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This morning’s post reminds me of some of the discussion in these posts, and that many are missing the real lesson of the Russia-Ukraine war: it’s the bandwidth stupid. That’s also the key to what appears to be going on in the U.S. and in Russia. In both cases, the bandwidth in terms of intelligence resources and the ability to transmit data and information is both broad and deep.
To do what appears may be happening requires several things, including competent leadership and planning. Let’s take a quick run down at what it takes to do coordinated, widely-distributed, sabotage and asymmetrical warfare.
I’m not going to sit here and play agent/operative word games that are the hallmark of the amateur. It’s bullshit to start with, as the fact is what you need are assets. Assets most likely are going to be a mix of your people (covert or even overt), locals, and others who may or may not be local per se but are resources you can use at need. Fact is, the best assets are often those who don’t realize they are an asset.
Just look at how the Soviet Union manipulated environmental and other groups not all that long ago. Masters at doing things at one or two removes, and even at pointing the finger elsewhere so that some of those being manipulated thought they were working for were someone else. The CCP is reported to be not shabby at that as well. Would we do something like that? Why, heaven’s forfend you dare make such a suggestion! *innocent blink*
The various do-good groups (environmental, justice, climate, etc.) would still appear to be easy targets of manipulation, IMO. You can do the same with ultra-nationalists of all stripes, but it’s a bit harder to put things at several removes. With the first set, the support may come from such a group in another country with strong backers, who are in turn being backed by an international group, who is funded by various NGOs and others, who in turn are being funded and controlled by yet others. NGOs are wonderful ways to isolate things, FYI.
Purely hypothetically, let’s say Inga believes passionately in her do-good cause. Bit of a natural leader, she gets selected for extra training, then participation in conferences and other leadership exercises that reinforce her beliefs, solidifies them, and expands on her natural leadership capabilities. Ingrid, on the other hand, is just as passionate as Inga but is less innocent, and it is clear she understands that peace and light may not be all that’s needed. She gets selected for other training, and then recommends a few others who also realize that sweetness and light may not be enough. Using local resources, they obtain and stockpile items that are not sweet, shall we say, that are available for those like them who have had the special training, or even by those who come in later and avoid all association with the group (it’s called deniability folks).
Other members of the group gather information related to the cause, from who’s building what and where to possible proposed legislation related to the do-good cause. All of this gets passed up the chain, where Inga and Ingrid both hear it and pass it along — up different chains. Light and dark. All hypothetical of course.
Technical means can tell you a great deal; but, to really know what’s going on, where the opportunities for psychological or other pushes are located, and other people-centric things are, you have to have HUMINT. I’ve discussed this a bit before here, here, here, here, and here. There’s more, but the fact is tech isn’t going to tell you how often Ivan sneaks out for a smoke at the ammo dump, or that Olga might be willing to drop an object where she works that (she thinks) promotes a good cause, or that John is happy to take photos of the nasty potentially polluting transformers at the power substation so that it can be used in a presentation on the evils of same before some legislators. Tech’s also not going to have Ingrid’s friends who will go do such things, and more, knowing what they are doing.
Why am I getting into this like this? If you are going to do a coordinated (even if the participants don’t realize it’s such) campaign, you have to have the human bandwidth in place. It’s why those facing the prospect of occupation need to be developing overt and covert networks NOW, not after the fact. If indeed the transformer attacks and mysterious fires in Russia are indeed planned and coordinated attacks it implies that some potentially significant HUMINT networks are in operation.
Now, let’s look at the second level of bandwidth: data and communications. Yes, you can pull a lot of information on things out via Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), but it can leave fingerprints if you are not careful. Between OSINT and your HUMINT operations in the areas of interest, you still have to get the data and local analysis back to headquarters. In the past, this was very dicey as radio transmissions were highly monitored and an unregistered broadcast could be quickly triangulated with nasty results in many countries. Getting print messages was and is very dangerous as well, even using dead drops. Even using computers to send files where information was hidden in photos, or even a period to a sentence, could be blocked or intercepted. E-messages have had to travel over local networks, allowing the chance for interception or monitoring.
There are ways to work around all that, even having to use local and other networks. However, imagine if you will using a system that allows you to contact a satellite directly, on a fairly narrow/tight signal. Your signal then bounces to another satellite, and maybe another, and then down (possibly even directly) to your intended contact. You have a greatly reduced chance of detection and interception, and if you use encryption (commercially available even) and/or code, much less chance someone can understand what you are saying.
Keep in mind that code doesn’t have to be gibberish. This post could be a code that when deciphered gives you the current stock of the wine cellar at St. Elmo’s and recommendations of what to try first. Pity it can’t create the money to go try those recommendations….
Welcome to modern satellite internet. Your system could consist of as little as a cell phone, but even a larger unit is just a small dish and a large modem. Not necessarily that hard to hide. Using care and tradecraft, a lot of information can be exchanged, and for better or for worse, extensive conversations with headquarters or other control are possible.
ASIDE: Yes, I am a bit of a cynic, and tend to think extensive communications with HQ or control are not for the best. On several levels. In fact, I’m reminded of a line from a Keith Laumer book that went along the lines of ‘Bomb Headquarters? No sir, I was suggesting we bomb the enemy, but now that you mention it…’
In this case, you have the intel coming in, analysis of it all, and then further instructions going back out. Possibly in several exchanges since you can enhance and refine with greatly reduced chance of detection. Then, orders go out to local or other assets that tell them what to do, where to get items needed, and how they are to proceed, and possibly even exfiltrate at need. At the end of which, transformers are attacked, the noisemaker dropped by Olga is instead a small but powerful incendiary device, and Ivan finds something extra in the air when he lights up.
The third and final bit of bandwidth is the command and control bandwidth. You need competent people getting, analyzing, and responding to the data. You need people who can and will think outside the box. Who can and will plan effectively, so as not to burn any assets without need. Who can create plans that also give the assets in control at the far end room to maneuver and improvise as needed (and there are never enough of that type, ever). If what we are seeing here and in Russia is indeed “enemy action” it implies a surprising amount of C&C bandwidth.
Hopefully, some good food for thought. I leave a final question for you, my readers, and for any intel or senior leadership that reads this:
If indeed the attacks on the transformers are a message, has anyone considered that they may be a mirror of the attacks on the power grid in the Ukraine?
UPDATE: A scary question, for some…