The Flip Side

Yesterday, I talked a bit about the Pagercide (and more) committed against Hezballess by parties unknown (cough) but widely suspected to be Israel. As I noted then, it was and is a masterstroke of an op and targeted against leadership with minimal chances of collateral damage. Brilliant. Pity they reportedly had to go early.

But, as I noted yesterday, it does raise a number of questions, many of which fall under the umbrella of ‘is it a good idea to buy products, especially critical products, from an open or potential enemy country?’ It is a very important question, and I’m old enough to remember when purchasing com gear from a NATO member who wasn’t always, er, in sync with NATO and it’s operations, generated a bit of conversation — some of it in public even.

Yet, a decade or three ago we began outsourcing a lot of our manufacturing, assembly, and other work to China and other countries that were potential enemies, somewhat open enemies, or former open enemies. Now, admittedly we have a thing about rebuilding former enemies and trying to turn them into our friends. Sometimes it works; sometimes it works for a few decades; and, sometimes it really doesn’t work no matter how much one or both sides try to paper over things. China is a case of where we tried to turn a potential/semi-open enemy into a friend and bring them out of communism in the process, and in my opinion at least it has been an abject failure on both counts.

Now, Cdr. Salamander and members of the naval brigade have been jumping up and down and pointing out that buying critical products, like port cranes and more, from China was a bad idea. They have been jumping up and down for a decade, if not longer, in fact. A number of others in non-naval roles have done the same for other products in other areas. I will simply note that when I’ve tried to point out that it is a bad idea derision is about the nicest response, and they go downhill from there. Lots of DC applecarts would be upset by recognizing reality. Heck, the CCP and Winnie the Pooh really don’t even bother to hide all the money (and other considerations) flowing into American politics and politicians, even into academia and other fields.

I’m less worried about explosives in devices as I would hope that despite the massive corruption and incompetence is our major institutions such would be discovered fairly quickly. That said, it is a possibility especially if you weren’t obvious about it. There are other things that I think are a far greater possibility that our elites and major institutions are furiously ignoring.

First up, intelligence gathering. Just for fun, go look at your phone, computer, the computers in your household appliances, the computers in your car, and other delights. How many of them are made in China? Other interesting countries? How about the major components such as chips? Where were they assembled?

Now, think about how easy it is for a company like, say, Apple to monitor what you do and have on your computer? Think they can’t and don’t? You haven’t read your terms of service, and unless you take steps that destroy a lot of functionality, they can, have, and will hoover a lot of info and can share it with LE and others quite legally. It is also not that hard to activate built-in cameras and microphones, both by the manufacturer and others who are up to no good. Most every computer security person I know has tape over their camera unless in use, and some have even installed switches to control microphones — even if they take a more ‘moderate’ approach in public comments. That says a lot.

Now, add in that if you have a smart home of any type, you’ve given permission to more than one entity to monitor everything said in your home. Ostensibly it is both to ensure commands are heard and to train the system to understand what you (and others) are saying so commands can be heard and heard correctly. How hard to you think it is for other parties to gain access to that info, openly or covertly? Especially if they make the hardware or the key components of same?

Now, take it a step further. How many of those large and important cargo cranes in our ports are made in the U.S. and how many of them are made in China? On the latter, who wrote the software and what is contained in all those lines of code? Chips are incredibly complex, are you sure you know what every part of every chip does? How many other critical products, including military products, use chips or other parts made overseas? Imagine if a data packet could be sent to tap something hidden in plain sight, and shut those products down? Or simply change a charging parameter so that your lithium battery overheats?

Years ago, a friend of mine named Bryan Gibson (sadly passed now, a very good artist) came up with a concept for a story where in a futuristic society terrorists attacked by simply changing tolerances in systems by one decimal place. Imagine if auto-avoidance or terrain-following systems suddenly went to feet (or more) instead of inches of tolerance in areas where inches counted? Don’t know that it ever got finished, but it is not only a quick way to create chaos, but to cause populations to lose faith and confidence in their systems. And, with a lot of fiction, it was a warning. One we have not heeded.

Just as an aside, if you are not aware, various Western government agencies often insist on backdoors for things like encryption, other software, and even systems and networks. Sure they get proper warrants to use it, really.

Heck of a thing when you have to start with the assumption your systems are compromised from the start. Even more fun is realizing how easy it would be for someone to turn them all off or otherwise manipulate them.

Imagine that things go hot with China. What would happen if a signal were sent, or a regular signal not received, and the port cranes quit or began to operate wildly? Same to systems in power plants and other critical infrastructure? Even down to your smart refrigerator and other appliances in your home?

It’s not that far fetched, and in fact it is a cold douche of reality that it can happen. We are conditioned in many respects to giving up privacy for the convenience of our smartphones and apps, which gleefully send information on our locations, purchases, purchasing habits, and more to those who use it and sell it. Not that hard for an enemy, foreign or domestic, to tap into those data streams. Not that hard for someone ill-intentioned to use our hardware and even software against us.

Leaving aside domestic considerations, it’s beyond foolish to allow open or potential enemies to supply critical infrastructure and systems. Civilian, military, it doesn’t matter. The opportunities for intel and for system denial in time of war or crisis are far greater than most realize or will admit.

Caveat Emptor.

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7 thoughts on “The Flip Side”

  1. This is something I’ve worried about for a long time. It frustrates me as a gap in the economic literature. I’m a big champion of free trade, and the rise of global trade has been IMO a major boon. But. It also seems obvious that in time of war, any advantages of trade are greatly offset by the disadvantages of trading with the people shooting at you. It seems clear to me that this is a gray zone rather than black and white. If it makes sense to stop shipping war material to your adversary in time of war, surely there must be some threshold *short of war* where it makes sense to stop trading or at least ensure you are prepared for its cessation. I can find almost nothing on this in the serious literature, but it makes sense to me.

    1. It’s a valid question that deserves a lot of thought — and some answers. In the case of China, I would have put the time to taper off more than two decades ago, and we should have stopped things at least a decade ago. It’s not just the hardware, it is pharmaceuticals and a host of other critical items. Very few will discuss the issue openly, and China works hard to make that so. We need a good discussion, a frank discussion, but it is going to take people outside of government, most academia, and certain power circles to do it.

  2. One example combining the a short-of-war threshold concept with the law of unintended consequences dates from the late 1930’s. The California oil industry had been diverting an enduring production glut from the depressed continental market to supply the Imperial Japanese effort to extend (in their way) their Economic Co-Prosperity Sphere across Manchuria, and China proper. When the Roosevelt Administration undertook to embargo said supply, the Japanese reached out (in their way) to the oil-rich Dutch East Indies for assistance; which occasioned the attempted neutering of the U.S. Navy at Pearl, and the utter destruction of the British fleet at Darwin, Harbors. I am confident this lesson is not lost on the Chinese.

  3. I guess you really don’t want to hear from me. My initial comment was rejected because of a bogus assertion about my VPN. When I turned it off and tried to repost, I got a duplicate comment message. If you care the message was about adjustable tolerances on signature matching for mail and absentee ballots.

    1. Part of me really wants to be snarky, but will just say this. I use a service/automated program to filter for spam as it is the only way to keep things manageable. If someone has a problem, some of them drop me an e-mail and ask me (nicely) to check. I also try to check on a regular basis anyway. Having been under the weather, haven’t done it. Just a thought, but a nice e-mail is a good alternative to buying cheese to go with the whine and pitching a pity party in the comments.

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