ability to come in low and fast, thus evading early warning systems which were (on both sides) primarily developed to detect ballistic missiles. Drones are often stealthy, which opens some interesting possibilities.

Artillery can be used to deliver nuclear weapons. While mostly reserved for tactical weapons, it is theoretically possible for modern systems to launch a strategic weapon. The trick, as always, is to ensure that the launch system is OUTSIDE the blast radius of the device being launched. And, yes, that actually was an issue early on.

While not in use anywhere that I know of, pretty much everyone around the world has looked into some form of man-portable launch system, with at least one shoulder-fired system developed. Problem was, such systems had issues including the slight downside of the person launching the weapon being inside (potentially well inside) the blast zone. Oddly, not a favorite with the troops.

Also, pretty much everyone has looked into the idea of small teams who can be inserted with a weapon into an area (most often by air) who will then place the weapon where needed and then high-tail it out of Dodge with the weapon timed to go off after they are safe. If all goes well.

Finally, you can put a bomb in a van or small truck (might want to beef up the suspension), and drive it to a target that can be reached via roads. Tom Clancy, John Ringo, and others have covered this quite well. Not great for a mass attack, but when we get into strategies it is another concept that can give planners ulcers. Same holds true for large boats/small ships.

So, that concludes a very quick, high-level overview of common, not so common, and even a couple of improbable delivery systems. I wasn’t joking when I said the only delivery system I haven’t heard seriously discussed was kites…

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

Nuclear 101: Weapons

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Nuclear 101: Weapons

UPDATED to correct typo, sure there’s at least one more in there…

While the primary focus is on nuclear weapons and war, I’m going to talk a bit about other types of special weapons as they can and do play a role in a nuclear war and nuclear strategy. So, let’s start by taking a look at the basic weapons.

First up, the original weapon that opened the nuclear age. Fission weapons derive their energy from breaking apart the atom. To be a bit more precise, a neutron is used to break apart a single atom into two smaller atoms which releases energy and more neutrons which then break apart yet more atoms in a sustained chain reaction. This releases a large amount of energy, which is then measured in kilotons (1 kiloton = 1,000 tons of TNT [note: typo corrected! Thanks for pointing it out]) or megatons (1 megaton = 1,000,000 tons of TNT). Note that pretty much all fission weapons stay in the kiloton range.

In terms of operating systems, there are two types of fission weapons: gun-type and implosion. In a gun-type fission weapon, conventional explosives drive two masses of highly-enriched uranium (HEU) into each other to produce what is called a criticality: the chain reaction necessary for the bomb to function. The bomb dropped on Hiroshima was a gun-type device.

The implosion device uses a core, or pit, of plutonium surrounded by conventional explosives. The sophisticated explosives create a uniform compression of the plutonium which creates the criticality which then ensures the chain reaction with some form of neutron initiator. If you want more details, you will need to look it up yourself and I note that there is a lot of information out there, a good bit of which is accurate. I will note that you can use HEU as the pit instead of plutonium. In fact, the UN reports that Iraq was doing just that back in the bad old days. It should also be noted that the world’s first nuclear explosion at Alamagordo and the Nagasaki bomb were both implosion devices.

Brief aside, gun devices are easier to build from a technological standpoint but tend to be rather large. Implosion devices are much more technologically challenging on almost every level, but allow a great deal of power in a smaller device.

The next level of weapons are fusion devices. Whereas fission splits, fusion brings deuterium and tritium together to form helium and a whole bunch of energy. Hence the name, hydrogen bomb as deuterium and tritium are isotopes of hydrogen. Edited for clarity and to fix a typo. The energy output of a fusion weapon is much (much much even) higher than a fission weapon.

In discussion on nuclear war, you are going to hear the term “thermonuclear weapons” used. What are they? Simply put, they are a combination of fission and fusion weapon. In grossly over simplistic terms, the fission weapons can be “boosted” by adding in a fusion component. The majority of nuclear weapons in use by major powers today are in fact thermonuclear devices.

Regardless of type, conventional warheads tend to be divided into two areas: Strategic and Tactical. Strategic are mated to longer-ranged delivery systems and are of larger yield. Tactical are intended for use with short-ranged systems and have a much smaller yield. Strategic are intended to take out large areas/targets and tactical are designed to take out a small/limited target and minimize damage outside a limited area. Cough, cough.

