UPDATE BELOW
What happened in the Texas hill country is horrible; and, the response to it by far too many is beyond horrendous. This weekend saw people throw down their masks and throw away any pretense at humanity and basic decency as politics trumps all.
One of the many lies promoted (suspect the social media version of JournOlist was running hot and heavy) was that no warnings were given because of DOGE cuts, short staffing, etc. All were lies as any cuts don’t take place until the FY, the NWS had extra staff on hand per SOP, and warnings were given in a timely manner. Not once, but no less than three times.
But, there does lie part of the rub. Texas was indeed right to criticize the NWS, as Todd Starnes pointed out on X. Back after Katrina, the NWS was (rightfully) criticized for not updating warnings and giving accurate warnings. The bureaucratic mind being what it is, the decision was made to treat every storm as the storm of the century and warn accordingly such that they could never be criticized again for not issuing strong enough warnings. Besides, that is easier, and easier to justify, that in having people show mature judgment and professionalism and update warnings if and as warranted. No thought, no muss, and it totally screws disaster preparedness planning and actions right in the keester.
If every storm or cloud is the storm of the century, none are. People tune out. I’ve cut off my alerts because of how often they go off for no real reason. It used to be the alerts meant something, and you got useful information from them. Now, you get the equivalent of the reams of useless paper that come with a one paragraph note from Medicare or any other government program. The alerts were meant to be short, effective, and only when needed. The perceived need to protect bureaucratic butt eliminated that utility.
As for the lack of preparedness and other issues in the area (dams needing maintenance, etc., that can wait. What matters now is trying to find those still alive; recovering the dead; and dealing with all the damage and things that come out of such a horror. As you pray for those missing and lost, say a prayer for the first responders who are dealing with a horror most can’t truly begin to imagine. And I guarantee you that they will wonder if they had been faster, better, etc., that some others might have lived. Probably not, but it is something they will be dealing with now and in the days ahead. Pray for them, and pray they get the help and support they need.
One thing to keep in mind is that in a flash flood, it’s not the water that’s the real enemy: it’s what’s in it and under it. Some do drown, but many die because of crush injuries caused by hitting debris under and in the water. Flailed chests are common from hitting trees, logs, vehicles or being caught between logs and trees while being swept away. Broken legs from hitting submerged vehicles and other objects are also common, and they remove the ability to swim (or even float). Those injured who survive the initial damage have a short window of survival. Pray they are found quickly, and can be gotten out of wherever they are.
If you live in an area prone to flash floods, your only realistic preparation is to be ready to evacuate on a moment’s notice. That, however, requires you to get real information concisely, accurately, and in a timely manner. The current warnings of the NWS are about anything but that. The system needs reform, and I hope that if nothing else comes of this tragedy that such does happen.
May God’s mercy be on those in Texas, and in the new flooding in Western NC. Pray for them, and let the basic humanity that seems all to scarce these days shine forth, now and in the days ahead.
UPDATE I: Sarah A. Hoyt, as usual, makes some good points in her post here. It does no good to send signals if they are not going to be received.
Getting hit by lightning is not fun! If you would like to help me in my recovery efforts, feel free to hit the fundraiser at A New Life on GiveSendGo, use the options in the Tip Jar in the upper right, or drop me a line to discuss other methods. There is also the Amazon Wish List in the Bard’s Jar. It is thanks to your gifts and prayers that I am still going. Thank you.
I, too, turned off my weather radio because of all the alerts, most of which weren’t even for my area were waking my up several times a night. Now I get them on my phone. Got one Monday. Potential tornado. Then the sirens went off. Grab phone, head for basement. No tornado, but an ugly storm.
As to the rescuers and responders, my uncle helped rescue and recover bodies after the 1972 Rapid city flood. A horrible tragedy as well. It changed him. And I think it was for the reasons you cited. He wished he could have saved more lives. Sad.
It is indeed, and it’s a form of survivor’s guilt. I’ve known of some combat medics who have had to deal with something similar. When you go all out to rescue and save, it rips a bit of something away from you each time you can’t. That can build up, and it does terrible things to the best of people. Especially the best of people.
