The previous post reminded me of one I’ve needed to do for a while. Some of the posts I do are to share knowledge and experience, some to share humor or joy, and some to provoke some thought. Especially if I’m not sure that things are being done and I want to push things while I am here to push them. On the latter, my concerns about the ability of humans to reproduce in space and microgravity are a good example, as I want to be sure it is something being looked at as we urgently need permanent settlements off this glorious mudball ASAP.
Right now, I want to talk a bit about command and control in the face of surprise. It is something I really hope is being looked at by Pete and company as they are taking care of a lot of things; and by the administration from a higher level. In particular, I want to look at nuclear command and control in the current environment.
A lot of our current system traces back to the pre-SAC days when Nightwatch was in Maryland and it was estimated we could have hours of notice. Even as that shrunk down, we’ve kept a lot of the basic premises past what I consider the best-buy date. As a result, I think we really, really, need to look at things and try to come up with something new.
Without going into too much detail (much less things that should not be talked about openly) our current system presumes something on the order of 30-minutes to an hour of warning of a surprise attack on the U.S. SecWar is the second man to the President for all intents and purposes, and is either with POTUS or in touch with him. POTUS is briefed on what is going on, confidence in the intel, etc. and uses the current iteration of the Single (Strategic) Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP) to order a response to the situation.
As we’ve discussed on here before in the “shall we play the game” category, the response is boiled down to a short (less than 200 characters) message that is then sent to the National Military Communications Center (NMCC) at the Pentagon who then re-codes it after confirmation, and sends it out to SAC (new version) and some other interested parties such as the Navy TACOMO planes. SAC then re-codes the order (after confirmation) and sends it out to it’s audience.
All well and good, and the two-man rule applies throughout. Well, all well and good if there is time. Are there alternatives if POTUS isn’t available or such? I’m told yes, though I have no details. Nor do I want them.
The thirty-minute window was predicated on detecting Soviet missiles being launched. Flight time from there to here is roughly thirty minutes. If we saw them fueling (Soviets/Russians use a lot of liquid-fueled ICBMs), longer period for response. That was sufficient: thirty or forty years ago.
Even twenty years ago, depressed trajectory shots from subs not too far off the coast cut that time from detection to impact to about fifteen minutes. The assurances the subs couldn’t get that close, and would be detected if they did, were deafening, though reminding me a bit of toddlers drumming their feet and yelling while having their fingers in their ears.
Today, we have massive container ships plying the waters of our country. If I can figure how to put one or more land-attack cruise missiles into a container for launch, I guarantee you others have as well. When you look at more modern drones, boy howdy are you talking the ability to get things in the air and to target with little or no detection. Iran has the capability (or did) and China has been openly experimenting with it. For all the open, think iceberg and know others have as well, a lot of others.
Thing is, if you launch like that from say a bay (and major trade route) near a capital city, you are potentially talking as little as five minutes from launch to impact. By the time the launch alert (if launch is even detected by anyone other than direct observers) gets to the right people in the military, you already have impact.
One also needs to factor in surface attack. Our borders were incredibly porous for way too long, and it is suspected that a lot more than people and drugs could have made it through. Small delivery van making the rounds in DC, passing in front of the White House, Congress, Pentagon…
I really, really do hope someone is looking at this, and looking to update the system. What we have now was good enough maybe ten years ago. Now, however… Think we need to rethink a number of things including designated survivors. I hope the world is about to get a lot more peaceful; but, you never plan for best case/most optimistic case. I will even go so far as to say we need some new designated survival centers as Camp David, Mount Weather, etc. are too well known.
Just a thought.
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LaughingWolf, I think this issue may be why the President and the War Department kicked out Anthropic and labeled Claude a supply chain risk. Anthropic demanded that the War Department get Anthropic’s agreement before their AI could be used for targeting. That would destroy the five minute window. This is scary, but I think the government’s answer to your question is letting AI respond inside the five minutes.
I hope not, as AI is not yet anywhere near up to the challenge. Nor do I see it such anytime soon.
Relying on AI for the response risks what YouTuber Perun (https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCC3ehuUksTyQ7bbjGntmx3Q) called “NukeGPT hallucinating a launch order.”
Wolf, I have a high degree of confidence that the Continuity of Government boys have a system that will protect a Presidential successor long enough for US to retaliate.
After that, who knows.
I wish I had that high degree of confidence my friend. Some things have come to my attention that suggest that the Biden Regency did to CoG what they did to the rest of the military. Even if catching up, much of that effort is predicated on things 20-40 years out of date. I really think we need CoG 3.0.
No one has yet come up with a counter to the container ship full of drones scenario. At least not publicly. I have a ton of ideas. Probably others do, but I’ve seen no sign that official defense department sorts are included in that number.
In fact, we’re seeing in the gulf that people haven’t paid proper attention to the last 4 years of Ukraine and so don’t have decent defenses for drones of any kind. Yes sure a patriot missile costing $1M+ and made in numbers of perhaps 1000/year can shoot one down. So you’ve just spent $1M+ to knock out a cheap $100k or less attacker. Which is expensive, but doable for one. But how about the next 999?
