Month: September 2022

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 201: Scenarios

Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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An Era Ends

The Queen is Dead! God Save The Queen.

For all that I am glad I don’t live under any monarchy, I liked Queen Elizabeth II; I admired a number of aspects about her; and, I respected even more. She was a better friend to the U.S. than many may ever know or realize. From all accounts she would be the first to admit she wasn’t perfect, but she set a standard few can measure up to.

For me, you gotta love that as a teenager facing the Blitz, she learned to shoot Winston Churchill’s tommy gun; reportedly received rather extensive weapons training as both she and her father said no to leaving in the face of invasion (rumor has it the initial response was rather pithy, and the public statement was a bit more diplomatic but also blunt). In addition, she learned car repair/mechanics and drove an ambulance during the blitz. When not driving, she worked on said ambulances. Fearless is one of the descriptors used in regards her driving, again rumor suggests a few others were applied as well. She reportedly retained a keen interest in both the military and intelligence throughout her life, possibly to the dismay of certain prime ministers. She also had a quick way with people who, er, got on her bad side. Personally driving the Saudi monarch around on a tour after that gentleman had made some comments in public about women drivers was just one of them. There is more I could say, but for now, I will simply say:

God Bless Queen Elizabeth II! May God have mercy on the United Kingdom and the Commonwealth, and all those who morn her passing. We will not see her like again anytime soon.

Nuclear 201: Policy, SIOP, and Escalation

Really wanted a catchier title this morning, but the imagination just isn’t cooperating. In some ways, this lesson is a hodge-podge of concepts yet it really isn’t. Instead, it takes scenarios and targeting and puts them into a plan that is governed to some extent by policy including (one hopes) how and when things escalate.

Absent some serious flip-ups, the detonation of a single nuclear device, or even two, should not result in a full-scale nuclear exchange. I will note that this is dependent upon Dead Hand not being programmed/ordered to do so on the Russian side, and a couple of other minor caveats, but one or two detonations — particularly in the tactical range — should not trigger all-out nuclear war.

First up, let’s explore a couple of points of policy. Absent signs of a massive full-scale attack by any enemy, the unofficial policy of the United States has been more towards restraint and proportionality. I say unofficially as the U.S., like most nuclear powers, has been coy about discussing what it will or won’t do in response to any attack. The idea is to avoid getting locked into a set of actions that might not be the best option(s) under the circumstances. Having the maximum amount of flexibility in deciding when, where, and how to respond is a very good thing.

For all that Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) was and is a thing, most people with any degree of sanity really want to avoid that. After all, you flush yours and we flush ours has a degree of finality to it for all the governments of the world, and isn’t going to be that good for the world in general. So, even if highly unofficial, flexibility is preferred by leaders with a degree of sanity everywhere. Those without sanity, or highly desperate, are the reason MAD put the world at the mercy of the least stable (mentally, politically, otherwise) leader(s) anywhere.

Which does bring up a number of issues, including how does one respond to someone using tactical nuke(s), or that is using chemical, biological or other weapons. I grew up and spent years using CBN (chemical, biological, nuclear) rather than WMD (Weapons of Mass Destruction) or the current CBRNE (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive). The latter encompasses a much broader range of nastiness, though I think WMD does cover things from a legal standpoint. Despite what some may think, the U.S. is not party to any treaty that bans the use of Fuel-Air Explosive (FAE), thermobaric, or other weapons. Reminds me, there is someone I need to ping to see if they might be willing to do a guest post on the various Geneva and Hague conventions and what the U.S. is, and is not, signed up to.

It was long the position of the United States that anyone using any type of WMD (CBRNE, MNOPQRS, or whatever) was effectively using a nuke and would be responded to as if they HAD used a nuke. The policy had the desired effect in that it made rogue states (and others) think twice and at least openly avoid using any type of WMD. It also gave the Soviet Union some pause in regards its doctrines calling for the use of various WMD in military operations. That it may also have helped to lead to some treaties limiting biological and other bits of nastiness is a plus in my book.

However, back in the Obama administration we got the famous “red line in the sand” incident involving Syria and Russia. If you are not familiar with what happened, you do need to look it up. From where I sit, it turns out the lines weren’t red and were indeed written in the sand as there was no real response to the (alleged) use of chemical weapons by Syria and/or Russia.

