If you follow some of the, ah, more seasoned milbloggers and such, yes there has been a bit of snickering and odd jokes. And, to be honest, there is a part of me that suspects that somewhere Guderian is smirking if not smiling. I know I smiled a bit at hearing Marders had broken through in Kursk. If you are a student of military history, you pretty much could not help it. Not because of sympathy for the Germans in WWII, but for the rich, deep irony of the situation.
Two good pieces on Kursk are up here and here. There is a lot of fragmented info coming in via OSINT. To call the situation fluid is an understatement on par with referring to the Sun as warm. Ukraine has wisely not said a lot and apparently not shared a lot. For all that many suspect the U.S. knew and said nothing, I’m getting suspicious that we may have known and been told far less than that, and that Ukraine has learned a lesson about sharing plans and info with the U.S. Nothing concrete, just odd bits of data that don’t fit the pattern. Then again, most of our allies learn that lesson, sometimes painfully, as sharing with our politicians is pretty much a bad idea. Yes, there are a couple of exceptions, but note that they are exceptions.
Now, lots of people are noting the railway lines and logistics. True, and very important. As is how an already strapped Russia is going to deal with the loss of more vehicles, tires, and other things in short supply. Heck, even their ability to respond with artillery is limited by the frantic need for replacement liners for the tubes they already have. Even with U.S. and European companies selling them chips, equipment, and more, they can’t keep up with the losses (and yes, these companies are indeed helping the enemy).
Many of the Russian troops involved are conscripts, without a good leavening of combat-experienced leadership. From reports from Russian channels, this is not working out well. I also note, as do some others, that reports of riots and looting are not calling out if they are the result of civilians, troops, or both. Chaotic is a polite descriptor and efforts to flee the growing zone of occupation are creating gas deserts and other problems.
Now, on top of the logistics mentioned above, which are critical to supplying troops and civilians in previously seized and recently seized areas, take a look at the gas pipelines. Guess what country appears to be sitting in control of up to fifty percent of the natural gas going to Europe? That brings in hard cash and more to Russia? Guess how much more is possibly within drone or artillery range?
Now look at energy, which is needed for logistics, industry, and more (keep in mind, energy for civilians will be a low priority at this point for Russia). Look at what nuclear plant just got taken out of the game (and the games being played by Russia burning tires in the cooling tower of one plant they hold in Ukraine. And, yes, that was a game and a threat). The ability to use railways still under Russian control, power airfields and other military bases, and critical industry and support just got taken offline (effectively). Heck, if Ukraine destroys about ten or so key transformers it could be years before power is restored without Ukraine getting within a mile of the plant. To replace them faster would mean taking them from other areas and depriving those areas of power until new ones could be manufactured. Also, look at what countries would be involved in that manufacture.
Oh, and don’t forget power is sort of critical to data, and access to data is a key to modern warfare. Drones, smart bombs, and more depend on data and taking out power reduces or eliminates local data transmission. You need that local data rather badly for all phases of the process. If properly prepared and with the right gear, it’s not a problem. What do you want to bet about such in regards Russian troops and the Ukrainians?
I agree very much with those who are pointing out that this is in some ways a mirror-image of ’43 Kursk. The Russians are scrambling to get troops headed towards the breakthrough. Not only are they pulling border troops from all over, they are pulling reserves (and possibly more) from the previously stalemated battle zone. Now class, can anyone tell me what happened when Hitler pulled reserves and even troops from the assault back in 1943 in response to Sicily and other pressures? Bueller? Bueller?
So, I find myself wondering about several things. How many of the Russian troops in the Kursk region were ghost troops? That is, they exist only on paper so that officers up and down the line can pocket the pay of soldiers that don’t exist? How many of the troops in surrounding regions that are now being sent to deal with the breakthrough (and I do call it that deliberately) are also ghosts? It is a large and ongoing problem for the Russians (and even the Soviets before them).
Another good question is how many of the so-called second-line troops that people are claiming were moved into the stalemated battle lines were indeed second-line? What is going to happen once the Russian reserves and even line troops are pulled back to deal with Kursk?
Also, there are interesting reports/rumors of movements elsewhere. What if there is another incursion in a strategic area, one that has the potential to become a full breakthrough?
Interesting and interesting. Given the limitations on Russia’s conventional assets (and critical items within same), it could set the stage for two to three different options if things stay conventional.
Now, Russia may well threaten again to go non-conventional. So far, it’s all been threats and that is exactly what the apparent tire burning in the cooling tower in Russian-occupied Ukraine yesterday was: a threat. Do I still believe that Vladimir would torch Ukraine if he can’t have it? Yes. Do I think that if he gives the order it will be carried out? Insufficient data, but I’m starting to get the idea that at least some people within a certain red-brick fort may have figured out that it might not be a good idea to do so. For all there are those fanatical and ignorant of operational realities that would try to go unconventional or scorched-earth, there may be reason to believe that at least some may be getting a glimpse out of the bubbles. We can but hope.