“I’ve cut off my alerts because of how often they go off for no real reason.”
Amen.
And, you’re not alone. Panic Mode (aka: “Liberalitis”) has permeated everything and anything regarding weather information making it not just worse than useless but a very strong negative. The TV Weather Guessers – who receive most of their info for broadcast from NWS, and the rest from computer models – have for some time shown only the “feels like” temperatures rather than the actual thermometer reading temperature, partly because the numbers are bigger, more easily lending them to increased hype, and partly because “we need to warn people,” just like they do when elevating regular summer rains into life-ending cataclysms of lightning and thunder. It makes me wonder how humans managed to survive a couple million years on this planet and develop entire civilizations without knowing the “feels like” temperatures minute by minute.
“Liberalitis” deserves much of the blame; common sense has become so rare, dependency on “experts” overriding any concept of personal responsibility so pervasive, that if Cletus suffers excessive sweating on a July day there has to be someone to blame for not warning him about “the heat index” and there are any number of lawyers anxious to assist in getting Cletus & Family some Dollar Sign Justice for his suffering.
On this planet drawing your first breath condemns you to also drawing your last; there’s no escaping that, and the goal should be to make those two events as far apart as reasonably possible and fill the time between with as much adventure, learning, passion and compassion as one can muster. Sometimes, and very unfortunately, those two events may occur more closely together than we would prefer, from a nearly infinite number of reasons, for which There Must Be Someone To Blame; Divine Providence, Unfortunate Confluence of Events, even rank stupidity, all discounted in favor of “we need to do something to fix this.” At which point the Master and Minions of Prevention and Control (don’t ignore the tremendous motivation to exert Control in all this, which is why it’s called “Liberalitis”) leap into action, desperately attempting to put rounded corners and padded surfaces on everything so It Won’t Happen Again.
Those Masters and Minions, some decades ago, began incorporating safety measures into cars because protecting the occupants seemed Such A Good Idea, with no possibility of doing too much of it. Except that’s exactly what they did; by making car crashes at higher speed more survivable, vehicle operators were encouraged to drive faster, leading to more crashes. Now the same thing has happened, in this case, to weather forecasting. Funny how that sort of thing works.
There is a thing called “reasonable prudence,” in which, first, individuals assume responsibility for themselves and their charges, and second, exercise thoughtful measures to minimize unfortunate occurrences. It’s something most of us practice, and strive to get better about, daily, but the truth remains life is finite, no one gets out of here alive, and sometimes, the risk vs reward ratio turns against you. No one human, or even group of humans, is capable of modifying that equation to produce beneficial outcomes always; knowledge, awareness, conscientious behavior, all work in our favor, as long as those providing the information deliver the raw, unmodified truth we can use to make intelligent decisions.
Welcome to Planet Earth, Stuff happens here, deal with it.
Iggy
Nailed it, Iggy.
I had Grok do a search for alert fatigue and the Crying Wolf effect post 9/11. Here is the results. I checked and all the studies are real, not AI hallucinations. I only asked for repeated studies for better accuracy. :
The “Crying Wolf” effect describes how repeated false alarms reduce the credibility of warnings, leading to decreased public response to genuine threats. Below, I summarize psychological studies on this effect, focusing on repeated studies conducted since September 11, 2001, as per your request. I’ve prioritized research that involves multiple experiments or longitudinal approaches to demonstrate repetition, drawing from web sources and critical analysis. Studies are grouped by context (e.g., weather, alarms, terrorism) to highlight recurring themes.