Good points (as always, love your work). On the first, I’m hoping that things are moving on the staff level but also not terribly optimistic. Still far too many GOFOs of the wrong mindset in place IMO, and they have no real concept of drones. One of the best suggestions on the squad level I’ve heard came from Cdr. Salamander, who suggested putting two people up with good shotguns who are trained at skeet shooting to deal with the small ones. For fixed position use an automated fully-automatic shotgun (Saiga type). Problem is, from that level up the brass just doesn’t seem to get it as a whole. LUCAS is the only sign that anyone is paying attention, and it is offensive, not defensive. We need a LUCAS program for defense ASAP.
Another way of looking at the economics of drone strikes is to assess the cost of the damage , not the cost of the anti-drone missiles.
You may fire a million dollar missile at a hundred thousand dollar drone, but you saved a fifty million dollar aircraft.
As usual, you hit the nail on the head. Sometimes the large and expensive is worth it. That said, we need to come up with new and innovative lower-cost solutions as well.
I’m a little confused. You seem to think it is a problem that we don’t have a system to immediately launch nuclear weapons if we are attacked in a covert manner.
That seems pretty wise to me. Regardless of how damaging such an attack might be, if we don’t know, for example, who was behind your small delivery van (or the cargo ship that launched some drones) then perhaps we shouldn’t be shooting off nuclear missiles at anyone.
I’m not sure how you came up with that from what I wrote. Given your statement and confusion, I should not wish to trouble you with particulars but my concern is that we do not have as robust a system as is needed to meet modern challenges. That is NOT launch on impact, which is even more stupid than many of the things proposed (or even done) during the so-called Cold War. One need only look at Petrov (Col?) who refused to launch Soviet missiles for what turned out to be a glitch to see the stupidity in that.
Yes, LTC Petrov did a quick analysis and concluded that the United States wouldn’t attack Russia with a single missile.
Too bad the movie House of dynamite didn’t conclude the same thing.
The Soviet’s never did decide if he was a hero or a heel. I still plump on him being a hero.
Couldn’t we use something like the Phalanx CIWS to defend fixed assets like the White House, etc. from drone attack?
Couldn’t we use something like the Phalanx CIWS to defend fixed assets like the White House, etc. from drone attack?
Heinlein pointed out the solution to this back in the depths of the Cold War, but then, as now, it would take legislation at the least. You designate alternates for senior officials and members of Congress to serve in event of their death or incapacity, and then you brief them in on matters but forbid them from being in D.C. during the term. Then in the event of a decapitation strike, everyone knows who to turn to and what the responsibilities are. And of course, just knowing that makes it MUCH less likely that it will ever be needed, because it tells adversaries you can’t paralyze the U.S. with a decapitation strike.
Jeff, we do have a Continuity of Government program but I am concerned that it: 1. Was done like so many other military programs under the Biden Regency; 2. Is compromised; and, 3. that it is predicated on assumptions and such that are 20-40 years out of date. Think we need to do some major upgrades, as well as revising our sensor nets for more modern threats and setting up defenses against same.
All of our logic on this topic presumes an opponent driven by similar passions and desires as our own; love of family, country, Life.
But suppose, strange as it may seem, that the enemy is motivated by different passions, or Demons?
Suppose they “Love Death as much as you love life”?
For container ships: Require top and side layers to be empties or vetted cargo. Deny entry to us ports or the CZ if not. Any ship that launches an attack; sink, burn, or take a prize to the entire shipping line.
I capitalized U.S., dammit.
I always wondered why we shouldn’t assume that there are nukes shielded in lead cases emplaced in the upper floors of skyscrapers in every major city in the country (and those of our enemies). Remove the casing and some commander somewhere detonates them all with a cell phone simultaneously with zero warning. I don’t know this stuff very well, but that seems awfully plausible to my nonmilitary mind.
With apologies to Stanley Kubrick and Terry Southern:
“For more than a year, ominous rumors have been privately circulating among high level western leaders, that the United States had been at work on what was darkly hinted to be the ultimate weapon, a doomsday device. Intelligence sources traced the site of the top-secret American project to the perpetually ice-covered wasteland below northernmost Greenland. What they were building, or why it should be located in such a remote and desolate place, no one could say.”
There’s an enormous difference in the level of damage between a relatively small drone launched from a container (you can’t fit a large drone in there–certainly not something large enough to lift a nuclear weapon; even a “suitcase nuke” with its small payload is HEAVY, so all you can have is about 20 pounds of regular explosives) and an SLBM or ICBM warhead. And it’s exceptionally difficult to have and use the sort of real-time intelligence required to take out senior US officials with a weapon that small.
That’s not to say that the Nuclear C3 portfolio doesn’t need updating–it does and there are efforts underway (dating back through the Biden regency) to make progress on addressing the known problems.