Meantime, given that no one outside of Ukraine really seems to know what is going on and what is planned, I plan to sit back, relax as much as I can, and wait. This has been an incredibly smart operation so far, and I hope it continues to be so. Let’s see what happens.
UPDATE I: Given a discussion with Francis in the comments, thought I should link to my posts on nuclear war and preparedness. In those posts, there is discussion on reliability and more from myself and others who know of which they speak. Some of it is in the comments, and some are posts. Enjoy.
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One of the things about Russian nukes is the question of whether they work. Considering the state of the rest of the military it is highly likely that a significant fraction of them will fail in some form other including blowing up in the launching silo or failing to ignite at all.
Of course you only need one nuke more or less on target to ruin everyone’s day in the vicinity but a documented failed nuke launch (doesn’t matter how it fails really, even if it spreads a bunch of plutonium dust over the target) is fatal for your deterrence. Putin is quite smart enough to figure this out and to prefer threatening to use them rather than actually doing so. This will only change when he’s on the ropes and at that point the chances are that people won’t obey him
We’ve talked about that a time or two here, both in terms of Russian nukes and our own. Probably should link to some of those discussions, but not sure I will remember to do so. My own take is that I’m now in the 20 percent camp. It used to be that back in the day the goal was 80 percent of the aircraft and missiles would get off the ground, 80 percent of the subs would get to sea and launch, 80 percent of the weapons would work, etc. In fact, the old SAC aimed for a much higher amount but 80/20 was the goal. These days, I think it may be more 20/80, and possibly even lower for Russia in terms of nukes, which are complex and finicky beasts. However, as I’ve noted several times, I really don’t want to find out. As for failed launch, two quick thoughts. Vladimir is in such a bubble I’m not sure it HAS occurred to him. Also, there is reason to believe he tried to do an unarmed launch of a SATAN III while Biden was in the Ukraine, and it failed. Not sure how much better our side is right now, but there is good reason to believe Russian special weapons may be on par with conventional…
BTW, great article (as always) and glad to link to it.
I’m with you on the not wanting to find out. Also thanks for the link, I’m glad you liked my post.
Our missiles are pulled out of the ground, shipped to Vandenburg and Edwards and test fired regularly, unlike the Russians’
True, to a point. I used to work at AEDC where a lot of testing was done, and I’m not convinced the current testing regime is optimal. Just my opinion though.
I assume the Ukrainians are mining the big pipeline they now have access to. I think they’d prefer to not starve their allies of natural gas, but, in extremis . . .
This is a wild card I was really not expecting. Probably the Russians weren’t either. But their whole psychology is to keep accepting losses until they win. Charles XIV found this out, as did Napoleon and Hitler, so . . .
Yeah but sometimes that doesn’t work out for Russia’s rulers.
The Russo Japan war and WW1 were both disasters for the Russian czars. Considering the location, the WW1 Eastern front may be a good hint at a possible future. Under the Czar Russia was decisively defeated in WW1, so much so that the Bolsheviks were able to stage a coup and take power. I see no reason why history should not partially repeat and we see Czar Putin deposed like the Romanovs a century and a bit ago.
Good point, and there are echos of 1914 here. While my memory is a bit fuzzy (stupid lightning), August 1914 the book is coming to mind a bit.
So…the Mother Russia rope a dope strategy will always work until it doesn’t. Zelenskyy is not quite in the same category as Hitler and Bonaparte.
Zelenskyy has the benefit of much shorter supply lines to the front in Russia, and the benefit of much smaller ambitions–tying up a bunch of Russian troops that allows his forces to improve their situation within the borders of Ukraine is sufficient: he isn’t attempting to conquer the whole landmass of Russia.
Something that I keep thinking about. Once you get 20 kilometers or so into Russia, turn right or left. Then start following the border. It’s maneuver warfare at that point.
You capture the rear area, you don’t have to deal with entrenched defense, you capture tons of ammunitions, supplies, and soldiers. You move the whole front line, UP. Now Russia is fighting and dying for their own land, destroying their own cities. And you use their own fortifications against them.
And you have something to trade in negotiations. It is cutting a big fat slice of baloney off Russia.
It doesn’t have to pull troops from elsewhere – it’s a huge strategic loss. Ukraine says it’s taken > 1,000 prisoners. Thousands have fled, creating chaos in the rear. Roads, pipelines, and rail lines are disrupted. Just don’t go too far, just into the rear areas behind the lines. Just looking at the map, there are a lot of areas Russia is going to have a very hard time holding.