—
### Psychological Studies on the Crying Wolf Effect (Post-9/11, Repeated Studies)
1. **Shlomo Breznitz’s Foundational Work and Follow-Ons (1984, Extended Post-2001)**
– **Original Study (1984)**: Breznitz’s book, *Cry Wolf: The Psychology of False Alarms*, established the Crying Wolf effect through lab experiments where participants faced threatened (but canceled) painful shocks. False alarms reduced trust in the warning system, leading to slower or no responses to later alerts. This work became a cornerstone for post-9/11 research.[]()
– **Repeated Studies (Post-2001)**:
– **Bliss (2003)**: James P. Bliss at the University of Central Florida conducted experiments with 138 students performing tasks while receiving alarms of varying reliability (25%, 50%, 75% true alarms) and urgency. Repeated false alarms significantly reduced response rates, with lower reliability (25% true alarms) leading to near-total disregard. A follow-up study in 2005 confirmed these findings, showing that high task demand exacerbated the effect.[]()
– **Bliss & Dunn (2006)**: Further experiments refined the model, testing alarm criticality (low, medium, high). Repeated false alarms consistently reduced compliance, but high-criticality alarms retained slightly higher response rates, suggesting urgency can partially mitigate fatigue. These studies built directly on Breznitz’s framework, adapting it to modern alarm systems.
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false alarms erode trust, with effects persisting across contexts (e.g., lab tasks, simulated emergencies). The studies suggest that alarm reliability must exceed 50% to maintain public response.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Bliss’s work was motivated by post-9/11 concerns about alarm overload in security and disaster response systems, reflecting heightened public exposure to alerts.
2. **Tornado Warning Studies in the Southeastern U.S. (2009-2020)**
– **Simmons & Sutter (2009)**: An econometric analysis of tornado disasters found that higher false alarm ratios (FAR) correlated with increased injuries and deaths, suggesting public complacency due to repeated false warnings. This study analyzed historical data and set the stage for repeated surveys.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Jauernic & Van den Broeke (2017)**: A survey of 640 undergraduates showed that a 1% increase in perceived FAR reduced sheltering odds by nearly 1%, confirming the Crying Wolf effect. The study repeated earlier methods, using online questionnaires to assess student behavior across multiple tornado seasons.[]()
– **Ripberger et al. (2019-2020)**: Four surveys (N=4,162) in the Southeastern U.S. examined public responses to tornado alerts, where 75% of warnings are false. Contrary to expectations, participants overestimated alert accuracy, but those with higher perceived FAR were less likely to take protective actions. A 2020 follow-up refined these findings, showing that 21.3% of non-evacuees cited prior false alarms as their reason.[]()[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false tornado warnings reduce protective behaviors, though public overestimation of accuracy can mitigate complacency. The studies highlight regional differences, with Southeastern residents particularly prone to alert fatigue due to frequent warnings.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Increased weather alert frequency post-9/11, driven by improved forecasting and heightened disaster awareness, amplified the Crying Wolf effect in tornado-prone areas.
3. **Weather-Related Decision-Making Experiments (2015-2020)**
– **LeClerc & Joslyn (2015)**: A psychological experiment tested whether participants would apply salt brine to roads based on weather forecasts. Repeated false forecasts reduced compliance, but the effect was weaker than expected, suggesting some resilience to the Crying Wolf effect in low-stakes scenarios. This study challenged earlier assumptions and prompted follow-ups.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Weyrich et al. (2018-2020)**: Multiple experiments simulated evacuation decisions under varying forecast accuracies. Participants exposed to repeated false alarms were less likely to evacuate, with a “tipping point” where trust collapsed if false alarms exceeded 60%. A 2020 study extended this, incorporating neuroscience’s free energy principle to model decision-making, confirming that effort required to act (e.g., evacuation) amplifies the Crying Wolf effect.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false weather alerts reduce action, especially when compliance is effort-intensive. The studies suggest designing warnings to lower perceived effort can counteract fatigue.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Post-9/11 improvements in weather forecasting led to more frequent alerts, increasing the risk of fatigue, as seen in the Texas floods context from your initial query.