Which does put the Biden administration in a bit of a bind. If Russia uses WMD in the Ukraine, does it hold to the stated policy or, once again, let it slide? If chemical or other, there is undoubtably going to be a LOT of pressure to let it slide. But, what if it is nuclear? My bet is lots of pressures from a lot of different directions, including from Vladimir with his “escalate to de-escalate” idiocy. Given that Biden reportedly told Vladimir well before the invasion of the Ukraine of his terror at the thought of a nuclear exchange, much less a nuclear war, who knows how either will react.

Which leads us (hopefully) to SIOP. The Strategic Integrated Operations Plan builds on all those scenarios discussed (or at least alluded to) yesterday. Within it are a series of responses to almost any set of circumstances that arise. This includes major and minor targets/target packages per each circumstance. In this case, Biden should already have been briefed in on SIOP when he was VP and should have taken part in some exercises that are designed to get those involved familiar with protocols, options, and other good things. This should have been updated when he because POTUS. Problem is, as Tom Clancy noted in his works, you can get administrations who blow those exercises off…

For our 201-level discussion, let’s start with the idea of Vladimir and Biden staring at each other with steely gazes and firm resolve over the Ukraine. As they jut their jaws and double down on showing firm resolve, the Duchy of Grand Fenwick uses Iran and Pakistan to attack the U.S. (or NATO) while everyone is looking with bated breath at Vladimir and Biden.

Got news for you, it doesn’t mean that everything we have launches at Vladimir. In fact, as a missile officer explained to me many years ago, the only time everything is aimed at one location is right before launch. In fact, he used the analogy of Countries A and B being in a fight (or ready for one) and Country C coming up and shooting Country A in the back. Do you shoot B because C shot you in the back? No. You turn around and shoot Country C.

In this case, it’s obvious pretty quickly what has happened. As a result, SIOP provides options that result in the President choosing target package MOUSE 7 which sends the appropriate weapons by the appropriate means to the assigned targets in those countries (and elsewhere) as needed. In this case, elsewhere could include the cruise liner charted by the Duchy to take its population out to sea so as to survive retaliation. Too bad they didn’t do more OPSEC on that…

SIOP is intended to provide a range of options for each scenario so that POTUS (or successor) can choose the right response given the situation. Within that is some flexibility in regards major and minor targets. The idea is, in part, to keep things equitable if you will. The problem with that, however, is that people are people. Leaders can miscalculate, they can misinterpret data or what is being said to them by their opposite number(s), and they can just flat out flip-up. A good example is in the movie By Dawn’s Early Light where the Russian launch at China is mistaken for another attack on the U.S., which leads to an escalation. That really should have been taken care of by notification through the hot line teletype, but it makes for decent movie…

In short, communications are the key. It’s why in the past a LOT of effort has gone into establishing and maintaining both official and unofficial lines of communications between governments and administrations. It’s why efforts were made to ensure the leaders had some understanding of each other. It’s why even when seconds count, people usually try to communicate. When they don’t is when you get things like the massive flip-up that was the weather rocket incident. Thought for the day: you can never have enough communications and redundant communications. No matter how much you have, there is always someone who does NOT get the word. Plan on it.

For all that the use of WMD, including tactical nuclear weapons, does not have to mean escalation to a larger nuclear exchange, I am concerned that such will happen. When you have one leader who not only threatens such on a regular basis, but has members of his administration talk about total nuclear war and how ready they are for it to the media and others (and even the animals at the zoo as enthusiastically as they go about it), it does not make fertile ground for restraint or for the concept of “escalate to de-escalate” to work as planned. In fact, it pretty much ensures that it won’t work. Throw in an opposite number of advanced age and concerns over mental competence, who spends a good bit of his time threatening and running down the majority of his own citizens, and it is a recipe for something nasty, not tasty and good. It creates a situation ripe for misinterpretation and misunderstanding.

To be honest, the best we can do right now is hold on, hope that the systems on both sides are weighted toward restraint, pray, and prepare. Anyone who says that Russian use of non-nuclear WMD is different from the use of nuclear, well, either doesn’t know history and historical policy, or is just a flippin idiot whistling past the graveyard. Things do NOT have to escalate, but it does depend on reasonable, competent, and frankly brave leadership on every side. May the situation never arise, but if it does, may the leadership on each side rise to the occasion.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 201: Scenarios

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Scenarios

First, for those who have persevered and gotten through: THANK YOU! My hosting provider Dreamhost sucks. Think I’ve been down more than I’ve been up the last few months. I’m now talking with two other providers to find out what it will cost to get their help migrating to an actual hosting provider. Particularly one that can handle basic blogging. I will add that to the fundraiser (getting hit by lightning and being out of work this long sucks even worse than Dreamhost, and that’s going some) and see what can be done.

