Just saw the preliminary report from the MD-11 crash in Louisville (Main Page, Preliminary PDF). As for the cause, no surprise but want to go back and check one thing on maintenance before commenting on such.
One thing I can say is that I expect this will end the use of MD-10/MD-11 planes in the U.S. The issues with the pylons and attachments are ongoing and it is not clear that even aggressive inspection and maintenance will be sufficient. Or, rather, it is going to be costly to operations. It’s also more than the direct costs: it is going to be insurance, litigation (and threats thereof), and public relations in regards continued use.
That said, it will be interesting to see what comes out of the testing being done at the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) labs. A soft landing in this case might be a recommendation by the NTSB that the 10/11 be retired, which the FAA could then make a directive. This could allow various insurance and other protections to proceed.
In a way, it’s a bit sad. The plane (s, I am referring to the 10/11s as one) has been a wide-body heavy workhorse, though with some stigma. A lot of that came from the 3-engine design of it and the L-1011 TriStar. Both were advanced aircraft in terms of technology, and there were some accidents that resulted in the public being wary of them at first.
I seem to remember a movie being made about the L-1011 crash in the Everglades that brought up the story that the ghost of one of the crewmembers killed in the crash was reported to have said that there would never be another crash of a L-1011. If a ghost did say that (great TV and propaganda, not so sure it’s real history) they were wrong, but it was many years before there was another crash.
The crash in Louisville is very similar to the crash in Chicago a number of years back. Same engine involved, similar pylon issues though that one was blamed on using forklifts to remove/replace the engines if I remember correctly. From what I was reading in the preliminary, I really think the metalurgical tests are going to pretty well make or break the future of the plane.
I have flown as a passenger on the L-1011 and the DC-10 (not sure about the 11), and have both loaded and done pushback on cargo DC-10 & 11s. So glad to do pushbacks with a batmobile versus a tug, as they truly are heavies (esp. loaded). This made using a tug not particularly fun, whereas the batmobiles would pick up the nose wheel and made pushing and turning a breeze (and even fun).
The three-engine widebodies had range and capacity. They filled a particular niche in cargo operations that can be covered but not necessarily fully replaced. For certain routes and operations, they really were the best choice.
That said, I’m not sure the pylon issues can be overcome. Even if they can, how insurers and others react to them continuing to be used is going to drive a lot of decisions. Air transport is costly enough as it is. If insurance and other costs go up too much, the planes will be gone even if a way is found to keep them flying. If I were in an air cargo C-suite right now, I’d be looking at my options very carefully and with an eye towards moving away from use of the 10s-11s.
Nor is it necessarily a loss to the air cargo companies. It is not uncommon, as I understand it, for those companies to buy the planes, then sell them to an outside company, who then leases the plane back to the air cargo company who then operates it including basic maintenance. Yes, tax laws and regulations are the big reason for this (again, as I understand it). Now, if I were the company that actually owned the plane, I’d be looking at options and for an overseas buyer.
And, yes, I am still monitoring the NTSB investigation into the DC crash (main page). The transcripts of the radio and internal coms is interesting. I’ve got my suspicions on what happened and what is likely to be in the final report. That said, still not jumping in as I may have missed something. I do think closing that corridor was long overdue. I am also still waiting for the final on the air ambulance crash as well.
More soon.
Getting hit by lightning is not fun! If you would like to help me in my recovery efforts, and to start a truly new life, feel free to hit the fundraiser at A New Life on GiveSendGo, use the options in the Tip Jar in the upper right, or drop me a line to discuss other methods. If you want to know some of what it is going for, read here. There is also the Amazon Wish List in the Bard’s Jar. It is thanks to your gifts and prayers that I am still going. Thank you.
I remember the American Airlines Chicago crash. I was 25 at the time. I seem to remember a room full of interested parties at later date analysis of the events leading up to the crash listened to the cockpit recordings of several take off runs prior, and several of them noted a crew member asking the question “what was that” during the takeoff roll. The AA flight was the first flite to take off from the other direction. A subsequent inspection of the runway maintenance records noted that a section of the runway had been repaired due to one edge of it heaving up due to frost heave. The engine pylons were designed to break away in the event of a crash. I heard that the engineer that designed them commented suicide over guilt. Sad story if true.
What’s amazing is the response of the American public to these things. Absolute rage and horror – precisely because we have made something so amazing so mundane and safe. You’re sending a few hundred people up to 40,000 feet, zipping along at more than the speed of sound, then descending and setting them down (mostly) gently at their destination, where they can grab their belongings and go their merry way. And it happens tens of thousands of times a day. Our biggest problem is trying to manage that immense traffic flow.
And then you get two crashes 46 years apart, and it’s the end of an era for the plane.
(I’m not saying it would be wrong to ground the plane because of the cries of despair. Just noting the background.)