4. **Post-9/11 Terrorism and Security Alerts (2002-2013)**
– **Schlenger et al. (2002)**: A national study post-9/11 found that frequent terrorism alerts (e.g., color-coded “Orange Alerts”) led to reduced public concern, with 60% of Americans paying less attention by 2002. This was part of a longitudinal survey tracking psychological responses.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Silver et al. (2002-2006)**: A longitudinal study (N=2,189) assessed media exposure to 9/11 and subsequent alerts. Repeated vague alerts correlated with lower public vigilance, with those exposed to 4+ hours of daily 9/11-related media showing higher stress but lower response to new alerts. Follow-ups in 2006 confirmed persistent fatigue.[]()
– **Rigos et al. (2013)**: Game-theoretic experiments modeled evacuation responses to terrorism alerts. Repeated false alarms reduced compliance, with participants ignoring alerts if false positives exceeded 50%. A 2015 follow-up at Stanford refined the model, showing unannounced drills can worsen fatigue.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Frequent, vague terrorism alerts post-9/11 fostered complacency, with media overload amplifying fatigue. The studies suggest specific, credible alerts are needed to maintain trust.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: The color-coded alert system, introduced post-9/11, was a key driver of fatigue, leading to its replacement in 2011 due to public disengagement.
5. **Flood Early Warning Systems (2017-2022)**
– **Girons Lopez et al. (2017)**: A socio-hydrological model simulated flood warning responses, showing that repeated false alarms reduced preparedness. This model was tested across multiple scenarios.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **HESS (2022)**: An extended model incorporated social trust, simulating 1,000-year flood scenarios. Repeated false alarms undermined trust in flood early warning systems (FEWS), reducing evacuation rates by 30% when false alarm ratios exceeded 70%. The study repeated simulations with varying trust levels, confirming the Crying Wolf effect.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false flood warnings erode collective trust, with long-term impacts on preparedness. The studies emphasize the need for high hit rates to sustain credibility.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Post-9/11 investments in disaster warning systems increased flood alert frequency, mirroring the Texas floods issue raised in your initial query.
6. **Alarm Response in Complex Task Environments (2021-2025)**
– **Marshall et al. (2021)**: Experiments tested pilot responses to automated aircraft alarms. Repeated false alarms slowed responses by 20%, with trust declining as false positives increased. This built on earlier work by Bliss.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Turnage et al. (2025)**: A study tested alarm responses in a simulated piloting task, using the Manikin test. Repeated false alarms reduced response rates by 15-25%, with trust recovering only if true alarms followed. The study repeated trials across 10 sessions, confirming stability in the Crying Wolf effect.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false alarms in high-stakes tasks (e.g., piloting) reduce trust and response, but training can mitigate effects. The studies suggest transparency in alarm systems improves compliance.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Post-9/11 automation in security and aviation increased reliance on alarms, heightening fatigue risks.
—
### Analysis of Repeated Studies
– **Common Methodology**: Most studies used repeated experiments (lab simulations, surveys, or models) to test the effect of false alarms over time. Longitudinal surveys (e.g., Silver et al.) and multi-trial experiments (e.g., Bliss, Weyrich) ensured robust findings.
– **Consistency**: Across contexts, false alarm ratios above 50-70% consistently triggered the Crying Wolf effect, reducing compliance by 15-30%. Tornado and flood studies showed regional variations, with frequent alerts amplifying fatigue.
– **Contradictions**: Ripberger et al. (2019) found less complacency than expected, suggesting public optimism about alert accuracy can counteract fatigue. LeClerc & Joslyn (2015) also questioned the effect’s strength in low-stakes scenarios, indicating context matters.
– **Limitations**: Many studies relied on self-reported data or simulations, which may not fully capture real-world behavior. Post-9/11 studies often focused on Western populations, limiting global applicability.
### Critical Examination
The Crying Wolf effect is well-documented, but its magnitude varies. Post-9/11, the proliferation of alert systems (weather, terrorism, security) amplified fatigue, as seen in the Texas floods critique from your initial query. However, institutional factors—like vague messaging or bureaucratic overreach—often exacerbate the problem, as the Laughing Wolf article suggested. Studies rarely address socioeconomic barriers (e.g., inability to evacuate) or distrust in authorities, which can mimic fatigue. The establishment’s push for more alerts post-9/11, while well-intentioned, may have backfired by overwhelming the public, a point underexplored in the literature.
A columnist a few years back (post 9/11) wrote regarding WARNING signals in general. The writer was waiting in line at a fast-food restaurant when a deep-fry alarm went off, yet staff was busy tending other tasks as the alarm chimed on, even tho’ it WARNED adequately, it was late in being heeded.