There are some specialized types of nuclear weapons. One that hit the news a few decades back was the so-called neutron bomb. This was a device designed to do minimum damage to an area (though it could be argued that it was intended to focus damage to a specific area/target) and neutralize the surrounding area via a massive dose of neutron radiation. That burst of radiation would result in the death of humans (and other animals) hit by it, but leave the infrastructure intact and non-radioactive.

Are there other types of specialized warhead? RUMINT, of course, says yes. Everything from enhanced/tuned EMP to signals to the aliens waiting just outside the solar system. May have to pull some of them into some fiction I need to write, but for purposes of our current discussion the only ones that, if they exist, would have any impact would be enhanced EMP.

No discussion of nuclear weapons would be complete without discussion of issues of criticality and fizzles. Criticality is essential to enabling the chain reaction that is a nuclear explosion. It’s when you get it without wanting to set of such a chain reaction that it becomes a not-so-minor issue.

One way to get an accidental criticality is to bring two masses of material, be it HEU or plutonium, close enough together that a reaction starts. This has happened, in more than one country, when people handling such materials either brought them too close together as part of an experiment (or manufacturing process) and got a flash criticality. This was a short-term event because the materials were immediately separated, though the flash was most often a terminal event for those present.

The other way it can happen is if a fire or other catastrophe some or all of the conventional explosives in a nuclear device. I will simply note that modern weapons make use of specialized explosives and explosives design/layout to minimize the risk of such.

Then there are fizzles. While most of the discussions of learned types focus on boosted weapons, they technically can happen to any type of nuclear explosive. In short, a fizzle is simply an incomplete reaction. In a boosted weapon, the boost doesn’t happen. In a single-type weapon, the chain reaction is not sustained to the planned extent. At worst/best (worse from the user standpoint, best case from the view of the target), the explosion is not as large as planned. RUMINT suggests that there can be odd effects from a fizzle, including some potentially nasty material for clean-up.

You can also have duds. For whatever reason, the bomb does not go off. The conventional explosives may or may not go off, but the core of the bomb does not even reach fizzle status. If nothing goes off, it does make clean-up and containment easier. If the conventional explosives do go off, it can spread radioactive materials around.

Which gives a nice segue into other types of special weapons. In the parlance in which I grew up, CBN for Chemical, Biological, Nuclear.

Chemical covers a range of nastiness from nerve agents to simple caustic compounds. They are intended to incapacitate or otherwise neutralize large groups of ground forces. For those who have not served, having to operate in MOPP gear is hot, nasty, and cumbersome to be polite I am told. I include it here because one of the best ways to deny an enemy use of nuclear weapons is to hit the appropriate storage depots with chemical (or biological) weapons. This prevents ready use and preserves them in case you want to secure them or use them for your own purposes (don’t judge). By the time someone can secure, decontaminate, verify, and then deploy — well, it’s most likely things are already over for the time being.

Biological weapons also cover a range of options. Most people think of killer plagues, and yes there has been research into such (and some countries continue on that to this day). It also includes other vectors designed to incapacitate enemy leadership. Again, there’s a range and if you are really interested, dive in and explore. I include it here primarily because it is a factor that needs to be mentioned, though one scenario may come up in later discussions.

Non-explosive nuclear are best represented by dirty bombs. That is, using conventional explosives to contaminate as large an area as possible by spreading some form of nuclear material including nuclear waste. If, like me, you’ve had the joy of going through the FEMA Weapons of Mass Destruction Course, even a very large and effective dirty bomb is only going to cover a limited area. Pick the right area though, and… While not necessarily practical, you could potentially use a non-explosive criticality to take out key enemy leadership with the right assets. This may or may not get discussed later.

Now, to the topic that generates large amounts of wailing and gnashing of teeth: testing. Yes, testing is needed.

Before computer modeling and simulations because practical, most nuclear weapons design was based on mathematical probabilities and a certain degree of trial and error. Want to know if a new design worked, and worked as planned? Build it and try it.

With the advent of truly advanced computer design and simulations, there came a group who said we no longer needed to do testing of any sort, above ground, underground, or even deep space. There’s just one problem that the smug SOBs who say that computer simulations are all we need don’t get: GIGO. Garbage In, Garbage Out.