Yesterday we got into the next level of targeting. Still a high level, even though I notice the comments are already pushing you to not just scuba, but go nitrox deep (smile). Before we go much further, I am being a bit of a bastard to you if you are new to all this. It’s for your own good, but still…

In teaching any subject, but particularly science, there are times when certain concepts almost need to be taught at the same time, but for a number of reasons they can’t be. Not easily at any rate. There are some who argue that in discussing nuclear strategy, you should start with scenarios then get into targeting. I take the tack that you need to start thinking about targeting first, as it is a good intro into the complexities involved. Since yesterday started introducing you to the complexities, let’s kick it up a notch and start talking about scenarios.

For all that I need to get into escalation tomorrow (note to self), why the flip are we going nuclear, and how are we doing it? This being a 201-level course, we’re going to sort of skip over the whole why thing for right now, and look more at the how for today.

In “entertainment” (using that term loosely) it’s usually because some bad guy thinks that they can take out their enemy (ies) without consequences (or at least with few for themselves). The madman who unleashes armageddon (deliberately not capitalized) upon a horrified world that has renounced nuclear evil. Sigh. One dimensional characters and threats. Second most popular trope is the religious nutcase unleashing holy war (funny how jihad is now never, ever mentioned in Hollyweird). Until recently (cough, Iran, cough) none of these terrorist organizations were likely to have more than a couple of weapons which put them to terrorism rather than war. Third most common trope is a madman or group that conspires to have the major nuclear powers (usually U.S. and Russia, funny how China is still getting a pass) get into a nuclear exchange so they can come out on top.

For all that they are tropes, and not even necessarily that good, I guarantee you they have been gamed out. Somewhere in the vaults of DoD (perhaps in the same warehouse as the Arc of the Covenant), there is a scenario for the U.S. to attack (or be attacked by) the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Yes, you do want to look that up, for all that it is far left it is a grand farce that manages to hit some interesting and even important points.

And, yes, the idea of Russia deciding to attack for no other reason than that Vladimir thinks he can win (just as he did in the Ukraine, cough) is a scenario. So are various scenarios where people on both sides miscalculate in response to events. If you’ve read your Clancy, you already know that a number of such war games take place so that people can get to know each other, and figure out how to respond to things. Rumor has it that such “games” have not been done in a while, at least on a senior level. If that is true, I think it a huge mistake. One of my larger concerns for escalation involves Russian doctrine and the asinine concept of “escalate to de-escalate.” For a number of reasons, I can see bumbling incompetence on both sides taking things a lot further than they should.

Where you can really start to have fun is in getting away from the traditional doomsday scenario. That’s when you can truly start to get sneaky and explore options that don’t tend to slag the world. At least not immediately.

For example, we’ve already had a comment on yesterday’s post looking at shipping containers in ports. Valid. Gamed even I believe. But, why stop there? What if a “terrorist group” (cough, cough) smuggled in multiple devices and literally drove them into positions? Given all the various uranium sales and such, the ability to analyze the bomb and figure out who it belonged to may not be as easy as it used to be. Yes, that can be done. Which means that if someone parked multiple devices around the U.S., it would take time to figure out where the devices originated. Meantime, if those locations included Sunnyvale, Peterson, Offutt (does building 500 have a loading dock?), Capitol Hill, the White House, the Pentagon, and maybe a couple of others — congratulations you just carried out a dream-level decapitation strike.

Of the leadership that is left, they are scrambling trying to figure out what has happened, how it has happened, and initiate search and rescue efforts. In short, a bit busy and if there is confusion that the attack(s) may have been with our own devices… Gee, if Vladimir and Xi were to decide to use special weapons and/or push on multiple fronts in that time…

Reality is that we should be looking for bad actors to take advantage of the situation, and there is going to be more than a little suspicion that anyone so doing was involved. There are already options in place for such. Problem is, which option is chosen and who does the choosing? There are operations in place to ensure continuity of government and civilian control of the military, yes, including designated survivors. In his Black Tide series John Ringo is basing his NCCC off reality.

I’ve also already discussed the scenario of exploding a device over the U.S. to take out the electrical grid and more. Exploring this option and variants has occupied more than a little bit of time.