Just as (escalator era) Trump was sold as “alarmist” or “Hitlerian” later morphing into “”literally Hitler” by the alarmist LOOK AT ME(!) media, most people were used to warnings and by then, not even quantifying the origin of the alarm itself.
All those WARNING’s of Trump’s (their words) Hitlerian tendencies have become the ones reacting to their own alarms as justification for the rise of why their violent reactions to Trump’s reasonable gov’t policies are warranted. We should be heeding the alarmed marxist-dems doing the violence and STOP it forcefully NOW. They’ve hopped on their own escalator upping their attacks on Trump Admin’s attempt to bring order back to American life.
I had Grok do a search for alert fatigue and the Crying Wolf effect post 9/11. Here is the results. I checked and all the studies are real, not AI hallucinations. I only asked for repeated studies for better accuracy. :
The “Crying Wolf” effect describes how repeated false alarms reduce the credibility of warnings, leading to decreased public response to genuine threats. Below, I summarize psychological studies on this effect, focusing on repeated studies conducted since September 11, 2001, as per your request. I’ve prioritized research that involves multiple experiments or longitudinal approaches to demonstrate repetition, drawing from web sources and critical analysis. Studies are grouped by context (e.g., weather, alarms, terrorism) to highlight recurring themes.
—
### Psychological Studies on the Crying Wolf Effect (Post-9/11, Repeated Studies)
1. **Shlomo Breznitz’s Foundational Work and Follow-Ons (1984, Extended Post-2001)**
– **Original Study (1984)**: Breznitz’s book, *Cry Wolf: The Psychology of False Alarms*, established the Crying Wolf effect through lab experiments where participants faced threatened (but canceled) painful shocks. False alarms reduced trust in the warning system, leading to slower or no responses to later alerts. This work became a cornerstone for post-9/11 research.[]()
– **Repeated Studies (Post-2001)**:
– **Bliss (2003)**: James P. Bliss at the University of Central Florida conducted experiments with 138 students performing tasks while receiving alarms of varying reliability (25%, 50%, 75% true alarms) and urgency. Repeated false alarms significantly reduced response rates, with lower reliability (25% true alarms) leading to near-total disregard. A follow-up study in 2005 confirmed these findings, showing that high task demand exacerbated the effect.[]()
– **Bliss & Dunn (2006)**: Further experiments refined the model, testing alarm criticality (low, medium, high). Repeated false alarms consistently reduced compliance, but high-criticality alarms retained slightly higher response rates, suggesting urgency can partially mitigate fatigue. These studies built directly on Breznitz’s framework, adapting it to modern alarm systems.
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false alarms erode trust, with effects persisting across contexts (e.g., lab tasks, simulated emergencies). The studies suggest that alarm reliability must exceed 50% to maintain public response.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Bliss’s work was motivated by post-9/11 concerns about alarm overload in security and disaster response systems, reflecting heightened public exposure to alerts.
2. **Tornado Warning Studies in the Southeastern U.S. (2009-2020)**
– **Simmons & Sutter (2009)**: An econometric analysis of tornado disasters found that higher false alarm ratios (FAR) correlated with increased injuries and deaths, suggesting public complacency due to repeated false warnings. This study analyzed historical data and set the stage for repeated surveys.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Jauernic & Van den Broeke (2017)**: A survey of 640 undergraduates showed that a 1% increase in perceived FAR reduced sheltering odds by nearly 1%, confirming the Crying Wolf effect. The study repeated earlier methods, using online questionnaires to assess student behavior across multiple tornado seasons.[]()
– **Ripberger et al. (2019-2020)**: Four surveys (N=4,162) in the Southeastern U.S. examined public responses to tornado alerts, where 75% of warnings are false. Contrary to expectations, participants overestimated alert accuracy, but those with higher perceived FAR were less likely to take protective actions. A 2020 follow-up refined these findings, showing that 21.3% of non-evacuees cited prior false alarms as their reason.[]()[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false tornado warnings reduce protective behaviors, though public overestimation of accuracy can mitigate complacency. The studies highlight regional differences, with Southeastern residents particularly prone to alert fatigue due to frequent warnings.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Increased weather alert frequency post-9/11, driven by improved forecasting and heightened disaster awareness, amplified the Crying Wolf effect in tornado-prone areas.