Simulations, while often quite good, are no replacement for reality. They can limit the amount of real-world testing required, but they can’t replace it any more than they can replace the need for manual checks of the weapons to detect corrosion in the pits or elsewhere, damage to components from radiation, or any of the other things that need to be checked. They can suggest a schedule of such checks, and maybe even where to spend extra time checking, but they can’t replace the checks, or the tests.

Question for the class: when was the last time we tested either a new or existing design to be sure they either worked as planned or still worked as designed and tested?

Given how much of our nuclear forces are still using designs and components from the mid-1960’s, it’s kind of an important question. Especially since we are at a point where we not only need to modernize our weapons and forces, we need to look at a variety of new warhead and delivery vehicle options to meet new and different threats.

On that note, I think I will stop for the day and on Monday pick up with delivery vehicles and systems. Today is a very quick and broad overview of the weapons, now it’s time to look at how they get from point A to point B.

Yes, I’ve very deliberately not gone into detail on any number of areas and issues. You can write massive tomes and dissertations on any facet of everything brought up today. It suffices to get get some basic information out and avoids becoming a primer if you will.

There are plenty of such out there, and some are fascinating reading. For the purposes of this series of posts, however, the high view should be sufficient.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Nuclear War Posts In Order:

*****

Nuclear What?

Yesterday, I read an interesting article on a recent conference on nuclear deterrence (and more) held in Omaha. This is an annual conference held under the aegis of the U.S. Strategic Command, formerly known as SAC before it was abolished in a fit of premature celebration years ago.

While it’s been going, mostly, since 2009, it seems this year the shit finally got real for some people as they realized what others have been saying for years: Russia is a realistic threat who is modernizing as rapidly as possible; the Chinese are still a few years away but working hard to bypass parity with the U.S. as soon as possible; Iran is a realistic threat on it’s own, much less as a catspaw for others; and, even North Korea needs to be taken seriously.

Consider the fact that at least the backbone of our nuclear capability is based on mid-1960’s technology. The Minuteman system is indeed just that, and you might want to take a look at the BUFF and how some of it’s crews include three generations of military family serving in the same plane over the years. Let’s not get into our command and control system and the reported use of floppy discs and other delights. Let’s not get into the age and design of our warheads, or that we need a better range of warhead options for scenarios that might have changed just a bit since 1965. Nor the fact that we have not taken full advantage of our technology and what is allowed under treaties to engage in the type of anti-ballistic missile (heck, anti-missile period) defense that would protect us from not just ballistic threats, including depressed trajectory shots from sub-launched missiles, but also from cruise missiles, hypersonic delivery vehicles, specialized delivery vehicles (deep penetrators, etc.), and, well, you get the picture. A lot has changed since 1965. Sadly, it isn’t our nuclear presence or posture.

Meantime, Russia has the SATAN-1 deployed and is working on the SATAN-2. I’m taking some of the things with the SATAN-2 with a grain of salt right now, as it was supposed to be fully deployed (and replacing the SATAN-1) about two years ago. They have continued warhead development, a variety of delivery vehicles, nuclear-capable bombers, and everything needed to have a reasonable assurance of a reliable and robust system. Or, at least the appearance of one. Again, there appear to be some glitches in the system, and I do take the Russian/Soviet tendency to develop what I call “Ronco Systems” as a result of an occasionally massive inferiority complex. That is, systems that are larger, better, faster, etc. than corresponding American systems and they also do other things/provide more options in the process. Problem is, the more bells and whistles, the more often there are performance issues.

China, well, what I will say right now is that they are working hard (and stealing tech/designs) not only for nuclear weapons, but the systems to accurately deliver them under a variety of circumstances. They appear to be looking for a robust, diverse, and effective system. Yes, they do worry me. They should worry anyone with a brain.

Iran, despite the implication in the linked article, was pursing and has never stopped pursuing development of nuclear weapons. They appear to have gotten a good bit of help from the Chinese both on weapons and on rocket technology. I find it amusing that when COVID hit them, it may have come in on some of the clandestine flights between Iran and China related to this project. While I don’t see them yet as a near-term peer, as I have written before, I can see them using their new satellite launch capability to initiate a Fractional Orbital Bombardment System (FOBS) attack on the U.S. as a lead in for another power to take advantage of. Given the current sorry state of our power grid, and that pretty much all efforts at hardening it and the electronic systems we depend on from just such an attack, just one burst of EMP could eliminate the U.S. as a modern society for some time to come.