Good points and info, thank you for the comment! Hadn’t heard anything about the engineer, if I get a chance will try to look into that. Again, thanks for the comment.
I really would hope the issue could be resolved without removing the aircraft, though I understand the dollar calculations. But there haven’t been nearly the problems (over time in service) with it as with, say, the 737MAX. And I’m really concerned about the monopoly of Boeing on American large aircraft manufacture. It’s so hard to do a start-up when the thing being built is so large, complex, and costly.
Of course, like with cars, I would be fine with a plane without all the bells and whistles, that got me consistently to my destination. But that ship (to mix a metaphor) has sailed. (Yes, I say bring back the DC-3 and such. Also, pay me enough money, dangit, that I can afford to buy my own airplane, and all these problems resolve themself, for me.)
Oh, I do see where the MD-10 is already a Boeing aircraft, derived from the DC-10, after the merger.
The DC-10 was built by Douglas Aircraft before the merger with McDonnell Aircraft in 1969. McDonnell Douglas marketed it as the MD-10 and upgraded it to the MD-11. Boeing killed the MD-11 after the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger in 1997 because it competed with the existing Boeing product line. But Boeing inherited and continued the product support.
Ah. Thank you for the clarification.
This is no longer widely known, but the two three-engine jumbos (L-1011 and DC-10) destroyed of both of their manufacturers and turned the US airliner manufacturing business into a monopoly.
At the end of the 1960s, as the 747 was becoming popular, it became clear to airliner manufacturers and their customers that there was a market for a three-engine jumbo jet. It wasn’t a huge market, but it was big enough to support the cost to design and develop the jet and still make a profit. It clearly was NOT big enough to support developing two competing jets.
Boeing was busy with the 727, 737, and 747, so they passed on this idea. Lockheed and Douglas, the other two American airliner builders, jumped at the chance. (Some say Lockheed had the idea first, and Douglas was frantically playing catch-up.) Within a few months, both had paper designs good enough to show to the airlines and start taking orders. Everyone in the business–the two manufacturers and all of their customers–understood that the first solid order would win the whole game. There just wasn’t a large enough market to support the development costs for two different aircraft, and the loser would have to fold. The salesmen on both sides were trying their best to get that first order, and the customers were all playing the two companies off against each other, angling for the best deal.
Eventually, after weeks of this merry-go-round, TWA (IIRC) signed an order with Lockheed for a bunch of L-1011s. At that point, everyone in the business knew that Lockheed had won the tri-jet jumbo competition, and Douglas was out. Several other airlines signed smaller orders for L-1011s in quick succession.
But for some reason, the Douglas salesmen didn’t give up, and a week or so later American Airlines (IIRC) signed a large order for DC-10s. And at that point, everyone in the business gasped in horror, because they knew what was coming. Both Lockheed and Douglas were about to take huge losses, big enough to put them both out of business. It was as predictable as sunrise. Both companies were committed–a contract is a contract–but there just wasn’t a big enough market to support the costs to develop two jets.
And, over the next few years, that’s what happened. Lockheed was eventually bailed out by the US government, because as a defense contractor they were too valuable to lose. Lockheed never built another commercial aircraft. Rolls-Royce, which had custom-designed an engine for the L-1011, was bailed out (or nationalized?) by the UK government. Douglas struggled through, barely–and with the help of a sweetheart deal from the US Air Force for a bunch of DC-10s to be used as tankers for air-to-air refueling–but was so financially weakened that they were acquired by McDonnell, which until then had only made fighter planes. Even then, McDonnell-Douglas never really recovered, and was eventually bought by Boeing to form the only airliner maker in North America.
Lockheed’s bailout, under Nixon, set the pattern for Chrysler’s bailout, under Carter, and for Chrysler’s second bailout–and GM’s first–under Obama. Not the best precedent.
It has been argued that both Lockheed and Douglas cut corners on the design of their jets, trying to save money and stave off bankruptcy, and that the corner-cutting caused later problems with both jets. There may still be some engineers left alive who might know the truth of that, yea or nay, but to my knowledge there is nothing definitive on the record either way.
Interesting, thank you for sharing that.
I think my last ride on a DC-10 was Reforger 81. Flew from Peterson Field to Kansas, needed a fuel stop because we had tons of baggage and it was a hot and humid August evening, then another fueling stop at Boston, one more at Shannon, then a landing at Rhein-Main where we deplaned on a taxiway due to a terrorist threat. Altogether we spent 24 hours on that plane.
At Boston the crew was taking garbage out and bringing food on when an airport police officer wandered down the ramp and looked in the open door.
As the Commander of most of the troops on board, I was standing at the cockpit door chatting with the pilots.
The cop noticed the .45 in a shoulder holster, started to react, then took in the camo uniform and relaxed. So a dull, long flight interrupted by a moment.
Heh. Good one.