3. **Weather-Related Decision-Making Experiments (2015-2020)**
– **LeClerc & Joslyn (2015)**: A psychological experiment tested whether participants would apply salt brine to roads based on weather forecasts. Repeated false forecasts reduced compliance, but the effect was weaker than expected, suggesting some resilience to the Crying Wolf effect in low-stakes scenarios. This study challenged earlier assumptions and prompted follow-ups.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Weyrich et al. (2018-2020)**: Multiple experiments simulated evacuation decisions under varying forecast accuracies. Participants exposed to repeated false alarms were less likely to evacuate, with a “tipping point” where trust collapsed if false alarms exceeded 60%. A 2020 study extended this, incorporating neuroscience’s free energy principle to model decision-making, confirming that effort required to act (e.g., evacuation) amplifies the Crying Wolf effect.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false weather alerts reduce action, especially when compliance is effort-intensive. The studies suggest designing warnings to lower perceived effort can counteract fatigue.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Post-9/11 improvements in weather forecasting led to more frequent alerts, increasing the risk of fatigue, as seen in the Texas floods context from your initial query.
4. **Post-9/11 Terrorism and Security Alerts (2002-2013)**
– **Schlenger et al. (2002)**: A national study post-9/11 found that frequent terrorism alerts (e.g., color-coded “Orange Alerts”) led to reduced public concern, with 60% of Americans paying less attention by 2002. This was part of a longitudinal survey tracking psychological responses.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Silver et al. (2002-2006)**: A longitudinal study (N=2,189) assessed media exposure to 9/11 and subsequent alerts. Repeated vague alerts correlated with lower public vigilance, with those exposed to 4+ hours of daily 9/11-related media showing higher stress but lower response to new alerts. Follow-ups in 2006 confirmed persistent fatigue.[]()
– **Rigos et al. (2013)**: Game-theoretic experiments modeled evacuation responses to terrorism alerts. Repeated false alarms reduced compliance, with participants ignoring alerts if false positives exceeded 50%. A 2015 follow-up at Stanford refined the model, showing unannounced drills can worsen fatigue.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Frequent, vague terrorism alerts post-9/11 fostered complacency, with media overload amplifying fatigue. The studies suggest specific, credible alerts are needed to maintain trust.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: The color-coded alert system, introduced post-9/11, was a key driver of fatigue, leading to its replacement in 2011 due to public disengagement.
5. **Flood Early Warning Systems (2017-2022)**
– **Girons Lopez et al. (2017)**: A socio-hydrological model simulated flood warning responses, showing that repeated false alarms reduced preparedness. This model was tested across multiple scenarios.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **HESS (2022)**: An extended model incorporated social trust, simulating 1,000-year flood scenarios. Repeated false alarms undermined trust in flood early warning systems (FEWS), reducing evacuation rates by 30% when false alarm ratios exceeded 70%. The study repeated simulations with varying trust levels, confirming the Crying Wolf effect.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false flood warnings erode collective trust, with long-term impacts on preparedness. The studies emphasize the need for high hit rates to sustain credibility.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Post-9/11 investments in disaster warning systems increased flood alert frequency, mirroring the Texas floods issue raised in your initial query.
6. **Alarm Response in Complex Task Environments (2021-2025)**
– **Marshall et al. (2021)**: Experiments tested pilot responses to automated aircraft alarms. Repeated false alarms slowed responses by 20%, with trust declining as false positives increased. This built on earlier work by Bliss.[]()
– **Repeated Studies**:
– **Turnage et al. (2025)**: A study tested alarm responses in a simulated piloting task, using the Manikin test. Repeated false alarms reduced response rates by 15-25%, with trust recovering only if true alarms followed. The study repeated trials across 10 sessions, confirming stability in the Crying Wolf effect.[]()
– **Key Findings**: Repeated false alarms in high-stakes tasks (e.g., piloting) reduce trust and response, but training can mitigate effects. The studies suggest transparency in alarm systems improves compliance.