North Korea is proof that the idea of the fate of the world resting on the least stable world leader wasn’t scary enough. For all that I think there is at least some method to the madness, I still see the madness as not being a happy-making thing.

I think that getting into all that is involved may end up taking several posts. For the public to understand not only what is going on, but how we got here and the options available to us, is complex and may take some time. For example, we need to look at basics of nuclear war, from theoretical limited use to a full exchange. We need to look at what is required to have a reliable and robust system and ensure it works when needed. This is especially important given that according to some sources, we’ve gone from an 80 percent success rate to a 20 percent success rate for launch. We need to look at what is required training for our political and other leadership so that they respond as well as possible to threats or attacks. The war games described by Tom Clancy and Larry Bond in their works were real, but can anyone tell me the last time a POTUS or other senior political leader took part in such? And, there are a few other topics that may need to be discussed in this context.

My goal is over the coming weeks is to explore these topics and to take such explorations where they, and possibly even the comments, lead to the extent that I can legally and morally do so. Meantime, I’m going to go ahead and invite some people I know to join in and shoot holes in what I put up. Who knows, maybe we will get a good guest post or two out of it.

I’m going to include this in my Russia/Ukraine coverage as it is there that I see the largest chance for people on all sides to fuck up by the numbers. Right now, I think we haven’t seen the worst simply because of legalisms, but that is both a past discussion and perhaps one for the future. Meantime, have a good weekend!

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

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Ukraine/Russia Tidbit

I’m not going to do a full update, but two things came out of the OSINT community today that caught my eye. One is a reminder of how fast things can get out of control. The second is a pipe dream that deserves to have a flamenco done on it in hobnail combat boots.

H. I. Sutton this morning shared the NavalNews story that the Knyaz Vladimir, a Bulava-class boomer, has had the “Z” invasion marking painted on it. While the marking has been going on a LOT of equipment that is in no danger of being sent to/used in or on the Ukraine, this is a very clear message that is well in keeping with some of the official comments and unofficial RUMINT coming out of Moscow.

For those just joining in, the Russians have been threatening the use of nuclear weapons, including full-scale global nuclear war, pretty much from the start. If this were a formally declared war, instead of a special military action, doctrine would have seen the use of special weapons (nuclear, chemical, biological) long ago. Given that Vladimir is a cheerleader for “escalate to de-escalate” philosophy, this is not a happy making thought for many of us. “This business will get out of control” is valid, and how easily and how fast it can do so is keeping a lot of good people up at night.

Also, DefMon asked a question yesterday that I saw this morning. It very simply was if Vladimir was a valid military target. Short answer: Yes, just as Zelenskyy was and is.

The longer answer is that any action by the Ukraine against Vladimir will rapidly escalate the situation and the scope of the war. An attempt to kill or kidnap him via military action, similar to what the Russian’s attempted with Zelenskyy in the early days, simply aren’t practical. Using other weapons simply to try to kill him are both unlikely, given the lack of long-range weapons or covert deep-strike capabilities. Finding a way to do it, however, is guaranteed to move things from special action to full war.

As Evergreen Intel dryly noted, a palace coup is not likely to work out as many would like to fondly imagine. Any internal coup is likely to pit various units/ministries against each other in literal, not figurative, battle. While things are not quite like they were when Tom Clancy and Larry Bond wrote Red Storm Rising, you are going to be talking troops, militias, and “security” troops that are former military turned mercenary involved in protecting Oligarchia and others. Would I be surprised at full-scale/small unit combat between groups? No. Would I be surprised at some form of maskirova with small special weapons? Honestly, sadly, no. Once the dust settles, things could get very interesting very fast depending on who won, as Vladimir is far from the most militant person involved, as there are others who make him look like the voice of reason and restraint.