But why look at scenarios? Simple. It allows you to develop defenses and responses that don’t necessarily involve destroying the world. Oh, someone can do X? Let’s make it where they can’t do X. If someone does Y, what can we do in response? Let us count the ways and costs involved in those responses. It also allows you to figure out what works best for you in different circumstances.

For example, someone picked up on something I wrote yesterday about targeting the individual missile silos. Why hit them if they are empty? Well, there can be some very good reasons to do so. There can also be good reason to go for them, especially if you’ve created a scenario where you can get in and hit them before they have a chance to launch, such as the fueling scenario I mentioned.

Even the most outrageous scenarios provide information and food for thought. From war with England to sneaking a device into Vladimir’s special toilet system (where a deliberate squib event might not set off Deadhand and render a bunker useless), it makes people think and get creative. Thus are valid defenses and response options born.

For you, my readers, scenarios let you explore and evaluate your security as well as that of the nation. For example, instead of that dream decapitation strike discussed above, what if you wanted to cripple logistics in the U.S. for a long, long time? Think about that comment on shipping containers in the ports, and then look at two devices hidden in Memphis and Indianapolis. You’ve just taken out our ability to bring goods in from overseas, and you’ve just crippled both air, rail, and road logistics for most of the U.S. Really want to flip things up, and I would add one to two targets more to the West.

If all goes to plan, tomorrow I hope to talk escalation and why I’m cringing at the statements from one OSINT analyst. Then, I want to start getting deeper into how to determine your level of threat and what you can do to survive it. For me, I have two plans. One involves continued support via the Tip Jar in the upper right and the fundraiser so I can move. One involves general preparation, because when you come down to it the disaster doesn’t matter: it’s the type damage it does and that, unlike disasters, is a limited set.

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SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Targeting, Take 2

While I still hope to go back for some further discussion on communications and control, the time has come to talk of mice and men, of targets and targeting. While we did a brief overview in Nuclear 101, it’s time to get a bit further into the weeds.

In many respects, there are three levels of target: Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary.

Primary are those things that if you are to have any chance of pulling off a successful (for values of successful) attack, you have to take those targets out. Such targets can include weapons systems, especially land-based systems; bases from which various systems can operate or be controlled; and, your command and control systems ranging from the NMCC in the Pentagon to the Nightwatch and TACAMO planes in the air. If you can take out the command and control (and communications nodes) centers, you can prevent (or reduce) the retaliation for your attack. If you can damage or destroy the missiles and planes, again, you reduce or eliminate the ability to retaliate. In short, primary targets are those things that can seriously hurt you.

Secondary targets are the “nice to do” targets if you will. They can’t hurt you immediately, but long-term are a problem. For example, tanker aircraft and the bases they fly from may not be a primary target, but you want to take them out in order to prevent refueling of bombers, fighters, and other craft. They can be secondary command and control nodes, military or civilian. RUMINT had state capitals as Soviet secondary targets (bomber targets) unless said city had a major military base/center that would make it a primary target.

Tertiary targets are sort-of the “eh, if we can we will” targets. These tend to be administrative centers and operations that keep the bureaucracy moving as it were. It could be something like Ft. Ben was/is in Indianapolis (want your money? Be nice to Ft. Ben!), to Fort Huachua which is home to a number of commands including the Army Intelligence Center. One can spend some time arguing where any given base or center falls in the rankings. Honestly, a lot comes down to how the given enemy views that location.

Why does it matter? Simple. There are limits to the number of nuclear weapons in the world, and there is a limit to the number of delivery systems. Some of the commenters on earlier posts have already dived head-first into those waters (or potentially even started scuba diving). For today, I’m going to keep it largely hypothetical with just a few dashes of reality.

Let’s start with that dash of reality. The U.S. land-based ICBM of choice is the LGM-30G Minuteman III. The Russian missile on which we will focus is the Satan 2/RS-28 Sarmat, which is in the process of replacing the Satan-1 missiles. Originally scheduled to be completed around 2018, this is still in process which suggests a few things. For all that I’m concentrating for now on Russia and the U.S., you may want to check out what’s going on with the Chinese as they could easily take over as the top threat from Russia. As within hours to be honest.

For our purposes today, we are going to go with some assumptions which may or may not be precise, but work for the points of this exercise. First, for U.S. weapons we are going to go with 400 missiles, each capable of carrying 3 independently-targeted re-entry vehicles (range 1,100 miles though not part of today’s exercise). For Russia, we are going to go with the same number of Satan-2 missiles, but for purposes of the exercise we will limit it to 11 re-entry vehicles (possible mix of light, heavy, HGV; range 11,000 miles).