– **Relevance to Post-9/11**: Post-9/11 automation in security and aviation increased reliance on alarms, heightening fatigue risks.
—
### Analysis of Repeated Studies
– **Common Methodology**: Most studies used repeated experiments (lab simulations, surveys, or models) to test the effect of false alarms over time. Longitudinal surveys (e.g., Silver et al.) and multi-trial experiments (e.g., Bliss, Weyrich) ensured robust findings.
– **Consistency**: Across contexts, false alarm ratios above 50-70% consistently triggered the Crying Wolf effect, reducing compliance by 15-30%. Tornado and flood studies showed regional variations, with frequent alerts amplifying fatigue.
– **Contradictions**: Ripberger et al. (2019) found less complacency than expected, suggesting public optimism about alert accuracy can counteract fatigue. LeClerc & Joslyn (2015) also questioned the effect’s strength in low-stakes scenarios, indicating context matters.
– **Limitations**: Many studies relied on self-reported data or simulations, which may not fully capture real-world behavior. Post-9/11 studies often focused on Western populations, limiting global applicability.
### Critical Examination
The Crying Wolf effect is well-documented, but its magnitude varies. Post-9/11, the proliferation of alert systems (weather, terrorism, security) amplified fatigue, as seen in the Texas floods critique from your initial query. However, institutional factors—like vague messaging or bureaucratic overreach—often exacerbate the problem, as the Laughing Wolf article suggested. Studies rarely address socioeconomic barriers (e.g., inability to evacuate) or distrust in authorities, which can mimic fatigue. The establishment’s push for more alerts post-9/11, while well-intentioned, may have backfired by overwhelming the public, a point underexplored in the literature.
Great job Iggy! Much appreciated and adds a lot of solid food for thought to the discussion. Thank you!
Allowing any home in a flash flood zone is obviously stupid. If those sleeping locations had been on higher ground those kids would be alive today.
While I tend to agree, the question becomes 1) defining “flash flood zones”, and 2) just how extreme of a case should we use? The second one is a problem in regular flood zones – should we use the 100-year flood numbers? (That was the rule until the teens, I think.) Or should we use the 500- or 1,000-year numbers?
In this case, I think there was a similar (if not quite as drastic) flash flood 50 years ago along the Guadalupe. But 50 years is outside the memory of too many, so they press on ahead.
Good points GWB! Growing up, most places used the 100-year numbers. Then, that got tossed out the window as unrealistic, too expensive, etc. which translates to ‘our patrons can’t make enough development money unless we toss this and open up land not previously suited for development’ IMO. Note that I am NOT talking Texas hill country here, but other locations across the U.S. I would also point out that in Texas hill country, not building in a flash flood area is going to be rather difficult just because of geography and geology. The question then becomes, what is the right (and realistic) choice?
Only two things…
First, the other problem, as Iggy notes (without naming it), with all of the warnings is Safetyism. The expectation that we can remove all death and suffering and pain from the world so we can live safe, bubble-wrapped lives, with no stress or complaints. All of the other issues are true about naming storms and warning systems, but Safetyism is a big contributor.
Second, the other problem with flash flooding is the force of the water – especially the … “front”? When that hits, it’s a wave of water crashing in to whatever is in its way. And then, the speed of the water behind it sweeps away anything without deep roots. People regularly get in trouble by thinking “it’s just water, and I’m stronger than that.” And, all of what you said, too.
On the first, safetyism is always tied with nannyism, where the state rules supreme. Perfect legislation yields perfect control and perfect safety is the result. A perfect progressive dream, with no connection to reality as you point out. We need to remove layers of bubble wrap, not add to them. Good point and well said.
On the second, you are right. I will note that the wall usually is quickly a wall of debris and not just water, and that debris smashes anything in the path, from homes to bridges. And you are right, too many think they are stronger than the water, and they are wrong. Again, good point and well said.
We need to be fair to NOAA/NWS.