As I noted on Twitter, “If Vladimir keels over dead for some reason, the claim he was assassinated will be used by those shooting for the top (all puns intended) to further their goals. Even if he knows it’s coming and tries for orderly succession, odds of pulling it off long-term about zero.” Even in the short term, I’m not sure Vladimir could pull it off. Given the prize, expect to see those looking to be come the new Czar go all in to the point that we will indeed see it get out of control to the point we will be lucky to live through it to modify the quote.

If some power outside of Russia and/or the Ukraine were foolish enough to try to assassinate Vladimir, much less succeed, things will get out of control pretty much immediately, with the unthinkable becoming the thinkable and implemented very, very rapidly. Especially as that is one of the automatic scenarios for which Dead Hand is supposed to monitor.

So, just a couple of tidbits of food for thought. As always, if you can shoot holes in the analysis using real citations, logic, etc., go for it. But, show your homework and no magical handwavium allowed.

Oh, has anyone else noticed that a portion of the Kremlin seems to have gone radio silent? As in almost no RUMINT, comments, or general chatter? Not a huge block, but interesting.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

Russia/Ukraine/Lithuania

Since the last update, the only thing that has changed in terms of Russia/Ukraine is that Russia is pushing hard in more areas in an effort to seize territory and cut off reinforcements from counter-attacking. Of course, that works both ways and the recent deep drone strike(s) by the Ukraine are designed to put the Russians on the defensive. Expect it to get even more brutal and nasty here soon, and for the latest information on the combat check out the OSINT people I link to on Twitter (@laughingwolfone) as a good start.

Not exactly a daring prediction, but expect the Russian push to intensify so that Vladimir can “annex” the most possible territory even if he doesn’t really control it. The announcement of annexation is also likely to declare that any attempt to defend (in areas he doesn’t really control) or to take back what they have seized will be an act of war by Ukraine and NATO.

Yes, I expect Vladimir to expand things as they’ve spent the last 20 or so years preparing the populace for war, even nuclear war, with NATO and the U.S. If you aren’t familiar with some of this, check out Kamil Galeev’s extensive work on this and related subjects.

Right now, Lithuania is pushing as hard as it can to make this a NATO/EU war by cutting off access to the Kaliningrad enclave. For those who know not history, Commander Salamander points out a rather unpleasant historical parallel.

The Baltic states have been pushing for this to be a NATO/EU war from the start, and on some levels it is hard to blame them. They know they are on the list to be brought into Russkiy Mir by force. Vladimir has just reinforced that with a series of comments and provocations against them and Denmark. That said, I am less than thrilled with their efforts and this latest by Lithuania has the potential to go sideways in a hurry. Then again, that’s why they are doing it.

There are those who are already calling this the Cold War 2, and saying it could last generations. On some levels, I hope they are right. There is far too great a potential for this to become a hot war on levels no one will like. It will take competent, knowledgeable, and strong leadership to navigate either a cold war or a hot, and frankly I don’t see that leadership anywhere in sight right now.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come

*****

A Quick Russia/Ukraine Update

As I said a while back, I am happy to have been wrong about May. That said, while I have dropped the use of special weapons to 40 percent, I am not inclined to drop lower yet. Why? Internal rhetoric and the fact that things stood up have not been stood down. Until I see the internal discussions change, and things stood down and locked back up, I have to consider such things as still on the table. Not likely currently, but things change and they can change in a heartbeat.

The demented meat puppet is NOT helping things. Someone yesterday said he was trying to finesse things, which scares the everliving out of most sane people as he and his handlers don’t have a clue of how to do that. He and his administration continue to both needlessly antagonize Vladimir (and miss a lot of what is needed to deal with him and the situation) and present challenges to our allies.

In other words, pretty much same old, same old. No real change over the last few weeks. As for the actual combat, it is the grind previously discussed. The OSINT crew out there is doing an amazing job of not only covering the combat, but also the history, cultural, and other factors that go into this conflict. If there is an interest, I will put up a list of the OSINT people I follow. I will also say (again) that back in the early 80s I would have just about killed for some of the resources OSINT has today. And, not surprising, OSINT is largely beating the various agencies and organizations on a consistent basis. Only other thing is that so far the Ukraine has fought very smart. Conventional wisdom and a lot of current military planning is getting stood on its head and smart people are paying attention.

Some Previous Posts:

Answers, Ramblings, And A Bit More On Vladimir And The Ukraine

War, Ag, Demographics, And The Worst Is Yet To Come