Now, to set the final stage of the exercise, let’s limit each side to just 1,500 nuclear weapons. Close to treaty, though how close to reality is something very different. Reality is that some on each side are going to be other-than-strategic, with the Russians having (again, according to RUMINT) a significantly larger stockpile of tactical/other-than-strategic. For exercise purposes, treat all 1,500 as strategic weapons of various sizes.

Now, go back to the discussions on reliability and let’s go with the (ludicrous) position of 80 percent success. My very cynical view on reliability is that one would be far better going with a 20 percent success rate, but let’s be optimistic for the exercise. Let’s assume that 80 percent of the missiles will launch; 80 percent of the nuclear weapons will work as advertised; and, that 80 percent of the aircraft will make it into the air and not be sidelined by mechanical or other issues.

Which means that the missiles on either side are reduced to 320 missiles. Which reduces the U.S. to 960 effective warheads via missiles and the Russians to 3,520 warheads. Ooops. Is anyone spotting a problem here? Well, it’s a problem and one of the issues in regards START and related treaties — no one really knows how many ICBMS Russia has. No one knows how many nuclear weapons they truly have either. One set of estimates is here and another is here. You might notice that there is a wide range on the total number of nuclear weapons Russia (and even the U.S.) are reported to have ready to go. As noted earlier, the 40,000+ warheads attributed to the Soviet Union is not reality today. Even so, there is a lot of “wiggle room” and that is what makes planning so much fun!

Again, for purposes of the exercise, let’s ignore reality and limit both sides to 960 effective warheads. Now, which ones are they? Are they on the missiles that don’t launch? How many are on missiles that do launch? Welcome to the sub-lesson Paranoia 101 in target selection! You can’t just assign one warhead to a crucial primary target. You have to figure on at least two warheads, on different missiles, to have a shot at one hitting on target. Really critical targets (such as The Hole, Pentagon/NMCC, etc.) are going to get 3-4 warheads via missiles, and then one or two via bomber.

You can get away with targeting one weapon per missile silo (odds aren’t good on catching it in the ground anyway) or even control capsules (and, yes, the Russians and others pretty much know where they are). Your major command and control nodes? You need to plan on 3-5 warheads for each target. Oh, and to make the planning even more fun, you can’t have all the warheads arrive at once. There’s a thing called nuclear fratricide which could have one nuke take out, or mitigate the effects of, the other nukes if they all hit about the same time. If you want to know more on the topic, do a search of “Dense Pack” and nuclear.

Now, for this exercise, let’s just keep it simple and go with each nuke being a large device. The fact is, as a commenter noted a while back, 4-40 KT bombs can be far more effective than a single 400 KT device. This being a 201-level exercise, we won’t get into size and placement. Presume each device is the same and we are using airburst rather than ground or ground-penetration blasts. FYI, going back to a comment, an underground test is not supposed to breach the surface (though such is reported to have happened), and even the so-called theoretical deep-penetrating warheads are going to send boom upwards and out — and frankly produce some nasty fallout in the process. It will NOT stay all underground.

Okay, now: pick your targets. If you want, you can play Russia and pick targets in the U.S., or you can pick targets in Russia. Up to you. Just you have to stay within the numbers above. In fact, if you like, since this is just an exercise, go with only missiles. Adding in bombers, sea-launch, and other delights really is a 301- or higher level course.

Ready? Go.

In some respects, there are no right or wrong answers for this highly theoretical exercise. The primary purpose is to get you to thinking about what constitutes a target so that you can understand current events. It also allows you to assess things such as if you live in a target zone, and if so what can you do to improve your odds of survival. Despite a number of movies and breathless television dramas, you can survive. Much depends on the level of target near you, distance to that target, and other factors.

For example, currently living in Indianapolis (and please help me get out of here!), I rate us as a secondary target. It’s not like it was years back when you had Ft. Ben as a bit more than just an admin center, major manufacturing, and some other things. Back then, one could make a case that Indy was targeted for at least four weapons. Today, with logistics being the dominant industry here, Ft. Ben reduced, and the critical wartime manufacturing pretty much gone, a good case could be made for a single weapon.