In 2019, the FCC under great pressure from Wall Street and the IC auctioned an alotment of 24 GHz spectrum for new 5G comms satellites (FCC Auction 102). This was done despite the fact that the US Navy, NASA and NOAA all warned both the FCC and the WH that these new 5G supporting satellites would seriously interfere with the USG constellation of weather satellites. Accuracy, timeliness and forecast ability would be seriously degraded. But the DC Lobbyists, Verizon/ATT/Tmobile and Wall Street were all beating the drum for the Valhalla of 5G and the risk of being passed by China. Forecast accuracy and advance notice HAS eroded.
How many Texans would be alive today with 45 minute of extra notice?
We’ll never know.
That problem needs to be fixed NOW! Simple answer is shut down a small part of the 5G comm satellite constellation. Longer term upgrading or replacing the weather sats is an option too. Don’t care what answer makes the most sense, but the interference and degraded weather forecasting need to stop.
Whoa! A post over at Battleswarm shows exactly what you’re talking about Wolf – the junk in the river (as well as the force and rapid rise) – in a video there. Especially as it widens out of the banks and knocks stuff down right under the observer.
(It is a looong video, over 35 minutes. But seems, so far, to have no narration, just the sound of the river as the rise is recorded.)
WOW! About 9 1/2 minutes in a tree right next to the bridge is knocked down almost on top of the guy filming. The guard rail saves him and the tree goes CRUNCH as it’s pushed under the bridge and broken apart.
At 17 minutes, there’s still people driving across this 1/4 to 1/2 mile long bridge, as the water approaches roadway height and is moving as fast as rapids that people love to raft down.
At 21 minutes it has reached the bottom of the roadway and stuff in the river is now hitting that concrete. And there’s still people driving across the bridge.
At 25 minutes, at least the trees it’s knocking down near the bridge are moving a little slower. They crunch more quietly as they hit the bridge roadway. Ironically, a surfboard goes under the bridge here.
At 29 minutes, water is splashing up onto the roadway. And people are still driving across the bridge, and slowing down to look at the flood waters. SMH. This is also where the tree growing right up against the bridge is finally being snapped in two (or more) by the force of the water. (It takes a couple of minutes.)
At 30 minutes, the water is now coming UP THROUGH the stormwater drains on the roadway (that normally let rain OFF the roadway and down into the river).
Almost 32 minutes in, it seems they are finally shutting down the bridge. Water is not quite over the roadway but it’s obviously real close. You can hear things hitting the bridge. There’s a log sticking up over the roadway (about 6-8 feet of it over the shoulder and roadway), with the water trying to fold it and stuff it under the bridge. It finally breaks the log and that 6-8 feet falls onto the roadway.
At 35 minutes, as he is being told “Get off the bridge!” the small building shows up. Yep, that’s a small house working its way along the edge of the raging floodwaters, over where the water is moving slowly but with great force. What will happen when the unstoppable object meets the unmovable object?
With half a minute left in the video, he pans back up to see the waters actually flowing over the middle of the bridge where he standing just a few minutes before. Unfortunately, the video ends with the unstoppable object stopped – wedged in between some trees and up against the bridge. Things are still crunching, but the contractors must have done a good job with that place since it doesn’t break up before the end of the video. And the waters still rage.
Yowza.
I’ve seen parts of that video, and a speeded-up version of it. It is truly terrifying to watch, at least to those who have a clue. Like you, can’t believe people continued to drive over it as flash floods like that not only attack the supports and top, but often undermine supports and the approaches. I may have been young and stupid enough to cross it at some point in my life, but I know better now. I’ve also taken some chances as a photographer, and the person shooting this was stupid. Me, I would have gotten to a side much, much sooner. Then again, I’ve come to appreciate my own mortality…
Having heard many civil alert loudspeaker/siren warning systems over the years, I wondered how a place that has such a predictable need for loud public warning alerts could fail to have one.
This post might provide the explanation: the false alarm problem is even worse when the alarm doesn’t just show up on your phone, but wakes you up in the middle of the night.
Great if it’s actually going to save your life, but really really annoying if it’s going to go off when there’s just a chance of danger.