Then the debate turns to how large and where. The argument I put forth earlier in the series looked at a 1 MT device airburst over the state capitol. Such an attack would take out several major interstate highways, a major airport, potentially cripple midwest rail operations, air and ground cargo operations, and state government. An equally good case can be made for targeting the airport (which would take out the state capitol in the process). Frankly, I don’t like either choice as while I am outside the total destruction zone, I would still be in the conflagration zone. Much better odds with the airport, but… Rough (very rough) rule of thumb on a 1 MT airburst: 4 mile radius total/near-total destruction, 2-4 mile additional radius for fire after damage. Not perfect, but gives you something to work with on damage assessment.

Again, this is all a higher level course but it is something about which you do need to think.

Oh, one final thought to share in selecting your targets for this exercise. If you choose to play Vladimir and target the United States, there is one other major consideration when looking at the number of missiles and warheads: you don’t want to use them all. You need to keep a reserve because it’s not just the U.S. and Russia. If you are playing Russia and use all your nukes and missiles on the U.S., Xi is going to be over on the side going ‘youuuuu soooo stuuuppppiiiddddd!’ as you just gave up your ability to deter him from taking some valuable chunks out of your empire.

Again, while it is a higher level course, keep in mind that Vladimir does not have the luxury of just targeting the U.S. He’s got to target NATO and more. Again, that’s higher level, but keep in mind the deeper you get into this the more targets you need to think about for your weapons. You also have to think about which weapons you want to hold in reserve, and how.

Finally, there should be some computer games/simulations out there. Years back, I remember one called (I think, stupid lightning) “Nuke War” that was a limited (only 3 or so dimensions) study that worked you through the Triad (planes, missiles, sub-launched) where you had to choose how to spend your defense budget for same and build up a nuclear capability. It also, at random, would decide to kick off a nuclear exchange. Think there were or are some others. If you know a good one, speak up in the comments.

Ah, that’s the other point I wanted to make today: Nuclear Winter. At worst, it will be nuclear autumn. Keep in mind that the original study on Nuclear Winter used a literally two-dimensional model of the Earth to come up with it’s conclusions. If memory serves, I think 16-24 dimensions are required just to start getting the atmosphere (much less what it does) correct. Caught an earful from a rather annoyed scientist at a major government lab over that one day. Enjoyed the info, though I enjoyed playing with an early version of the holodeck even more.

So, have fun and take a look at your list then tuck it away. If we keep going with this, you will need it again as we once again kick targeting up a level.

*****

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order:

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Nuclear 201: Additional Thoughts On Coms

While I still hope for a further guest post or two, today I want to lay out a few further thoughts on nuclear communications. We’ve got into some of the how, and why, they are done the way they are to prevent problems. Another point to consider is that you don’t want any enemy or potential enemy to be able to read your mail.

The fact is, anyone with a functional brain does tests of their command and control systems. You check things out, try to find and correct problems, and test the reliability of the system in all aspects. Thing is, you don’t want those who don’t like you to know what you do and how you do it as it gives them both information and options.

There is a lot of discussion on preventing or eliminating that command and control communications. If you can do that, you can keep release and launch orders from going out. Thing is, even better, if you can get the right info and access the right things you can do something even worse: you can take over that net. Imagine if someone got inside the net, sent the necessary targeting info, then launched your missiles for you — at targets inside your own country/forces.

Shades of a bad James Bond movie? Not entirely, and there are rumors that such has been gamed out.

Going back to reading the mail, keep in mind that different countries/powers use different systems. We tend to go with solid rocket motors, while others go for liquid engines. If you are using liquid engines, you have to load fuel before launch. If someone is reading your mail, and they know you’ve ordered all rockets to load fuel, a process that is not instantaneous though faster than it was I’ve heard, and that you’ve taken steps to prevent detection of said loading, what happens? Do you think they might launch attacks that can hit your sites before load and launch is complete? Using sea- and air-launched assets could take out the attack before it gets started, and reserves the crucial land-based launch capabilities for either last-ditch or follow-on operations.

So, you want to have a robust system to prevent bad things and ensure that things work. Do we have such? No. As a commenter pointed out earlier (think it was The Drill Sergeant) we do not, and in fact some of what we have is reported (widely) to still use floppy discs. On the good news front, as someone noted in an article elsewhere, it uses technology that is so old it pretty much precludes modern hackers from getting inside it. For a number of reasons, I invite you to research this on your own as it is yet another area where we need to be making some serious changes and upgrades.

On that happy note, enjoy your weekend!

*****

SOME PREVIOUS POSTS:

Nuclear 201 Posts In Order

Nuclear 101 Posts In Order: